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ABSTRACT
Exploring Educators’ Decisions During the Era of New Professionalism:
Teachers and Administrators Dialoguing Together in a Performance-Based Pay School
District
by Nicholas V. Vancheri

The purpose of this action research study was to examine how teachers embedded in cultures of
accountability, performance, and rewards, attempted to maintain integrity and professionalism in
their instructional choices, with administrators as supportive partners. In addition, I aimed to
explore how teachers and administrators balance power relations while negotiating this terrain.
The research questions that guided this dissertation study were:
1. When given a supportive space for ongoing dialogue in the current era of new
professionalism and neoliberalism, how do we as teachers and administrators
describe our educational decisions while functioning in evaluation systems?
2. What kinds of actions might teachers recommend or consider taking regarding
how administrators can best support their instructional decision-making in this era
of heightened accountability?
Teacher accountability policies since 2001 have changed the landscape of education in the
United States, with a heightened emphasis on the yearly evaluation scores of educators. Hence,
this study took place within the new era of heightened accountability and rewards cultures that
prevailed in education. I conducted a participatory action research (PAR) study consisting of
eight participants (seven teachers and myself, an administrator) who met weekly in a
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professional learning community (PLC) and journaled online about these sessions, as well as
their everyday experiences. These findings add to research regarding the effects of new
professionalism on both teachers and administrators and how an in-depth look at the daily
interactions between these groups can inform future legislation and local decisions regarding
educator practice and evaluation systems.

Keywords: new professionalism, neoliberalism, instructional choices, educational
decisions, teacher evaluation, connections
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PROLOGUE: THE EXPERIENCE
I am a high school principal in an urban school district that uses two different salary
guides and offers teachers and administrators the ability to choose between them, a condition
agreed in the district’s last contract negotiations. One is a traditional guide that allows staff to
move up one step each year, as long as they are rated by their supervisors as Effective or higher
on their summative evaluations; the other is a performance-based salary guide wherein scoring
Effective moves an individual up one step and scoring Highly Effective moves him or her up two
steps.
On this crisp fall morning I am very busy. What am I doing? I am not monitoring the
number of absent teachers and ensuring appropriate classroom coverage. I am not welcoming
students into the building and encouraging them to have a great day. I am not discussing
instructional strategies and life with a first-year math teacher. On this morning, I am printing
piles and piles of actionable evidence and organizing examples of correspondence, agendas, and
professional development sessions into specific categories of the principal observation rubric—
all in preparation for the first of two observations that the district administrator who evaluates
my own performance will complete this school year.
As part of the first evaluation of my own performance this year by my immediate
supervisor, beyond examining the evidence presented in two very thick binders, the district
evaluator and I venture out to classrooms where we will complete informal teacher visitations of
five to ten minutes in length—and this information will be used by my direct evaluator to
complete the first formal evaluation of me. We are sure to visit classrooms focused on the four
major content areas (English, math, science, and social studies) and a non-core class (world
languages) during our travels. In these very brief moments, we see highly engaging instruction,
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with one exception—a tenth grade English class that was on task but transitioning from a quiz to
independent work during our brief visit. Upon receiving the completed formal evaluation from
my district evaluator, I am perturbed that my rating for “management of rigorous instructional
settings” dropped two slots from Exemplary during my last observation to Proficient I—all
because five of the twenty-five minutes of classroom visitations were not considered “rigorous
and engaging enough.”
Down the hall, I see a social studies teacher who I rated Highly Effective in the past
school year. In working with him, I have considered him a knowledgeable and engaging
instructor. Despite that, my own views and anecdotal evidence are considered irrelevant in his
rating. Instead, I can only rate him Highly Effective based on the composite of his performance
while being formally observed (during two, twenty-minute lessons) and the progress of his
students from pre- to post-assessments (which he created, administered, and graded). By being
rated Highly Effective, this teacher will move up two steps on the district’s salary guide, simply
because during the equivalent of one class period, he scored at the highest levels on the
observation rubric. By contrast, in the next door classroom, a teacher with what in my views is of
the same instructional prowess may have had two poor performances on his or her observation
days and is now rated Ineffective, placed on a Corrective Action Plan (CAP), stuck on the same
salary guide step, and may have his or her livelihood taken away after another, similar year.
Moving along through the school, I run into Teacher A, one of my favorite and strongest
math teachers. However, these days I never look forward to the post-observation conferences
with her, as they typically go beyond the designated time allotted and involve a protracted
discussion of every single instructional indicator not rated as Exemplary, of the sixty-three
assessed. Although this teacher is interested in improving her practice, in post-observation
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conferences her focus seems purely on how she can reach Exemplary in every category on the
observation rubric, which would qualify her for a Highly Effective rating and a performancebased salary increase of two steps.
Upon receiving her written observation and score, Teacher A uses the three to five days
in between receipt of the final observation and our post-conference to gather evidence to argue
for higher marks in each area. For example, when we discussed technology integration in the
instructional delivery standard of the rubric during one post-observation conference, she spent
twenty minutes arguing that she should have received an Exemplary rating rather than the
Proficient II I assigned to her (two spots higher on the rubric). Based on the language in the
rubric, I assessed her as Proficient II because she had implemented technology (e.g., power
points and interactive games into her lesson). To be considered Proficient III or Exemplary, she
needed to implement data management systems or offer opportunities for students to access
materials and discuss math online (e.g., Google Classroom). After making my case for why she
deserved a Proficient II rating, I had to listen to her argument for why she considered herself
Exemplary. I reiterated why she deserved a Proficient II and explained how to improve this score
for the next observation. This left us with twenty minutes to discuss the other thirteen indicators
she wanted me to consider adjusting. At this moment, I felt useless, as my instructional leader
role was pushed aside by my role as an evaluator defending score allocations.
In contrast, during a post-observation conference with another math teacher, who is NOT
on the performance-based salary guide, the discussion takes a different direction. After telling
Teacher B that based on my assessment of her teaching, she was performing well as the score
indicated and would move up to the next step on the salary guide [and was not in danger of
being placed on a CAP] we went on to discuss many of the same indicators I reviewed in the
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post-observation conference with Teacher A. However, this post-observation conference
proceeded as a constructive conversation; we discussed ways she could improve her classroom
performance. Instead of focusing on the quantifiable performance indicated by her score, we
discussed her overall work as a classroom teacher.
Prologue: Situating the Experience
This is the reality of the new era of heightened accountability and rewards cultures that
currently prevail in education—an era in which five minutes in one day of 180 school days of
instruction is used as evidence to characterize a school and individual teachers in it as lacking
rigor and student engagement, and a mere two observations determine fates and finances. This is
especially troubling when educators believe that the best indicator of our performance is the
unremarkable and everyday events of our routine (Tripp, 2012). I explained many times to the
school staff (especially Teacher A) that the best way to meet the indicators in the new
observation rubric and obtain performance-based pay is to teach, and reflect on and discuss their
teaching with me just as we did prior to the days of heightened accountability. It is during these
tense times of heightened accountability, when ratings on indicators in a rubric take precedence
over a simple conversation on what works and does not work in the classroom, when I realize
that something needs to be done to protect the integrity of our profession and its inherent
collegiality. With accountability standards and surveillance monitoring becoming more and more
the norm in education, it is our duty to move beyond this (new) way of looking at things and
examine the ways in which this shift has become problematic (Tripp, 2012). After all, if we lose
control over decision-making in our profession, those who are pushing accountability standards
and surveillance culture monitoring will control us (Tripp, 2012).
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As a public school administrator, I have evaluated teachers both before and during this
new era of heightened accountability. During my informal and formal observations of teachers, I
gathered much anecdotal information that shows a change in teachers’ instructional choices, as
well as society’s perceptions of the profession (Evetts, 2011; Jabbar, 2013; Ward, 2007;
Zeichner, 2010). I witnessed teachers placing the edicts of larger policy-makers at the forefront
of their instructional decisions, ahead of their own teaching expertise (Evetts, 2011; Jabbar,
2013; Ward, 2007; Zeichner, 2010). In addition, I noticed teachers and administrators make
decisions geared more towards obtaining extrinsic rewards such as performance-based pay,
regardless of the potential effects on student outcomes. I also observed the vilification of
teachers amplified in the past decade, as society blames the money allocated to teachers’ salaries,
health benefits, and pensions, along with the presence of strong unions, for its own financial
struggles (Ball & Olmedo, 2013; Evetts, 2011; Giroux, 2002; Harvey, 2005; Jabbar, 2013; Ward,
2007; Zeichner, 2010).
According to Murnane and Cohen (1986), an emphasis on meeting individual goals over
the greater community good is a common consequence of performance-based pay systems and
new professionalism as a whole. This raises the question of whether the focus of Teacher A on
her evaluation ratings and the chance to obtain additional compensation via performance-based
pay criteria, as described above, causes her to negotiate instructional decisions with the demands
of accountability systems and rewards culture. Along related lines, if the opportunity to obtain
performance-based pay and the demands of the current system improve her teaching, is this not a
positive effect for all stakeholders involved, particularly students? And, when we speak of
improving teaching performance, are we referring to the “quantifiable scores” that teachers
obtain in classroom observation events or to the work they engage in routinely with their
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students over a school year, which goes by unquantified? Additionally, how do we as a
community of administrators and teachers move away from mini-trials/judge and jury dynamics
to work within these systems in ways that are generative for educators?
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
Teacher accountability policies promoted by the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB) of
2001 have changed the landscape of education in the United States (Springer et al., 2012). Many
scholars and educators believe that formalizing teacher accountability, as NCLB did, will
produce improvements in students’ standardized test scores and college/career readiness
(Harvey, 2014; Murnane & Steele, 2007; Rice, et al., 2015). Some scholars contend that the new
accountability policies and evaluation tools make it possible for educational administrators to
remove from the classroom those teachers found to be performing at “unsatisfactory” or only
“partially effective” levels and ultimately provide students with only “effective and highly
effective” teachers (Springer, et al., 2012). In this early transition from the previous inconsistent
system of teacher evaluations, which relied on subjective observations of the teachers’ classroom
performance by administrators, to the formalized system of teacher accountability that combines
criteria-based observations (e.g., Danielson’s Framework for Teaching and Stronge’s Teacher
Effectiveness Performance Evaluation System) and student growth and/or performance on
standardized assessments (e.g., Partnership for Assessment and Readiness for College and
Careers—PARCC), researchers and educators are giving just as much attention to teacher
retention rates (especially in critical need areas such as math and science) as to student
achievement results (Springer, et al., 2012). Some scholars worry, that the perennial struggle
inner city, low-income school districts experience in recruiting and retaining teachers may
actually become exacerbated by the intense pressure and scrutiny that formalized accountability
policies have placed on teachers, which, in turn, could lead to burnout and higher turnover rates
than in the past (Firestone, 2014; Harvey, 2014; Liang & Akiba, 2015; Springer, et al., 2012). As
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this suggests, the new teacher accountability policies and systems have both supporters and
critics.
It is important for all stakeholders to discuss and support the everyday instructional
decisions of teachers during this era of heightened accountability. As adults, today’s United
States K-12 students are likely to be competing with students from other countries for jobs that
may not currently exist, all while the country deals with teacher shortages and promotes
increased standards for academic performance (Dee & Wyckoff, 2013; Firestone, 2014;
Goldhaber, et al., 2008; Goldhaber, 2009; Ingersoll, 2007; Johnson & Papay, 2009; Lavy, 2007).
I maintain it is beneficial to the field of education for administrators and teachers to discuss their
everyday instructional decisions while operating within accountability systems and within a
rewards culture. It is important for educators, while operating in a profession where day-to-day
responsibilities potentially push us into silos, to speak with both peers and superiors to remember
that we are dealing with similar circumstances and not operating alone. By everyday
instructional decisions, I refer to pedagogical choices teachers make that have implications for
not only student learning but also their own personal and financial well-being. Through coming
together in a non-evaluative and supportive setting, it was my hope that the teachers I supervised
could brainstorm, discuss, and negotiate with me tensions that arose when making instructional
choices, even within this culture of heightened accountability. I wanted to continue to build
educator capacity in this setting through growth-fostering relationships, open and honest
dialogue, and healthy connections (Freedberg, 2007; Jordan, 2000a, 2000b, 2008; Miller, 2010a;
Raider-Roth, 2017). Because I saw this as essential to professional practice, I was interested in
developing and testing out ways in which administrators can support teachers’ growth in this
culture. In keeping with these ideas, I argue that the study will broaden and enrich the field of
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education and administrator-teacher relationships by providing a glimpse into how educators can
succeed professionally and personally, support their students, and maintain healthy connections
with administrators, all while working within systems of heightened accountability.
Problem Addressed in the Study
Based on the logic that both teachers’ instructional practices and students’ standardized
test scores will improve as a result of new federal and state accountability policies, school
districts (particularly those in low-income, inner cities) have been pressured into adopting formal
evaluations systems (Firestone, 2014; Goldhaber, 2008; Ingersoll, 2007; Murnane & Steele,
2007). In addition, in school districts throughout the United States, performance-based pay
incentives have become a centerpiece of these formal teacher evaluation systems (Firestone,
2014; Goldhaber, 2008; Ingersoll, 2007; Murnane & Steele, 2007).
The current state of education has given more credence to instructional check-ins,
performance evaluations, and prescribed usage of our time. Therefore, at the heart of my
research interests was a yearning to provide teachers with a voice and much needed support
within these contexts, especially during this era of heightened accountability where neoliberalism
and new professionalism have changed the profession. By heightened accountability, I refer to
the current situation in education where formal evaluation systems, which produce quantifiable
scores to rate and sort teachers, are at the forefront of virtually all decision-making.
Neoliberalism, as defined by David Harvey (2005), is the “intensification of the influence and
dominance of capital; it is the elevation of capitalism, as a mode of production, into an ethic, a
set of political imperatives, and a cultural logic” (p. 23). New professionalism is a movement
which takes aim at teacher knowledge, dedication, and statuses, in an attempt to deprofessionalize and erode the dignity of educators (Evetts, 2011; Jabbar, 2013; Ward, 2007;

EXPLORING EDUCATORS’ DECISIONS

21

Zeichner, 2010). The neoliberal and new professionalism movements are geared towards
streamlining the work of teachers and quantifying their production. In addition, the current
economic, political, and educational climate continues to push for more accountability at every
level (Zeichner, 2010). In this context, educators must find ways to build capacity, recognize
opportunities, and reframe the profession rather than let surveillance culture affect their
instructional decisions (Ward, 2007; Zeichner, 2010), as they attempt to maintain their sense of
professionalism and provide their students with the best opportunities to succeed. My initial
interest in the potential effects of performance-based pay incentives on teachers’ instructional
decisions morphed into a larger exploration of how neoliberalism and new professionalism—
with performance-based pay serving as one tool utilized by proponents of these
agendas/movements—affected us as professionals. It was my goal to bring professional
educators to the table to identify the tensions in teaching in an era of high-stakes accountability
and how we, together, might consider these demands but also hold ourselves to the ambitious
purpose of quality teaching and education.
Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this study is to examine how teachers embedded in cultures of
accountability, performance, and rewards, attempt to maintain integrity and professionalism in
their instructional choices, with administrators as supportive partners. In addition, I aim to
explore how teachers and administrators balance power relations while negotiating this terrain.
Consistent with this purpose, the research questions that guided this dissertation study were:
1. When given a supportive space for ongoing dialogue in the current era of new
professionalism and neoliberalism, how do we as teachers and administrators
describe our educational decisions while functioning in evaluation systems?
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2. What kinds of actions might teachers recommend or consider taking regarding
how administrators can best support their instructional decision-making in this era
of heightened accountability?”
Significance of the Study
Current literature on heightened accountability, neoliberalism, new professionalism,
value-added models, and performativity, which I review in Chapter 2, suggests/shows that the
teaching profession has been negatively affected by these developments (Ball, 2003, 2016;
Evetts, 2009, 2011; Zeichner, 2010). In addition, current empirical research on performancebased pay, which I also review later in Chapter 2, is mostly concerned with possible correlations
between its implementation and teacher retention and student achievement (Rice & Malen, 2017;
Springer, 2009; Stedman & McCallion, 2001). As performance assessment becomes further
integrated into everyday practices in schools, it is important to examine how teachers attempt to
remain true to their professional convictions while balancing the requirements and tensions of
this era of heightened accountability and new professionalism. It is also critically important that
we explore the effects of this balancing act, along with accountability policies and regulations,
on teacher-administrator relationships, since it is possible that disconnection amongst teachers
and administrators can hinder student growth. Educational researchers need to ascertain the
effects of neoliberal policies and attitudes towards teachers in the current era of new
professionalism since our efforts to merely survive within the profession could damage both the
profession and our students. Along related lines, the field needs to identify and understand if/how
administrators can support and encourage thoughtful practices and good instruction while
teachers operate in systems of heightened accountability.
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This study provides a window into the on-the-ground efforts of teachers and
administrators working together to navigate the terrain of a heightened accountability system
through dialogue. Studying the instructional decisions teachers made and the support and
encouragement they received from administrators, like myself, will generate insights that might
enable educators to collectively navigate new professionalism and neoliberalism in ways that
retain the broader aims of education. The study might also serve as a data source for other
researchers interested in learning about how teachers and administrators continue to draw on
their expertise and professional judgment when making instructional decisions, despite
legislation and rewards meant to create an educational climate informed by a worker-producer
and top-down leadership model (Ball & Olmedo, 2013; Evetts, 2011; Giroux, 2002; Harvey,
2005; Jabbar, 2013; Ward, 2007; Zeichner, 2010). Information gained from this study has the
potential to provide all stakeholders in education with new knowledge that may be pivotal in the
implementation of accountability policies that support teachers while still holding them to high
standards. My findings contribute to the knowledge base of the daily decision-making of teachers
and how teachers and administrators can navigate our educational terrain in a mutually
empowering way.
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CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW
Over the past few decades, the U.S. has undergone an economic transformation from a
previous focus on manufacturing of goods to a current focus on information and services (Dee &
Wyckoff, 2013; Lavy, 2007; Johnson, 2012; Murnane & Steele, 2007). This economic shift
directed considerable attention to the quality of the education system, and especially teachers,
who are now considered key players in producing workers for the new knowledge economy
(Evetts, 2011; Jabbar, 2013; Kallio & Kallio, 2012; Ward, 2007). Because current knowledge
work requires more demanding intellectual skills than that previously needed by manual
laborers, the poor performance of US students on international tests has become a perennial topic
of discussion and an issue of public concern (Cochran-Smith & Villegas, 2015; Dee & Wyckoff,
2013). The struggles of US students relative to their counterparts in other developed nations, as
reflected in standardized test scores, is a source of concern for many who fear that the U.S. has
lost the economic advantage it once held in the world (Cochran-Smith & Villegas, 2015; Dee &
Wyckoff, 2013). This fear of losing ground to other nations has placed considerable pressure on
schools and teachers to better prepare students for the global workforce and has crowded out
other educational aims (Cochran-Smith & Lytle, 1999; Murnane & Steele, 2007). The concern
that US educators are not doing enough to prepare students for the global workforce has led
policy-makers to gradually pull back creative control over instruction from teachers (Cohen,
2014; Evetts, 2011; Kallio & Kallio, 2012; Ward, 2007).
The push to mesh education and market practices tightly together undermines the
integrity of the teaching profession—that is, the ability of professional teachers to make
instructional decisions that build on students’ strengths while stretching learners beyond what
they already know and can do well. A crucial element in providing all students, regardless of
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their backgrounds, with equitable access to an education is giving teachers power over the
educational decisions they make and trusting their professional judgment. (Villegas & Lucas,
2002). After all, it is teachers—not policy-makers—who know their students best. As such, they
can make instructional decisions that build on learners’ strengths while addressing their needs.
As this suggests, professional teachers have their students’ best interests at heart and see it as
their moral obligation to do right by them (Villegas & Lucas, 2002).
Unfortunately, current trends in teacher evaluation do not support this notion of teacher
autonomy over instructional decisions. Instead, market-driven principles push educators away
from the intrinsic motivation of doing right by their students and in the direction of extrinsic
rewards, such as performance-based pay.
To give a clear understanding of the current state of education, particularly as it is evident
in the setting in which this study was conducted, this chapter reviews the literature on
neoliberalism, new professionalism, and performance-based pay—all central ideas in this
dissertation study. I served as a school principal before and during the implementation of
systems of accountability and noticed a change in education during this time, particularly due to
the policies and processes developed around these central topics.
Neoliberalism and The Performativity Push
Making sense of current efforts in school reform becomes possible once the influence of
neoliberal ideology is recognized in the specifics of the reforms themselves. Unsurprisingly, the
push toward heightened accountability and top-down practices prevalent in the business sector
(for example, being on time and being held to production outcomes) now permeates education
and plays its part in creating an obedient society (Cochran-Smith, 2001). However, the rise of
neoliberalism has thrust the additional element of sorting and quantifying educators into this

EXPLORING EDUCATORS’ DECISIONS

26

process. Neoliberalism, quite simply, is based on market-orientated reforms. Neoliberalism has
had a dramatic effect on education during the past two decades, as the market mentality now
prevalent in educational systems is becoming the ultimate criterion of success or failure in our
schools. Whereas the mission of public education once was to develop a strong workforce, while
molding the minds of tomorrow’s leaders, it has now shifted to a push to simplify and stratify a
complex profession (Zeichner, 2010).
The 1980s saw the rise of neoliberal governments, through the elections of Margaret
Thatcher as Prime Minister of the United Kingdom in 1979 and Ronald Reagan as President of
the United States in 1980 (Ward, 2007; Zeichner, 2010). Consistent with the neoliberal agenda,
attempts were made to deregulate the private sector and regulate the public sector (Ward, 2007;
Zeichner, 2010). The first example of attempts to bring public entities into the private sphere via
regulation was a renewed focus on the U.S. public schools system by the Reagan Administration
(Ward, 2007; Zeichner, 2010). Although the federal government focused attention on the state of
the U.S. public schools throughout the 20th Century, particularly in the aftermath of the USSR’s
launch of Sputnik in 1957, it was the release of A Nation At Risk in 1983 (National Commission
on Excellence in Education, 1983) that began the neoliberal push for heightened accountability
in schools. Interestingly, earlier accountability systems either failed or were unsustainable for a
variety of reasons, including firm opposition from teachers’ unions, issues with procedures and
implementation, lack of money, and the lack of objective and consistent evaluation systems (Dee
& Wyckoff, 2013; Firestone, 2014; Goldhaber, et al., 2008; Johnson & Papay, 2009; Lavy, 2007;
Springer, 2009; Stedman & McCallion, 2001). However, since the authorization of NCLB in
2001, followed by Race to the Top (RTTP) in 2009, the implementation of the Common Core,
standardized tests such as PARCC, and the Every Student Succeeds Act (ESSA) in 2016,

EXPLORING EDUCATORS’ DECISIONS

27

systems of heightened accountability were reborn and are now considered by many as the
prominent way to improve teacher quality (Dee & Wyckoff, 2013; Ingersoll, 2007; Lavy, 2007).
NCLB was initially viewed as a victory regarding equity demands as it required states to
report out the academic achievement information needed to prove achievement gaps (US
Department of Education, 2006). In addition, NCLB required schools to take responsibility for
ensuring every child was learning and provided extra help and resources to poorer schools with
larger African-American and Hispanic populations (US Department of Education, 2006).
However, over time, the initial good that came out of NCLB was replaced by the heightened
performance and rewards cultures which began to hinder those individuals it initially intended to
help (Dee & Wyckoff, 2013; Ingersoll, 2007; Lavy, 2007; Zeichner, 2010).
This new era of heightened accountability and rewards culture is a product of
microeconomic and capitalist production process theories, where individuals are expected to be
judged by their outputs (Evetts, 2011; Jabbar, 2013; Kallio & Kallio, 2012; Ward, 2007). The
idea of management by results is assumed to encourage effective work, particularly when
additional compensation is used to increase educators’ motivation (Dee & Wyckoff, 2013; Kallio
& Kallio, 2012). This thinking has created a new environment in which everyday successes are
pushed aside in favor of the standardization and formal inspection of both educators and students
(Evetts, 2011; Jabbar, 2013; Kallio & Kallio, 2012; Ward, 2007)
According to Springer et al. (2012), teachers have been domesticated by these new
systems, perpetuating their role as semi-skilled workers and promoting a type of teaching that
will produce more obedient and semi-skilled workers. In conjunction with the aforementioned
economic transformation, teacher accountability policies promoted by the No Child Left Behind
Act of 2001 have changed the landscape of education in the U.S. (Springer et al., 2012). Many
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scholars and educators believed that formalizing teacher accountability, as NCLB did, would
produce improvements in students’ standardized test scores and college/career readiness
(Harvey, 2014; Murnane & Steele, 2007; Rice, et al., 2015). According to Springer, et al. (2012)
and Firestone (2014), new accountability policies and evaluation tools have made it possible for
educational administrators to remove from the classroom those teachers found to be performing
at unsatisfactory or only partially effective levels based on the idea that doing so provides
students with only the best teachers.
There are, however, scholars who critiqued this new way of thinking. First and foremost,
opponents argued that teaching is too complex to quantify a teacher’s performance and base pay
on student achievement results and yearly evaluation scores (Firestone, 2014; Goldhaber, 2009;
Johnson, 2012; Lavy, 2007; Murnane & Cohen, 1986; Springer et. al., 2012; Stedman &
McCallion, 2001). Opponents also argued that teaching is inherently a profession for those who
are intrinsically motivated to teach students and that using extrinsic rewards to motivate teachers
would likely be counterproductive because it would shift the focus of attention from their
students’ needs to their own personal needs (Firestone, 2014; Goldhaber, 2009; Johnson, 2012;
Lavy, 2007; Springer et. al., 2012; Stedman & McCallion, 2001). For most educators, the idea
that their needs could conflict with the needs of their students is troublesome, as the prevailing
idea is that educators make decisions in the best interests of students.
In this early transition from the previous system of teacher evaluations, which relied on
subjective observations of the teachers’ classroom performance by administrators, to the
formalized system of teacher accountability and surveillance that combines criteria-based
observations (e.g., Danielson’s Framework for Teaching and Stronge’s Teacher Effectiveness
Performance Evaluation System) and student growth and/or performance on standardized
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assessments (e.g., PARCC), researchers and educators are giving just as much attention to
teacher retention rates (especially in critical need areas such as math and science) as to student
achievement results (Springer, et al., 2012). Some scholars worried that the perennial struggle
inner city, low-income school districts experience in recruiting and retaining teachers may
become exacerbated by the intense pressure and scrutiny that formalized accountability policies
placed on teachers, which, in turn, could lead to burnout and higher turnover rates than in the
past (Firestone, 2014; Harvey, 2014; Liang & Akiba, 2015; Springer, et al., 2012).
Within the neoliberal push to codify schools and formalize the observation process
evaluation systems encompassing value-added models, or VAM, started to sprout up throughout
the U.S., beginning in the 1990s (Braun, 2005). VAM are statistics that measure test score gains
by students over a period of time (Braun, 2005). The use of VAM in U.S. schools is attributed to
the research of William Sanders (Braun, 2005). By his creation of the Tennessee Value-Added
Assessment System (TVAAS), Sanders provided a method to measure a district, school, and
teacher’s effect on student performance by tracking the progress of students against themselves
over periods of time (Sanders & Horn, 1998; Sanders & Rivers, 1996; Sanders, et al., 1997).
Sanders postulated that teacher effectiveness, regardless of other factors surrounding a child’s
education (for example, school environment), was the number one factor in student academic
growth and that VAM could accurately measure this effectiveness (Sanders & Horn, 1998;
Sanders & Rivers, 1996; Sanders, et al., 1997). Consequently, the statistics produced by VAM
have been used by school districts to distinguish teachers based on their effectiveness in
producing students’ growth, as measured by standardized tests (Atteberry & Mangan, 2020).
This study took place at a school site where VAM was not factored into the yearly evaluations of
participants. However, VAM-inspired elements such as those that attempt to measure the impact
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of educators on student growth on locally-administered assessments, were factored into the final
evaluation scores of educators at the study site. Therefore, it is important to acknowledge VAM
and how it paved the way for the models used at the study site, which I will describe in further
detail in the chapter to follow.
While proponents of neoliberalism, such as Dee and Wyckoff (2013), focused on
accountability as a means to improve teacher quality and, in turn, student achievement,
opponents were concerned that neoliberal ideology is penetrating political and social institutions,
such as education, and promoting capitalist ideology (Ball & Olmedo, 2013; Harvey, 2005).
Opponents of the neoliberal push into education feared that the implementation of economic
measures into education, rather than supporting the knowledge and expertise of current staff,
would erode the personal connections between all stakeholders (Ball & Olmedo, 2013; Harvey,
2005). Accordingly, proponents of neoliberal systems and policies looked to the private sector as
an untapped skilled labor force able to assist struggling schools (Hess, 2002). This is
accomplished by the infusing of skilled experts into school settings (Hess, 2002). Opponents, on
the other hand, argued that this push to deregulate the private sector while privatizing the public
sector is part of an overall campaign to change what is considered to be part of the public good,
de-unionize the labor force, and cut social services (Ball & Olmedo, 2013; Giroux, 2002;
Harvey, 2005).
Hess (2002) postulated that merging the private sector with the public sector is all about
doing what is in the best interest of students while opponents maintained that the ultimate goal of
this neoliberal penetration is for a free market exchange to guide all human action and replace
the previously held, core beliefs of particular institutions such as education (Ball & Olmedo,
2013; Harvey, 2005). This new regime of truth forces teachers, when planning and implementing
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lessons, to factor in systems and policies that make them responsible for their own performance
and the performance of others (Ball & Olmedo, 2013). Unfortunately, in a profession that is too
complex to make high leverage decisions based on glimpses in time such as observations, this
new regime of truth does a disservice to the overall body of educators’ work (Dee & Wyckoff,
2013; Firestone, 2014; Goldhaber, 2009; Johnson, 2012; Lavy, 2007; Murnane & Cohen, 1986;
Springer et. al., 2012; Stedman & McCallion, 2001). In the neoliberal paradigm, education
cannot meet the needs of its students unless teachers are held accountable for their performance
and administrators are held accountable for the work of their teachers in particular measurable
ways.
Although current empirical research highlights the effectiveness of accountability
systems and performance-based pay on student outcomes (Ball 2003, 2016), it ignores the
unintended outcomes and effects on the intrinsic motivation, instructional performance, and
overall psyche of teachers (for example, teachers manipulating the system or leaving the
profession due to stress; Jabbar, 2013). Moreover, it should be noted that even the economic
literature, which has been used to create educational policy, acknowledges that accountability
systems are highly problematic to implement in “knowledge-intensive areas” such as education,
mainly due to the complete lack of control of variables such as a student’s home-life, the
imperfections and/or cultural bias inherent in standardized tests, and the overall inability to
choose one’s client (the student; Kallio & Kallio, 2012).
By the same token, proponents of neoliberalism utilize a bottom-line economic rationality
which focuses on improvements in productivity, customer service, organizational de-evolution,
and market style incentives (Ward, 2007). In addition, these economists postulate that a lack of
success in a particular profession is due to workers not working hard enough or lacking the
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necessary capacity and/or knowledge to do their work effectively (Jabbar, 2013). From a
neoliberal point of view, an underperforming teacher should be penalized and or removed from
the profession because teaching is not considered a complex task like the work in other
professions, such as medicine (Jabbar, 2013).
The neoliberal movement runs counter to the idea of treating teachers as professionals, as
well as informed perspectives on teacher decision-making. Proponents of neoliberalism, in their
attempts to close the achievement gap, espouse a one-size-fits all approach to teaching where
educators are provided with a script to transmit to students and they, in turn, can be rated and
sorted based on quantifiable data. What this philosophical framework does not take into account
is that: 1) teaching needs to be contextualized; and, 2) teachers are successful when they are
supported as professionals. For example, neoliberalism does not account for the significant
attention needed to be given to the effects of the policies on contexts of practice, as well as the
evolution of teachers as professionals (Talbot & McLaughlin, 2002; Schoenfeld, 1998).
Moreover, neoliberalism fails to recognize flexibility in teachers’ instructional decisions and an
appreciation of diverse contexts (Darling-Hammond & Snyder, 1999). In addition, since the need
to close the achievement gap has codified instructional and curricular practices, teachers are
beginning to exercise less professional judgment and are no longer tapping into their repertoires
like they were in the past, when great strides were made to shift education from a transmission
model to one of meaning-making (Cochran-Smith & Villegas, 2015; Florio-Ruane, 2002).
Consequently, the neoliberal push to recreate the public sector of education into the private
sector has afforded schools less and less self-governance and, in turn, further degrade the
teaching profession (Ingersoll & Collins, 2018).
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With fewer opportunities to own decisions, educators have been stymied in their efforts to
deepen, refine, and extend their subject matter and instructional practices over time; therefore,
they become less like professionals and more like purveyors of content (Feiman-Nemser, 2001).
And this is a disservice to the profession as some researchers have postulated that the strongest
positive effects in education are tied to teachers’ authority, autonomy, and decision-making
influence (Ingersoll & Collins, 2018; National Commission on Teaching America’s Future,
1996).
All things considered, there is very little sympathy for educators from the neoliberal
perspective. Historically, teaching has been treated as a public entity separate from the private
sector (Ward, 2007). Neoliberal policies, however, have attempted to bring teachers back into the
political and economic arena by shifting teaching and learning from a state regulated profession
to a federal and market driven profession (Ball & Olmedo, 2013; Ward, 2007). This shift in the
field has advanced the idea that the self-interest of educators and the lack of an objective system
for monitoring their performance have hindered student achievement; therefore, in the spirit of
promoting the public interest of the U.S., it behooves educators to standardize education like the
private sector (Evetts, 2011). As Ward stated in 2007, unmanaged professionals are a risk and, to
neoliberals, teachers should be characterized as unmanaged professionals. From the neoliberal
perspective, unmanaged educators, making unsupervised decisions, are a detriment to the
potential success of their students (especially in less privileged schools), as they are not
following the protocols and procedures assigned to all educators by knowledgeable decisionmakers. However, some researchers demonstrated that teachers, as the real experts in their craft
who have a genuine interest in their work, should not have their creativity and work interfered
with, for fear of decreasing their intrinsic motivation (Kallio & Kallio, 2012).
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The Performativity Push
Within the push to infuse neoliberal ideology into the teaching profession comes the push
to monitor, inspect, quantify, and sort educators. And this is where the idea of performativity
becomes a critical element within the neoliberal infiltration into education. Performativity, as
defined by Ball (2003), consists of the regulations (for example, rewards and sanctions) used to
employ judgment, comparisons, and displays as a means of incentive, control, and change. These
systems are considered the “new common sense” as they appear logical and desirable (Ball &
Olmedo, 2012, p. 89). In a system of performativity, the goal is to summarize the quality or value
of an individual, group, or organization (Ball, 2003; Elliot, 2001; Shamir, 2008; Sikes, 2001;
Thomson, et al., 2014) and codified expectations that the district distinguish teachers based on
effectiveness (Atterby & Mangan, 2020). And, typically, these summarized performances
measure productivity through output displays of quality and/or moments on inspection (Ball,
2003). For example, educator success is predicated more on meeting compliance requirements
than on how they improve their instructional practice (Atterby & Mangan, 2020; Raider-Roth,
2017; Sleeter, 2014). Moreover, systems of performativity are not just systems used to manage
performance or rate indicators; rather, these systems have been enacted to quantify complex and
powerful work, decisions, and relations (Ball, 2003, 2016). In a way, systems of performativity
are pre-empting judgment and displacing it to external drivers (Ball, 2003; Elliot, 2001; Shamir,
2008; Sikes, 2001; Thomson, et al., 2014). And, in the end, although educators are quantified and
sorted now more than ever before by these systems, we continue to lack the answers to the bigger
questions in schools, such as how to define teacher quality (Paige & Amrein-Beardsley, 2020;
Weiner, 2020).
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For educators operating within systems of performativity, more time is spent reporting on
what they are doing than actually doing the real work (Ball, 2016). So much energy is consumed
to meet the controls of the system via “enacting fantasy lessons” and the “staging of educational
processes” that the humanity of the profession is lost in the insecurity of endless judgment and
the performances become the center of competent pedagogical action (Ball, 2003). The true
reality for educators readily becomes the enactment of socially prepared possibilities for action
(Weiner, 2020). What has happened in education is that documenting and defending our work
has begun to take precedence over our actual work, as we now have the need (and directive) to
replace our knowledge and expertise with meeting socially constructed goals and requirements.
Opponents of performance systems claimed that “performance has no room for caring”
(Ball, 2003, p.224), quantifiable value, such as student standardized test scores, displaces
everyday events of value, such as helping a struggling student improve incrementally (Peters,
2001), experience means nothing (Ball, 2003), and professional judgment is the enemy of the
system (Ball, 2016). Ball (2016) even goes as far as saying that systems of performativity are
reducing humanity by assigning quantifiable scores to educators and the battles against it are
struggles for the soul of teaching. Proponents argued that, like the neoliberal movement, the
ability to quantify educators and remove those who are ineffective deregulates the profession,
opening doors for others who may have been shut out in the past (Ball, 2003; Elliot, 2001;
Shamir, 2008; Sikes, 2001; Thomson, et al., 2014). In addition, the supposed freedom and
cleanness of data allows managers to make solid decisions regarding staffing and put the best
people in positions to improve student performance (Ball, 2003; Elliot, 2001; Shamir, 2008;
Sikes, 2001). Opponents countered the above-points by stating that, rather than deregulation, a
system of “re-regulation” is in place, as regimentation has replaced authenticity (Ball, 2003). By
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re-regulation, Ball (2003) believes that deregulation of education, under the guise of opening up
the profession to other, capable outsiders, is actually meant to reshape what we value in and how
we assess education. Along the same lines, opponents of performativity systems also believe that
managers within the system, although labeled by neoliberals as the new heroes of educational
reform, are really the technicians of the larger transformation occurring in our schools (Ball,
2003; Elliot, 2001; Shamir, 2008; Sikes, 2001;). The best example of the change in the role of
managers is by exploring the change in feedback given to the educators they supervise as
feedback shifts within these systems from dialogue about instruction to hard evidence and
numbers (Ball & Olmedo, 2012).
Theorists have also espoused that performativity not only encompasses the vehicles for
strategic change of educators but, rather, it also contains the mechanism to reform (Ball, 2016;
Zeichner, 2010). These pressures are pushed into the daily work of educators by compelling
them to meet the new controls of the system and, in turn, developing an inauthenticity of our
practice and relationships (Ball, 2003). For example, the previous authenticity of an educational
decision or interaction with a student/colleague/superior has been gradually replaced by
inauthentic decisions and practices made to meet the requirements of an evaluation rubric. This
struggle with doubt and fear also thrusts educators into developing new views of ourselves,
devoid of our daily work and interactions with students, and now based mostly on the value of
our productivity established by classroom observation and evaluation scores (Ball, 2003, 2016).
Lastly, systems of performativity give birth to some of the resistance on the part of
teachers evident in classrooms currently (Ball & Olmedo, 2012). Drawing on the work of
Foucault (1982), Ball and Olmedo (2012) describe how, as practices change and educators
become aware of these changes through the lens of performativity, teachers adopt practices of
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resistance to bring to light fundamental changes in power relations taking shape in educational
settings. As educators struggle to continue defining what they are doing and fear what they are
becoming, the fundamental challenge becomes what to do next: fight back or give in—or both
(Ball & Olmedo, 2012). Consequently, in some cases, educators have begun to offer up every
day acts of resistance to these struggles. As defined by Anderson (2008), everyday acts of
resistance are “tactics of the people that circumvent power rather than actively opposing it.”
(Anderson, 2008, p.261). In this era of performance and surveillance cultures, everyday acts of
resistance are “safer than overt acts of protest and refusal” and can potentially have a “higher
effect in achieving limited objectives of subordinated social actors” (Anderson, 2008, p. 261,
267). These acts of resistance serve as the catalyst in bringing to light power relations, fostering
courage against the mundane and tedious, and guiding educators to overcome new, sociallyaccepted practices (Ball & Olmedo, 2013; Foucault, 1982). In addition, these acts are aimed at
practices that aim to change what it means to be a teacher, educated, and secure in all aspects of
our life (Ball & Olmedo, 2013; Zeichner, 2010).
The Shift from True/Old Professionalism to New Professionalism
A shift in educator professionalism has definitely occurred since the advent of neoliberal
policies in education. What educators have witnessed is a shift from what some scholars have
called true/old professionalism to new professionalism. True or old professionalism is defined by
Gorman and Sandefur (2011) and Davidson (2005) as the ability of educators to use their expert
knowledge, to assert their critical agency, to be autonomous against efforts to codify their work,
to primarily serve others (particularly students), to maintain their passion, and to value
individual, daily efforts over systems of quality assurance, status, income, and extrinsic rewards.
True/old professionals derive their legitimacy from internal accomplishments and the value of
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their practices—not from the external rewards of inspection culture (Friedson, 2001; Gorman &
Sandefur, 2011; Nixon, et al., 2010). These individuals care and have affection for those they
serve (their students) rather than their own needs and desires (Nixon, et al., 2010).
Since the 1980s, neoliberal policies have spawned an era of new professionalism in
education which takes aim at teacher knowledge, dedication, and statuses, in an attempt to deprofessionalize and erode the dignity of educators (Evetts, 2011; Jabbar, 2013; Ward, 2007;
Zeichner, 2010). Since the early 2000s, scholars have documented this “old to new” shift in
educational decision-making largely from insiders (educators) to outsiders (policy makers and
economists; Zeichner, 2010). Moreover, the policies created by educational outsiders are focused
on the final products and the bottom-line. Prescriptive accountability, top/down management
styles, and auditing systems that have become the norm, create a system of judgment through
domination and eliminate caring and dialogue (Ball & Olmedo 2012; Cohen, 2014; Evetts, 2011;
Gorman & Sandefur, 2011; Ward, 2007; Zeichner, 2010). Over time, opponents of new
professionalism postulate that educators operating within this system will have diminished
efficacy, commitment to the profession, and professionalism (Anderson & Cohen, 2015;
Zeichner, 2010).
It is worth noting that true/old professionalism was not perfect and that a simple return to
the good old days is not going to cure the nation’s educational problems. Rather, the point here is
that ideas at the heart of teaching, such as creativity, diversity, and academic freedom, have
become secondary in this era of new professionalism, as they threaten the core of neoliberal
policy implementation (Cohen, 2014; Evetts, 2011; Kallio & Kallio, 2012; Ward, 2007).
Correspondingly, when creativity, diversity, and academic freedom in teaching suffer, the overall
quality of the product is subordinate to meeting prescribed goals (Kallio & Kallio, 2012).
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Under the circumstances, new professionalism has successfully created a system in education
that gives attention to organizational professionalism (competencies determined by policymakers and enforced by managers) over occupational professionalism (decisions guided by
practitioner experience and trust) (Evetts, 2011; Ward, 2007; Zeichner, 2010), as well as one that
reduces autonomy by pushing educators to a more scripted form of teaching and learning (StoneJohnson, 2014).
New Professionalism has assisted in eroding and de-professionalizing public school
teaching, as controls and surveillance have more prominence in schools these days than
collegiality and support (Zeichner, 2010). For teachers, the policies advanced by neoliberals
during this era of new professionalism have discarded expertise, autonomy, and discretion and
replaced them with bureaucratic controls, standardized work practices, performance targets, and
rule through fear (Zeichner, 2010). These controls are promoted in the name of improving
teacher quality by assisting teachers in achieving performance goals within evaluation systems or
removing them from the profession if they do not. However, these systems of oversight have also
opened up opportunities for the private sector to become further entrenched in the U.S. public
schools’ system (Hall & McGinty, 2015; Zeichner, 2010).
Teachers have lost creative control, are vilified in many circles, and are judged solely on
performance goals. According to Ball and Olmedo (2013), who we educators are as professionals
and how we think about the profession have been forever changed. Put simply, teaching is
becoming what we do (for example, our job) rather than what we are (for example, our calling in
life; Ball & Olmedo, 2013). In addition, what we are able to be is directed by a larger force and
what we are is defined by our performativity. Elements of heightened accountability and new
professionalism are seductive and alluring to educators but overbearing and burdensome to them
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in the long run. These elements begin to take their place at the forefront of our moral compass
and our inability to perform to these new standards of professionalism makes us feel
irresponsible and inadequate (Ball, 2003). Where “old professionalism” was grounded in the
educators themselves, whereby they held each other accountable, new professionalism has
attempted to change what it means to be an educator by affecting our subjective existence and
relations with one another (Ball, 2003). Bottom line, we are only as good as our previous
evaluation score/rating.
Within this push by new professionals and proponents of performativity to transform the
system is the movement of the profession from one of thought, reflection, and intellectual inquiry
to a purely technical occupation where wonderful ideas are replaced by edicts (Raider-Roth,
2017). Our concept of what an educator is has changed from a creative and engaging individual
to what Raider-Roth (2017) described as an “educational clerk.” These educational clerks, in
their limited roles where they do not exercise judgment (Zeichner, 2010), are “purveyors of skills
who do not make decisions about the content and pedagogy in the classroom but deliver that
which others—often remote experts—deem important” (Raider-Roth, 2017, p.1). Bottom line,
attempts to socialize teachers into teaching and learning have been countered by a push to
recreate educators into educational clerks (Johnson, et al., 2005). As Zeichner (2010) concluded,
the need to develop deep and meaningful decisions at the local level has been replaced by
“product implementation.”
History, Perspectives, & Empirical Research of Performance-Based Pay
Within neoliberal attempts to recreate teachers and school administrators as new
professionals comes the need to attract and retain high-quality individuals into the profession—
and many of these efforts to attract and retain strong workers resemble similar attempts in the
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private sector. Not only has the neoliberal agenda attempted to implement educational policies
that resemble the accountability standards of the private sector, it has also promoted the idea of
performance-based pay in education (Jabbar, 2013). Neoliberalism espouses that “good teachers”
should be rewarded for their performance (which is determined by calculating a “score” based on
teacher performances during classroom observations and student performance on standardized
and/or school-based assessments; Jabbar, 2013; Johnson & Papay, 2009; Lavy, 2007; Rice &
Malen, 2017; Springer, 2009; Stedman & McCallion, 2001). Although performance-based pay is
not new to education, it has shifted from initially being a reward given to educators for the
completion of additional tasks (for example, writing curriculum) to a reward tied to the outputs
of students on tests and classroom performance at small intervals throughout a 180-day school
year (Dee & Wyckoff, 2013; Firestone, 2014; Harvey, 2014; Heneman, et al., 2013; Ingersoll,
2007; Lavy, 2007; Stedman & McCallion, 2001; Weiss & McGuinn, 2016).
Based on the logic that both teachers’ instructional practices and students’ standardized
test scores will improve as a result of new federal and state accountability policies, school
districts (particularly those in low-income, inner cities) have been pressured to adopt
performance-based evaluation systems (Atterby & Mangan, 2020; Firestone, 2014; Goldhaber,
2008; Ingersoll, 2007; Murnane & Steele, 2007). Performance-based pay is a broad term used in
several ways within the field of education. Teachers can earn performance-based pay by
acquiring additional knowledge and skills, taking on increased roles and responsibilities in their
current positions, and/or by teaching in hard to staff subjects or schools (Johnson & Papay,
2009). However, as used in this dissertation study, I have adopted the definition of performancebased pay (also referred to as merit pay or pay-for-performance in the literature) proposed by
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Johnson and Papay (2009) as pay earned by teachers for effective instructional practice, as
measured by student test scores and professional evaluations.
School districts throughout the country made attempts to implement performance-based
systems throughout the 20th Century, particularly in the aftermath of the USSR’s launch of
Sputnik in 1957, and then again subsequent to the release of A Nation At Risk in 1983 (Dee &
Wyckoff, 2013; Firestone, 2014; Goldhaber, et al., 2008; Johnson & Papay, 2009; Lavy, 2007;
Rice & Malen, 2017; Springer, 2009; Stedman & McCallion, 2001). However, these systems
either failed or were unsustainable for a variety of reasons, including firm opposition from
teachers’ unions, issues with procedures and implementation, lack of money, and most important
to this study, the lack of objective and consistent evaluation systems (Dee & Wyckoff, 2013;
Firestone, 2014; Goldhaber, et al., 2008; Johnson & Papay, 2009; Lavy, 2007; Paige & AmreinBeadrsley, 2020; Rich & Malen, 2017; Springer, 2009; Stedman & McCallion, 2001). However,
since the authorization of NCLB in 2001, followed by Race to the Top (RTTP) in 2009, and the
implementation of the Common Core, standardized tests such as PARCC, and the Every Student
Succeeds Act (ESSA) in 2016, performance-pay has been reborn and is now considered by many
as a prominent way to improve teacher quality (Dee & Wyckoff, 2013; Firestone, 2014; Harvey,
2014; Heneman, et al., 2013; Ingersoll, 2007; Lavy, 2007; Weiss & McGuinn, 2016; Stedman &
McCallion, 2001).
Since the advent of NCLB, performance-based pay systems have become an attractive
option within structured systems of teacher evaluation (Firestone, 2014; Goldhaber, et al., 2008;
Ingersoll, 2007; Murnane & Steele, 2007; Rice & Malen, 2017), which replaced subjective and
unstructured systems of “check-ins” (Dee & Wyckoff, 2013). As applied here, performancebased pay systems call for teachers to be compensated based on the academic outcomes of the
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specific students they teach, not their credentials and/or years of experience, central indicators
used in the past in teacher salary scales (Dee & Wyckoff, 2013; Firestone, 2014; Goldhaber, et
al., 2008; Ingersoll, 2007; Murnane & Steele, 2007).
Proponents of performance-based pay systems argued that, to prepare students to
participate competently in today’s knowledge-based economy, every classroom must have an
effective teacher (Dee & Wyckoff, 2013; Firestone, 2014; Goldhaber, et al., 2008, 2009;
Ingersoll, 2007; Johnson & Papay, 2009; Lavy, 2007). They believe that extrinsic motivators, in
the form of monetary rewards, will improve teacher pedagogy and help school districts recruit
and retain the “best and brightest to teaching” (Dee & Wyckoff, 2013; Firestone, 2014;
Goldhaber, et al., 2008, 2009; Ingersoll, 2007; Johnson & Papay, 2009; Lavy, 2007). Generally,
advocates of performance-based pay assume that improvement in pedagogical practices and the
ability to provide a highly effective teacher in every classroom would translate directly into
improved standardized test scores for students (Firestone, 2014; Goldhaber, et al., 2008;
Ingersoll, 2007; Murnane & Steele, 2007; Rice et al., 2015).
Since most school districts with poor standardized test scores and poor track records for
teacher recruitment and retention are in low-income, inner-city districts, performance-based pay
systems have come to play a salient role in these settings (Goldhaber, 2009; Johnson, 2012;
Murnane & Steele, 2007). With an increased sense of urgency to improve student test scores and
to recruit and retain quality teachers, urban school districts have looked to neoliberal incentives,
such as performance-based pay, to better their schools (Goldhaber, 2009; Johnson, 2012;
Murnane & Steele, 2007). More to the point, performance-based pay became incorporated into
teacher evaluation systems in states such as Texas and Arkansas, which embrace a neoliberal
agenda that emphasizes individualism and deregulation (Lavy, 2007). From the reformers’

EXPLORING EDUCATORS’ DECISIONS

44

perspective, performance-based pay will ultimately reward the hardest working and most
effective teachers by allowing them to obtain status in school (intrinsic reward) and increase pay
(extrinsic reward). Consequently, proponents also believe that performance-based pay will either
force poorly performing teachers to improve or to leave the school and/or the profession. It is
further argued that since the stigma of lower, fixed salaries will disappear with performancebased incentives, the “best and brightest” are likely to be drawn to teaching because there’s the
opportunity to earn substantially more—like jobs in the private sector (Dee & Wyckoff, 2013;
Firestone, 2014; Goldhaber, et al., 2008, 2009; Ingersoll, 2007; Johnson & Papay, 2009; Lavy,
2007).
In sharp contrast to the above thinking, opponents of performance-based pay contend that
because teaching is a highly complex activity, it is impossible to quantify a teacher’s
performance and validly base his or her pay on student achievement results and yearly evaluation
scores (Dee & Wyckoff, 2013; Firestone, 2014; Goldhaber, 2009; Johnson, 2012; Lavy, 2007;
Murnane & Cohen, 1986; Springer et. al., 2012; Stedman & McCallion, 2001). Opponents have
also argued that teaching is inherently a profession for those who are intrinsically motivated to
teach students and that using extrinsic rewards to motivate teachers is likely to be
counterproductive because it shifts the focus of their attention from the needs of their students to
their own personal needs (Dee & Wyckoff, 2013; Firestone, 2014; Goldhaber, 2009; Johnson,
2012; Lavy, 2007; Murnane & Cohen, 1986; Springer et. al., 2012; Stedman & McCallion,
2001). As a result, current accountability systems and accompanying rewards culture may push
teachers to teach to the test and the observation tool used to evaluate them in an attempt to
achieve status and obtain additional pay.
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Relational Cultural Theory (RCT)
I am drawn to RCT because from this perspective, the process of change in education is
conceptualized as relying on the dynamic relationship between client and worker, and the
development of said relationship is not considered a one-way street (Freedberg, 2007; Jordan,
2000a, 2000b, 2008, 2010; Miller, 2010a). Although the bulk of research grounded in RCT
occurred in mental health systems, researchers have used this theory to successfully frame
educational research (for example, Abrams, 2016; Stieha & Raider-Roth, 2012). In this study, the
basic tenets of the theory apply to the current state of education, with the client representing the
teacher and the worker representing the administrator. The idea of mutuality in RCT is critical
given its stress on the need for mutual acknowledgment and co-existence between all
stakeholders (Freedberg, 2007; Jordan, 2000a, 2000b, 2008, 2010; Miller, 2010a).
RCT focuses on the importance of relationships within a particular context (Freedberg,
2007; Jordan, 2000a, 2000b, 2008, 2010; Miller, 2010a; Raider-Roth, 2017). Moreover, RCT is
comprised of six major tenets. First, there is mutuality, or the sharing of feelings or actions
between two or more parties, is vital to daily functioning. The ability to be open about strengths
and weaknesses with colleagues and, most importantly, those who hold evaluative power over us
is critical to providing the best education possible to our students (Jordan, 2010). Without mutual
respect and understanding amongst evaluators and evaluatees, any type of negative feedback will
put both sides into adversarial positions and push them farther away from the bonds needed to
lead successful learning environments. Second, there is the idea that growth is determined by
relationships (Jordan, 2010). Without a strong relationship of trust and mutuality between
evaluators and those whom they evaluate, growth will be stunted as all parties will focus on
individual success—regardless of how they get there. Third, mutual empathy and mutual
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empowerment are at the core of growth-fostering relationships (Jordan, 2010). Once mutuality
and a strong, trusting relationship has been established, both parties begin to empathize with each
other’s plight and seek to empower through their words and their actions. Next, authenticity, or
the act of being genuine in one’s actions, is necessary for full participation in growth fostering
relationships (Jordan, 2010). This is an important step beyond mutual empathy and
empowerment as it is accompanied by genuine actions on the part of both parties that are
noticeably authentic and done without looking to receive praise or incentives. Fifth, all people
contribute or benefit in growth-fostering relationships (Jordan, 2010). Once the first four tenets
are in place, both evaluators and those whom they evaluate become equal partners in the learning
whereby the success of the group leads to a successful and nurturing environment. Lastly, human
development occurs when relational competence, or the art of learning to give and take freely in
a relationship, increases (Jordan, 2010). Here, in the sixth and final tenet, we see that both
evaluators and those whom they evaluate—when the other tenets have been fortified—no longer
look to relationships as a means to end but, rather, an everyday action to ensure success of the
school community.
From the RCT perspective, the level of connection/disconnection we have with particular
individuals within a specific context will have social implications. Specifically, RCT postulates
that quality relationships and connections have positive effects on all those in a shared context
that are subjected to growth-fostering practices and supports (Freedberg, 2007; Jordan, 2000a,
2000b, 2008, 2010; Miller, 2010a; Raider-Roth, 2017). Positive connections will then lead to
mutuality, empathy, authentic connections, and empowerment which, in turn, fosters
vulnerability (Freedberg, 2007; Jordan, 2000a, 2000b, 2008, 2010; Miller, 2010a; Raider-Roth,
2017). And this vulnerability is seen as essential to creating and building the trust needed for
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self-improvement. Jordan (2008) further contends that our capacity to function and flourish in a
given context will increase when provided with the healthy coexistence that growth-fostering
relationships and connections generate (Jordan, 2008).
RCT researchers highlight five good things that need to happen to shift relationships from
one-way streets to growth-fostering connections (Jordan, 2008; Miller, 2010a, 2010b). These
growth-fostering connections are meant to build clients/teachers up rather than judge and/or
break them down (Jordan, 2008; Miller, 2010a, 2010b). They are: 1) a sense of zest, 2) clarity
about oneself, 3) a sense of personal worth, 4) the capacity to be creative and productive, and, 5)
the desire for more connection. Conversely, work suffers when there is a drop in energy, a
decrease in sense of worth, lack of clarity and confusion, less productivity, and withdrawal from
relationships (Jordan, 2008). In an educational setting that embraces RCT, individuals work
together to achieve social change (Lewis & Olshansky, 2017; Raider-Roth, 2017), all while
balancing personal convictions and accountability standards when making decisions.
According to RCT, the growth of all human beings is influenced by culture and power
practices within a larger socio-cultural context. Moreover, supportive growth is nurtured by the
relationships we engage in, which cannot be isolated from the culture in which those
relationships are embedded. As human beings, we have an innate need to connect and grow
through connections (Freedberg, 2007; Jordan, 2000a, 2000b, 2008, 2010; Miller, 2010a; RaiderRoth, 2017). Unfortunately, neoliberal policies and the influence of new professionalism, have
created a top/down, evaluative culture within education, thereby promoting interactions that are
antithetical to the nurturing connections/relationships promoted by RCT and considered vital to
effective educational change. That is, to foster growth among educators, mutually empowering
relationships must develop and flourish in a non-evaluative and inclusive setting (Freedberg,
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2007; Miller, 2010a). On the contrary, disconnection between client and worker leads to a loss of
a sense of purpose in the evaluative process, which in turn produces a drop in energy, decreased
sense of worth, lack of clarity, confusion, reduced productivity, and further withdrawal from the
relationship. RCT espouses the creation of a safe haven for the client to move out of isolation
and experience a sense of autonomy and connection (Jordan, 2000a; Lewis & Olshansky, 2017;
Raider-Roth, 2017).
New professionalism potentially interrupts the positive relationships between teacher and
administrators that advocates of RCT seek to create and maintain by attenuating a top down
dynamic that is not growth enhancing to anyone. Neoliberalism and new professionalism have
created an expectation that the ultimate goal of the U.S. public school system is to create human
capital that can compete in the global workforce. However, Cohen (2014) argues that when
policies and regulations are based on this premise, it is the role of school administrators to assist
teachers in negotiating their instructional decisions. Moreover, the shift in focus from developing
civic-minded individuals to producing human capital has narrowed educational aims, which is
more reason for educators to find a balance between personal and professional convictions and
policy (Cochran-Smith, 2001). As heightened accountability standards and rewards cultures
further pervade the U.S. public school system (for example, the increasing number of
assessments used to evaluate educators and measure student growth), the costs to all stakeholders
and relationships of this constant vigilance and antagonism are becoming evident. Thus, this is a
critical time for administrators and teachers to work together to balance their integrity and
abilities with current policies and regulations (Ball & Olmedo, 2013; Cohen, 2014). And it is a
big first step for both administrators and teachers to realize that they share this same level of
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discomfort with the demands of accountability systems and rewards culture that have taken over
education (Ball & Olmedo, 2013).
RCT also stresses the need for bio-directionality in relationships between administrators
and teachers in the school, which reflects a mutual relational flow between them. In heightened
educational accountability systems, mutuality does not mean sameness or equality (Miller,
2010a) and power is a very real thing to be confronted (Miller, 2010b). Therefore, the
identification of these so-called barriers and efforts to obtain mutuality in engagement are
important when trying to negotiate the terrain of educational change. Since members of the
supposed subordinate class (the client/the teacher) affect change, these healthier and mutual
relationships will create a culture of inclusiveness in a hierarchical context that is built on
empathy, reciprocity, connectedness, and mutual empowerment (Freedberg, 2007; Jordan,
2000a; Lewis & Olshansky, 2017; Miller, 2010a, 2010b; Raider-Roth, 2017). Relationships of
respect between teachers and administrators will lay the foundation for how they teach the
students they serve and whether they nurture dialogical classrooms rather than authoritarian ones
(Freire, 1998).
Beyond the mutual empowerment and open relationships, the administrator brings more
of herself/himself into the relationship (Freedberg, 2007), a factor that promotes responsive,
respectful, and empowering relationships. If the teacher sees an impact on the administrator and
the administrator shares his or her own vulnerability, much good can happen. For example, a
sense of authenticity and safety will be fostered, the negotiation of shared circumstances will
take place, and a pathway through the rocky landscape of unsettled assumptions to new
understandings will be created (Freedberg, 2007; Jordan, 2000b; Lewis & Olshansky, 2017;
Raider-Roth, 2017).
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CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY
Participatory Action Research
In a time where educators are vilified and major decisions in the profession are made
based on economic principles of production (Ball & Olmedo, 2013; Evetts, 2011; Giroux, 2002;
Harvey, 2005; Jabbar, 2013; Ward, 2007; Zeichner, 2010), it is important to study the work of
administrators and teachers who are trying to negotiate their personal convictions with the
tensions brought forth from the edicts of neoliberalism/new professionalism. As a researcher, I
am interested in how teachers and administrators communicate and work together to navigate
through elements of new professionalism (for example, performance-based pay systems) when
making decisions, particularly during formal classroom observation events.
After previously serving for three years as the building principal, I was considered an
insider in the school that served as the site for this investigation. Hence, my initial knowledge
was based on informal conversations and anecdotal observations made throughout the years. In
addition, like the teachers, I too was observed and evaluated on a yearly basis and had the
opportunity to obtain performance-based pay based on my own yearly evaluation scores. I spent
extensive time building relationships and leadership capacity among staff members. It was my
hope that a Participatory Action Research (PAR) study would allow me to learn something more
about the topic than when I started, especially about teachers’ instructional decisions and the
perceived efforts of administrators such as myself in supporting teachers in these systems of
accountability and rewards culture. By working jointly on this study with the participating
teachers and providing a safe space for conversation/dialogue together, I aimed to get a sense of
how we balanced personal convictions with the neoliberal policies and regulations that dominate
the profession. For clarification, the usage of we in Chapters 3, 4, and 5 encompasses all study
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participants, including myself. According to Merriam (2009), “qualitative research is a
systematic process by which we know more about something than we did before engaging in the
process” (p. 4). Even though I was keenly aware of the strides we made as educators to break
down traditional power dynamics during these tense times in education, I was eager to uncover
new insights into this topic. Therefore, my goal in using we is to acknowledge that my fellow
study participants and I were immersed in this struggle and conversation together. In addition,
through constant data analysis, member checking, and analysis tweaking, I feel my usage of we
was vital to my work as a participatory action researcher.
Building on work by de Shutter and Yopo (1981), Anderson, Herr, and Nihlen (2007)
characterize PAR as a “vision of social events as contextualized by macro level social forces” (p.
25), an integration of theory and practice, a “subject-subject relationship through dialogue” (p.
25), tying of research and action into a single process, and the (hopefully) immediate application
of findings to the current situation. In the study, which drew on RCT, described in the previous
chapter, I hoped to promote educational change via mutuality between administrators and
teachers in a specific setting. It was my belief that a setting where teachers and administrators
worked together to build capacity and negotiate personal convictions with educational edicts
could provide the field with a glimpse into ways of co-navigating through new professionalism.
PAR is value laden, particularly because it is a catalyst for changes to broader societal concerns
and challenges in possibly non-responsive institutions such as education (Herr & Anderson,
2015). As such, my aim as a researcher was to break down the barriers of traditional researchersubject power relationships and create a setting where participants wanted to come together for
the common good of the location and profession (Herr & Anderson, 2015). As a result of this
fostering of empowering relationships, I aimed for all stakeholders to develop the knowledge and
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consciousness necessary to reflect upon and operate within the technical and social dimensions
of their daily instructional practice (Tripp, 1990).
Elements of the new professionalism, such as performance-based pay, are now part of the
educational landscape of teachers and administrators (Ball & Olmedo 2012; Cohen, 2014; Evetts,
2011; Ward, 2007; Zeichner, 2010). Using PAR, I strived for a dialogue with teachers about the
ways in which we could negotiate our beliefs with policy and legislation. It was important for me
to safeguard teachers from negatively influencing the educational experience of students and
their own professional experience by providing them with outlets to negotiate what it means to
be an effective teacher with all that federal, state, and local decision-makers now require.
Ultimately, I aimed to learn about ways in which administrators, such as myself, could support
teachers and ways teachers could collectively negotiate the constraints encountered in current
performance-pay systems, while holding on to what it means to be a good teacher.
Context and Participants
I am a public school administrator in Northern New Jersey. At the beginning of this
study, I was the principal of the school which served as the study site. The site for this study was
a large high school in an urban school district in Northern New Jersey, which was in the midst of
its third decade of state control. The school district was taken over by the state department of
education for many reasons, most notable to this study being poor student performance on
standardized tests and a lackluster instructional program. At the time of the study, the school
district was very close to regaining local control, especially since the state department of
education changed the requirements to regain local control in the area of student performance.
Previously, the district was required to have a certain percentage of students in the school district
meet performance standards in math and language arts; however, at the time of the study, the
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state had shifted to a growth-based model whereby the district needed to set and meet
benchmarks of adequate growth at particular grade levels.
The school consisted of approximately 650 students and 45 teachers. In addition, the
school was one of four schools within a single educational complex. Although the schools comingled for certain electives and content area classes, they did operate as separate entities within
the complex, albeit with each school’s administration focusing solely on academics and a fifth
principal leading the operations portion of all four schools (for example, student discipline,
facility issues, and athletics). The goal of this setup was to free up school-based administrators to
focus solely on the instructional portion of the job and not get bogged down with the daily
operations of the physical plant. The total population of students in the building exceeded 2000
and the total population of teachers was close to 200. Each school within the complex had a
particular career and technical theme and the population was made up almost entirely of Latino
(57%) and African-American (40%) students.
The school, since it did not consist of students in grades 3-8, was considered a nonstudent growth percentile (SGP) school; therefore, standardized testing did not factor into the
final evaluation scores of the teachers participating in the study. The school’s teachers received a
yearly summative score consisting of formal observations (85%) and student growth objectives
(SGOs) (15%). Non-tenured teachers were observed a minimum of three times per year, while
tenured teachers were observed a minimum of two times per year, for 20-40 minutes at a time.
Staff members received quantifiable summative ratings at the end of each school year which
ranged from Highly Effective (3.5 or higher), Effective (2.5 to 3.49), Partially Effective (1.52.49), and Ineffective (1.0-1.49).
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At the time of salary guide ratification by the teachers’ association in the spring of 2013,
all teachers under contract had the option to choose between placement on the universal salary
guide or the traditional salary guide. The traditional salary guide, unlike the universal salary
guide, had a higher base salary but limited teachers to moving up only one step per year, as long
as they scored Effective or higher on the yearly summative evaluation. On the universal salary
guide, if a teacher was rated Highly Effective on a yearly basis, s/he moved up two levels on the
yearly salary guide. If a teacher was rated Effective, s/he moved up one step on the salary guide.
Regardless of salary guide, if a teacher was rated Partially Effective or Ineffective, s/he did not
move up on the salary guide and was placed on a CAP. Additionally, if the teacher scored
Partially Effective or Ineffective for two consecutive years, the school district could seek tenure
charges and have the teacher removed from their position.
It should be noted that all new teachers hired on September 1, 2013 or later were
automatically placed on the universal salary guide and the choice of salary guides at the time of
contract ratification was binding; therefore, teachers would never again have the chance to
choose between salary guides. Furthermore, regardless of which salary guide a teacher chose,
s/he was no longer able to move up the guide for any reason other than their yearly summative
performance. For example, obtaining an advanced degree had no bearing on salary guide
placement and equivalencies for such degrees were eliminated. Lastly, like all teachers and other
certificated staff in the district (for example, child study team members), all district
administrators had the opportunity to earn performance-based pay. However, unlike the teachers’
association’s members, all district administrators were placed on the universal salary guide.
Unlike years past where losing tenure and jobs involved a lengthy process in which the
burden of proof rested with the school district, at this point teachers and administrators could

EXPLORING EDUCATORS’ DECISIONS

55

lose their livelihoods with two consecutive years of poor performance on the evaluation rubric.
To reiterate, poor performance during four to six formal observations over the course of 360
school days (two school years) could cost us our jobs. Moreover, the current financial situations
of educators are vulnerable given the rising cost of health insurance contributions, the increase in
deductions from our paychecks for pension contributions, and the capping of yearly percentage
increases. Furthermore, opportunities for extra pay are narrowing with the implementation of
performance-based systems tied directly to yearly evaluation and student performance (unlike in
the past where it was obtained by completing extra work or duties) and school districts, such as
the one which served as the site of this study, moving away from additional compensation based
on attainment of advanced degrees in favor of performance-rewards. Lastly, the competing
demands of the relationships we are in and the conflicts within each of these connections have
heightened the pressures on educators more than ever before, as we are being blamed for the
falling standardized test scores of American youth compared to the scores of their peers
worldwide, particularly within inner cities such as the site of the study (Harvey, 2014; Murnane
& Steele, 2007; Rice, Malen, Jackson, & Hoyer, 2015).
I served six years as a principal in the school district that the study took place, including
the final three years at the school site of the study. A timeline of my service in the school district
which served as the study site is below in Table 1.
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Table 1
Timeline of Events

Month/Year

Event

October 2011

Started working in the district as a content area supervisor.

December 2012

Named principal of a middle school within the district.

January-June 2013

Extensive professional development provided to all certificated staff on
the new teacher evaluation system.

September 2013

New teacher evaluation system and performance based-pay incentives take
effect for teacher and administrators.

July 2015

Named principal of a high school within the district that serves as the site
of the study.

February 2018

My research study began.

March 2018

Left the school district for my current position. Simon, the school’s vice
principal, was named principal upon my departure.

March-June 2018

My research study continued after my departure. I visited the school one
time per week to continue to lead the PLC.

July 2018

The district regained partial, local control of its schools.

June 2019

Performance-based pay incentives for teachers in the district were
discontinued (a development I discuss in Chapter Four).

September 2020

The district awaits word from the state department regarding full, local
control.
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My role of principal required me to complete substantial formal and informal
observations of both teachers and administrators under my purview. Additionally, during the six
years as a principal in this school district, I was provided with informal and formal observational
feedback of my own work from six different evaluators. Like the teachers I supervised and
evaluated, I too was affected by the experience of heightened accountability measures.
During my tenure as principal of this high school, the school’s vice principal and I
dedicated considerable time to working closely with teachers with the goal of empowering them
to feel like active participants in the profession. We recognized the disproportionate emphasis by
stakeholders on the observation process and regularly discussed ways to negotiate our work as
educators in the current surveillance culture. Therefore, I was interested in working with teachers
at the urban high school where I was principal, at the time, given our extensive and ongoing
efforts to create and nurture an empowering educational setting for all stakeholders.
Since I was the school’s fourth principal in six years, the overall sense of defeat and
hopelessness that permeated the setting was obvious to me. To address this problem, the vice
principal and I developed a plan to empower the staff gradually over time. Aside from my
personal ways of communication (e.g., referring to the staff and students as a “family,” asking
staff to call each other by first names, and having an open-door policy), I was very interested in
breaking down traditional power barriers through the use of PLCs. Since we were just one of
multiple schools in a larger complex and the entire student body had lunch at the same time, the
master schedule allowed for nearly all teachers to be off from teaching during the same period
daily and all PLC meetings took place during this time.
Prior to beginning this study, I had completed five PLCs in which I served as the chief
facilitator. Previous topics were based on the work of Daniel Pink (A Whole New Mind, To Sell is
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Human, and Drive), the Disney business model (The Imagineering Pyramid), and Sun Tzu (The
Art of War). Simply put, interested teachers and I decided on a topic, selected a book that fit said
topic, and held our PLC every Friday for one semester. At the beginning of a PLC, I typically
introduced the topic and then, working as a group, we divided the book into different sections,
whereby PLC members (me included) teamed up, presented on a select aspect of the topic, and
led a discussion about the practical applications for the entire school and in our classrooms. At
the end of the semester, PLC participants would begin implementing new strategies into their
classroom lessons. In addition, participating teachers led professional development sessions for
other interested teachers who had not participated in the PLC. Lastly, what may appear to be a
book club is far from it. Our process of building mutuality and empowerment in our school was
supported by the PLCs’ emphasis on teacher motivation, establishing school-wide norms for
discourse, strategically implementing instructional changes, and building our brand as teachers
and as a school—all of which came to life through the reading and discussion of the selected
books.
A key element of breaking down barriers and making this a truly inclusive PLC was the
establishment of session norms. The norms that we collectively established at the first PLC and
reiterated during ensuing PLCs (especially as the group grew) were as follows: we called each
other by first name; we were (brutally) honest; we did not judge each other; and what was
discussed in the room, stayed in the room. I reiterated to teachers that when I participated, I was
an educator named Nick and not their evaluator (or former evaluator by week 4 of the study).
Beyond the collective creation of norms, we also took other steps to break down the traditional
barriers of administrator-teacher relationships such as: holding PLC meetings on Fridays because
the urge to grade papers and work on lesson plans dwindled towards the end of the week;
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providing coffee and snacks to further move away from the traditional view of faculty meetings
and/or professional development sessions; and, alerting school staff to refrain from interrupting
us during that time.
What started out as my own attempts to break down barriers and empower a defeated
staff blossomed into something I never imagined. By the start of this study, the school had eight
other teacher-led PLCs (beyond those I facilitated) that ran during the school day on a weekly or
bi-weekly basis on topics such as resiliency, digital learning platforms, environmental science
instruction, and teacher-student relationship building. Under the terms of the teachers’ contract,
each high school teacher had a preparation period, lunch period, and professional period, along
with their five teaching class periods. This professional period could be used as an extra planning
period or be utilized by teachers to plan and meet with other teachers. Since the entire
educational complex where the study took place housed four schools and each school had its
own, assigned lunch period, every teacher at the school where the study took place was off
during the same professional period daily; therefore, all of the teachers at the school had the
ability to join or lead one or more PLCs. At the time I left this school for a new position, I
facilitated a Friday PLC and was an active participant in two, teacher-led PLCs. In fact, one of
the PLCs that started out as the brainchild of two teachers became the focal point of future
school-wide action plans and professional development sessions. As I see it, the PLC approach
described above empowered the staff, built our professional capacity, and positively changed the
culture and climate of the school.
During my initial experiences as school principal and from our conversations in prior
PLCs, I felt it was time to explore a book on relationships since these seemed to be the key to our
current and future success in this era of heightened accountability. Consequently, since my
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facilitating of a PLC became a part of the school’s regular routine, I planned on having the next
scheduled PLC be the context for the PAR study. Typically, ideas for new PLCs were presented
in person or via email by those willing to lead them prior to the next semester. For this PLC
about relationship building within school communities, my gauging of teacher interest was no
different than in years past. I provided the staff with information about my intended PLC and my
targeted audience (teachers on the performance-based pay salary guide). Additionally, I made it
clear to the staff that this PLC would serve as the datapoint for my dissertation. Along with the
overall idea of my study and its focus on relationships, I presented the idea of reading
Professional Development in Relational Learning Communities: Teachers in Connection by
Miriam B. Raider-Roth (2017) after our initial conversations about the purpose of the PLC.
During these tension-filled times in education, a book about relationship building in open and
authentic learning environments would hopefully help us stay true to our professional identities. I
was interested in how we made meaning of our circumstances, how we weighed educational
decisions, and how I as an administrator, as well as those administrators above me, could support
us as we navigated these waters. It was my hope that the mutually empowering relationships
already established prior to this study (and hopefully further heightened during it) would lead to
openness of communication.
It was my expectation and hope that the PLC would be a place where we would grow into
our roles as change agents. Consequently, I anticipated that the everyday pedagogical decisions
of these teachers were exerting a positive influence on their students and the profession as a
whole. Next, it was important to view ourselves as empowered decision makers who could
provide verbal and written feedback about the impact that national, state, and local policies such
as performance-based pay had on our daily decisions and discuss it in a mutually beneficial
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setting without ramifications from their chief evaluators. Lastly, I too wanted to share my
experiences and responses to new professionalism and heightened accountability measures.
The study was part of the regular routine of professional learning communities (PLCs) that the
new principal of the target school (who served as vice principal during my principalship) and I,
with the then vice principal, established when I took over as principal in September 2015. In this
capacity, improving the culture and climate of the school and reinvigorating the teaching staff
was our number one priority. These PLCs, unlike professional development sessions, provided
teachers and administrators with opportunities to identify problems, analyze available data, and
make informed decisions to improve the instructional practice and climate of the school. As a
reminder, I left as principal of this school in March of 2018, which was three weeks into the
study. After my departure, the school’s vice principal replaced me as principal.
In my continued efforts to be inclusive and empower the staff, I did not directly select
fellow participants. Instead, the first seven teachers on the performance-based pay salary guide
and were willing to participate in the study were included in the group. In addition, although the
school’s new principal, Simon, was not part of the PLC, the group agreed to invite him to our
final session to share our discoveries and feelings. It should be noted that the final PLC session
which Simon attended took place after the evaluation process for the school year of the study
was complete. The first seven teachers (who self-selected) and I participated in this study, a
number that fell within the typical size range of previous PLCs. Study information was provided
via a handout and participating teachers were given a consent form. This form reiterated to
teachers that their participation was voluntary, they could leave at any time, and they should not
expect any ramifications from the study’s findings.
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A summary profile of the eight participants in the study (including me) is presented
below in Table 2. All names other than my own are pseudonyms.
Table 2
Profile of Study Participants

Name

Position

Yrs in Education

Yrs in District

Status

Ava

English Teacher

3

3

NT

Donald

Social Studies Teacher

4

4

NT

Gary

Social Studies Teacher

12

12

T

Gina

Special Education Teacher

17

1

NT

Nick

Principal

14

7

T

Otto

English Teacher

8

7

T

Roger

English Teacher

8

7

T

Warren

Social Studies Teacher

16

15

T

Organization of the Study
Data Collection
At the start of the study, I was in the process of leaving my role as principal of the study
site and moving into a central office position in a nearby district. I facilitated three PLC sessions
while still in the role of principal and continued participating in the remaining sessions after
changing jobs. To ensure that our work remained true to the basic tenets of PAR such as
fostering communities of inquiry to address significant problems, the group determined if and
how our findings would be shared with Simon, the former vice principal, who replaced me as
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principal upon my departure. At the beginning of the study, we agreed to have the new principal
join the last study session and review the findings with us.
Like previous PLCs, we read a book together. During this PLC, we read Professional
Development in Relational Learning Communities: Teachers in Connection by Miriam B.
Raider-Roth (2017). During initial conversations about the intended topic of the study, I
recommended this book to the group, as the idea that we were going through the motions of our
work and doing the bidding of larger policy-makers dominated these early. For my approach to
data collection, I used notes and audio files collected during PLC sessions. I delineate my
approach to data collection below.
Weekly PLC. Our PLC met during the school day for forty-five minute sessions, once
per week, for fifteen weeks (except for two sessions cut short due to schedules adjusted for
standardized testing). All PLC sessions were tape recorded and transcribed for purposes of
analysis. The intent of our weekly PLC was to create rich conversations from participant
journaling, the reading of our book on RCT, and any “critical incidents” that occurred during the
week. The topic for each PLC session corresponded to a particular topic/chapter(s) in the
selected book and as participants, all of us were expected to read the chapter and journal via the
shared Google Doc. Journaling consisted of reactions to the reading; reactions to any events we
participated in within the evaluation system (for example, a pre-conference, post-conference, or
observation); comments that other participants made in a previous session or in our journals; and
any critical incidents that took place between PLC meetings. By “critical incidents,” I refer to the
“underlying structure which both limits and facilitates what we consciously and unconsciously
choose to attend to” (e.g., making an instructional decision that contradicts one’s personal
convictions but meets a standard on the observation rubric) (Tripp, 2012, p. 13). These critical
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incidents were either brought up directly to the group within the PLC discussion or they were
documented in the journaling via the Google Doc. In keeping with this format, each PLC session
was guided by the following questions: (a) “What are some of the tensions you face in making
instructional decisions?”; (b), “How did you negotiate your practices in the face of these
tensions?”; and (c), “What support do you need or appreciate from administrators in facing these
tensions?” I asked each of the participants (including myself) to use the book’s weekly
topics/chapter(s) as the lens by which to analyze our respective actions and the actions of other
stakeholders we interacted with.
Journal submissions. We kept individual, weekly journals to log thoughts regarding our
assigned readings from the book and/or discussions during the PLC. Each of us kept a journal,
which was shared by all participants via a Google Doc. Each participant had his or her own
section in the Google Doc; therefore, our responses were visible at all times to everyone else.
Additionally, we were encouraged to journal whenever a “critical incident” took place, as well as
after the specific events of the classroom observation process. Participants, for the most part,
journaled on a weekly basis, with journal submissions consisting of critical incidents, action
within the evaluation process, and/or reactions to the book or the thoughts of their colleagues.
The vast majority of participants, myself included, journaled on a weekly basis, with one
exception. I also kept both a participant and researcher journal to document my own experiences
in the evaluation cycle and as the researcher.
I was aware that teacher journaling went beyond the scope of the daily work of
participants. As such, I gave all other participants a $20 gift card at the start of the study, as well
as an additional $100 gift card to one participant at the end of the study, via a random drawing.
The time and energy that my fellow participants gave to this study during the school day and
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after hours journaling meant a lot to me; therefore, it was the least I could do to recognize their
efforts. To provide a designated period each day for journaling, the new principal agreed to
waive the teaching participants’ daily supervision period (e.g., office duty and student attendance
monitoring) during the study.
Data Analysis
Throughout the study, data collection and data analysis occurred simultaneously.
Although I hoped to compare units of information collected with the next, in search of finding
recurring regularities (Merriam, 2009), I understood that the book selected for discussion and
any “critical incidents” that occurred on a typical day would take precedent during our weekly
discussions—and this happened at times. All means of data collection provided significant
findings for teacher instruction and administrator-teacher relationships as the economic and
professional livelihoods of educators were at stake. Moreover, since I pursued this topic in this
school setting largely due to anecdotal evidence I gathered during my time as principal and my
yearning to see the effect that mutually empowering administrator-teacher relationships
potentially had on instructional decisions in the context of heightened accountability, it was
important for me to analyze data when my assumptions were negated. By discussing ways to do
things differently given our circumstances, I wanted the teachers to feel empowered to positively
affect change in the school and the profession.
At regular intervals throughout the study (every two weeks), I reviewed participant
journal submissions, attempted to find themes, and used this data to forward the discussion in our
weekly PLC. I began each PLC by sharing noticings and wonderings from journal submissions
and how the book on RCT potentially applied. Prior to the study, we agreed to use our journals to
generate themes and share these themes with the whole group via an electronic platform such as
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Google Docs. All data collected via journals and discussions were first analyzed via open coding.
Once I identified key concepts, categories, and properties (Anderson, et al., 2007), I constructed
themes via descriptive coding, as this was a useful tool for analyzing a wide array of data forms
(Saldana, 2009). Additionally, as Saldana (2009) points out, descriptive coding is vital for the
reader to “see what you saw and hear what you heard” (p. 71). Since data collection and analysis
were ongoing and simultaneous, it is important to reiterate that I completed another level of data
analysis after all data had been gathered and collection was finished.
Memo writing (Saldana, 2009) served as my outlet to make meaning of/connections
between my data throughout the collection and analysis process. According to Saldana (2009),
writing is analysis, and analytic memos expand on the meanings of codes and themes as the
researcher transitions this information into a more logical account of the research study.
I reported data obtained from all participants thematically. Since I clearly stated my intent
to provide teachers and administrators with opportunities to negotiate personal convictions with
prescribed policies and regulations, a thematic approach enabled me to bring the voices of all the
participants to life. My goal as a researcher, participant, and author was to offer a view of the
countless ways that teachers and administrators negotiated personal convictions with neoliberal
policies and elements of new professionalism while making educational decisions (e.g., teachers
and administrators negotiating their way through this). Individual voices were empowered to
give a comprehensive, insider account from teachers and administrators in a heightened
accountability system and a rewards culture.
Ethical Considerations
Since my study involved research on human subjects, I obtained permission from the
Institutional Review Board (IRB) to conduct it. I considered the risks to all participants minimal,
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as we are adults who volunteered our time and were already comfortable sharing our
experiences. However, I was sure to continually reinforce the norms of RCT, as I was an insiderresearcher who once had evaluative power over teacher participants in the study. Teacher
participants were free to leave the study at any time. Additionally, to protect the confidentiality
of teacher participants, pseudonyms were used in the collection, analysis, and reporting of all
data.
Researcher Positionality
I am a veteran educator who has observed and evaluated teachers before and during this
new era of heightened accountability. At the time of the study, I was in my fourteenth year in
education, serving six years as a teacher and eight years as an administrator. I began the study as
the principal of the school that served as the research site and, as such, I was the direct evaluator
of the teacher participants; therefore, I was an insider with power at the beginning of the study. I
transitioned out of the role as school principal after the third PLC session.
The current political climate of public education, as well as my own professional
experiences, influenced my research. My research interests stem from my own firsthand
experiences as a classroom teacher, as well as the anecdotal evidence I accumulated during my
six years as a school principal in a district that offers performance-based pay to teachers based on
their yearly evaluation ratings. I, along with administrative colleagues and teachers, have become
disheartened, stressed, and penalized all too often within this system of quantifying and sorting.
Therefore, I believe that the work teachers and I did in this school setting represents positive
ways in which teacher convictions have been negotiated effectively in a heightened system of
accountability and rewards culture. As such, I brought much conviction to my work. As an
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insider to both the profession and this school, I am able to see the task that lays ahead for
educators, how difficult it may be, and how I am just as important a part as they are.
Administrators are affected just as much as teachers by policies and regulations
perpetuated by neoliberalism and new professionalism, and they play a vital role in the
negotiation of personal convictions and prescribed accountability measures. In this study, I
wanted to learn from the teachers, ways in which they feel administrators can help them maintain
their professional integrity in the face of the demands of accountability systems, as well as make
a contribution to the field via an authentic account of what is happening in schools to teachers
and administrators. As a reminder, I too felt the tension of the new systems of heightened
accountability, as I was also observed and evaluated like teachers in the school. It was difficult
dealing with this hierarchy since for the sake of performing well when I was observed, at times, I
felt forced to choose between what I saw as working well in my leadership position and the other
types of decisions thrust upon me by the powers above.
Validity & Trustworthiness
The first step in ensuring validity and reliability in qualitative research was to carefully
design the study (Merriam, 2009). I took several measures to ensure the validity of my work.
Journaling and Memoing. First and foremost, as an insider in a PAR study, it was
important for me to keep a running account of research decisions via a researcher journal
(Anderson, et al., 2007; Merriam, 2009)—which complimented the participant journal I
previously described. Since qualitative researchers cannot expect a replication of our account, we
can focus on explaining how we arrived at our findings (Merriam, 2009). Keeping a participant
and researcher journal was important for me in establishing the study’s trustworthiness. I also
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used memo writing to make meaning of/connections between my data throughout the collection
and analysis process.
Prolonged engagement. We as participants were engaged over time (weekly) for 15
sessions. This allowed the conversation to unfold in complex ways while we strategized on ways
to negotiate the current educational context.
Triangulation. It is vital for an insider researcher in a PAR study to triangulate all forms
of data to see if different perspectives are offered and to heighten the credibility of the study
(Anderson, et al., 2007). By using multiple data sources and opportunities for us as participants
to express ourselves, many, differing ways to answer the research questions were built into the
study. For example, educators talking together during the weekly PLC sessions offered one
vantage point, while our writing (journaling and critical incidents) offered another view.
Member checking. Lastly, I met with my fellow study participants on multiple occasions
throughout the process and provided multiple opportunities to have their voices heard. Along
these same lines, I brought back to the group identified themes in the continuous conversation. I
cross-checked my ongoing meaning making from a variety of sources with the teacher
participants to see if they recognized themselves in the themes and descriptions presented. They
had the opportunity to refine these and to comment further on these emergent findings (Merriam,
2009). This process was in line with action research in that the ongoing findings were brought
back to the group for larger meaning making, as well as to inform fellow participants about any
ongoing decision-making they might be engaged in day-to-day.
Critical friends. Since I was an insider/researcher with an angle, I chose a colleague who
was a principal in another school district to serve as a critical friend to help me identify my
assumptions and make sense of journal submissions, “critical incidents,” and PLC discussions
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CHAPTER FOUR: FINDINGS
Setting the Stage
In this chapter I describe the findings from my PAR study. I embarked on this study

because I saw a noticeable change in my school since the implementation of performance-based
pay. The pressures of this new system, due to the increased importance of final evaluation scores,
shifted conversations between teachers and administrators from those focusing on instructional
improvement to those fixed on attaining higher scores on the evaluation rubric. Additionally, on
a personal level as a school principal within this system, I too felt these same pressures and shifts
in my decision-making. As I began to witness the change in the teachers at our school, as well as
myself, I felt I needed to explore what was happening to us within the large frame of
neoliberalism and the creation of the new professional. I was also interested in attempting to
figure out ways for us to operate moving forward, as these systems became embedded into our
daily work.
I hoped that providing an open and non-evaluative space would allow a group of teachers
and myself an opportunity to discuss how we weighed our personal and professional interests
while operating within surveillance and rewards cultures (Freedberg, 2007; Jordan, 2000a; Lewis
& Olshansky, 2017; Miller, 2010a, 2010b; Raider-Roth, 2017). The subsequent research
questions allowed me to explore the following in this era of new professionalism and
neoliberalism:
1) When given a supportive space for ongoing dialogue, how do we as teachers and
administrators describe our educational decisions while functioning in evaluation
systems?
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2) How can I, as an administrator, along with the other administrators with whom I work,
best support teachers’ instructional decision-making during the current era of heightened
accountability?
During the study and the iterative process of meetings, observations, journaling, and
analysis, we all shared feelings and experiences regarding our educational choices by engaging
in frank discussions (in person, online, and via journaling) and sharing a sense of vulnerability.
In addition, we discussed how, as teachers and administrators, we could best co-navigate
educational decision making in our school, which offered performance-based pay incentives
based on final yearly evaluation scores. My data is organized in a way meant to narrate our
interactions and decisions. My first theme is: What We Faced—The Push and Pull of New
Professionalism. Within this first theme, I explore the different types of pushes we faced, such as
accountability measures and standardized practices; and, the pull of new professionalism, most
notably performance-based pay incentives. My second theme is: What Happened to Us—The
Onset of Insecurity, Powerlessness, and Disengagement, the by-products of the push and pull of
new professionalism. My third theme is: How We Responded—The Everyday Acts of
Resistance we used to fight back against the system. My fourth and final theme is: The Collateral
Damage of the System, such as the disconnect in our relationship with the district and our
evaluators, and the pushing of ethical boundaries.
What We Faced: The Push and Pull of New Professionalism
Education is currently in an era of heightened accountability where neoliberal decisionmakers have created policies and procedures aimed at recreating educators into new
professionals. In her book, Professional Development in Relational Learning Communities:
Teachers in Connection (2017), Miriam B. Raider-Roth described educators who are purveyors
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of skills and who do not make decisions about the content and pedagogy in the classroom. She
terms these people, who deliver that which others- often remote political experts- deem
important, educational clerks. Reading her book together at the start of the study, we quickly
recognized that the system was attempting to push and pull us in this direction—and we
acknowledged that this recreation was already taking place in our setting.
Within the current performance and rewards culture, educators are faced with constant
pushes and pulls of new professionalism. The pushes and pulls, described below, are factors that
both thrust (pushes) and lure (pulls) us into accepting this new way of thinking and teaching.
Educators in general are dealing with the policies and procedures that push us into embracing
new professionalism; however, our specific setting, which was a high school in a performancebased school district, had the added pull of performance-based pay incentives. Throughout the
study, we shared our educational decisions and discussed the complicated route by which we
came to them. We confirmed that we were being pushed and pulled by the forces of new
professionalism toward becoming educational clerks in our school rather than the professionals
we knew ourselves to be.
The Pushes of New Professionalism
By the push, I refer to the policies, practices, and tools at our school that moved us away
from decisions made from years of experience and accumulated knowledge, as well as
knowledge of our specific students, towards decisions predicated on following the mandates and
quantifiable indicators of the evaluation rubric that would recast us into educational clerks. The
pushes included: 1) accountability measures with their heightened emphasis on performance; and
2) the standardization of practices, which we felt lessened our autonomy and creative control.
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By standardization of practice, I refer to the curricular pacing, resources, and
instructional strategies dictated by local, state, and national decision makers that affected our
everyday work. These mandates dictated instructional choices and practices, and in striking
contrast to our previous experiences limited our ability to make the work we did our own. We
were saddened, angered, and fearful that we were being pushed into such regimented and
pressurized systems. Unfortunately, because we needed to survive in the profession, we fell prey
more often than not to the onslaught of this push.
Push: Accountability Measures
The accountability measures’ push consisted of the evaluation system and the observation
rubrics required by ESSA and implemented at the local level to measure and sort us. This
evaluation system and its accompanying observation rubrics produced a composite of our
performance in one to three formal observations (85%) along with our progress on SGOs (15%),
served as the determining measures of our yearly performance. The push of new professionalism
was alive and highly visible to all of us during the study. We shared numerous instances where
the push of the evaluation rubric was at the forefront of our educational decisions. For example,
Gary recounted a specific formal observation where he admitted to having the observation rubric
in mind when making instructional choices—more so than the needs of his students. Gary stated
that:
[The evaluation rubric has you] doing the things that don’t make you better just to get the
necessary points. It’s like doing extra moves to dunk a ball into the basket. It’s still two
points but the moves just make you look good.
Here, Gary’s recollection of the lesson, as well as his decision-making process, demonstrated
that he took accountability measures into consideration and acted accordingly; therefore, the
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heightened importance of his performance and meeting specific criteria of the observation rubric
pushed him towards becoming a different teacher, potentially one who added more flare without
relevant substance.
In the PLC Gina discussed a newfound fear while teaching at our school. For example,
Gina described colleagues at another school in the district spending more than the typical amount
of time on the processes and procedures needed to carry out a successful formal observation than
focusing on what would best benefit their students. Gina shared with the group a story she had
heard at a meeting of newly-hired teachers because she thought it was relevant to our discussion:
An author was coming to the school to read and conduct a poetry workshop for students.
English classes were invited several weeks before the event. The day before two teachers
backed out because they were going to be observed later in the week. They wanted to be
sure their students were prepped for behavior, procedures, and be at the specific point in
their learning. They told the organizer that the students behaved okay and had routines
but they had to be sure and that they actually wanted to pre-teach some of the material.
Apparently, the ‘observer’ is well known for knocking teachers on the most minor things.
These are not novice teachers, they are tenured and in the district for years but fear this
supervisor's wrath. So much so that their students missed what was described as a fun and
worthwhile learning experience that broadened the students’ ideas about poetry.
The story Gina relayed paints a picture of seemingly experienced and knowledgeable educators
sacrificing a rare opportunity for their students out of fear—a fear of performing poorly on an
upcoming formal observation. This fear of poor performance was a typical example of how we
changed as educators due to internal and external factors.
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Push: Standardized Practices
Along with the influx of accountability measures and a heightened emphasis on
performance, the standardization of our practices provided another example of how we were
pushed into systematic directions as educators. Throughout the study, we lamented the fact that
our decisions/choices were becoming more regimented and our ability to maintain autonomous
and creative control in our positions was lost. For example, pacing guides and recommended
instructional practices, once elements in our toolbox to choose from, now dictated our
educational choices and changed our decision-making. Roger described a situation in which he
felt not only losing creative control of his work with students, but what was being dictated for
him to do was actually wrong. Yet, he was required to comply with this standardized assessment
and process.
I was recently administering district assessments—AP Language and Composition. I
cannot explain how tiresome and frustrating it is to be forced to give an exam, to grade an
exam, to count this exam towards the student's score, and to use the score towards my
own evaluation, when the exam is full of mistakes! The district, time and time again,
prints hundreds of copies of exams which are littered with errors. Some errors are simple,
such as citing the wrong lines, and some, like this AP Lang and Comp Post Assessment,
pull an excerpt from an entirely wrong passage, and then ask questions which are of no
correlation to the wrong passage.... but rather must be asking questions about the mystery
excerpt. The idea that days are pulled from my instruction to administer these exams, to
grade them, to go to meetings to then analyze them... is insane to me. If the test editing
and creation process is done with such low fidelity, then why should I be asked to treat it
with any more seriousness than the test makers have?
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The excerpt above epitomized the effect that the standardization of practices had on changing our
decision-making. Although Roger believed that he had been asked to administer an inferior and
inaccurate assessment to his students, he could not break away from this mandated assessment
based on the fear that his evaluators would use this lack of compliance against him—even if it
could have negatively impacted his SGO score and did not truly assess the progress of his
students. The system and the standardization that came with it frustrated Roger; however, he had
to follow it or suffer negative evaluative consequences. Since scores on the rubric used to assess
a teacher’s teaching performance accounted for 85% of his yearly evaluation score, while his
SGO scores accounted for only 15%, Roger focused more on what he could to ensure
compliance on the evaluation rubric rather than worrying about student progress on his SGOs. In
this instance, to make certain success on the evaluation rubric, Roger had to give up the
autonomy and creative control he valued and which he felt his students needed to do well in his
class.
For us, the push of standardized practices was not only frustrating because it infringed
upon our autonomy—it was also frustrating because we, especially during formal observations,
sacrificed creativity for standardization, as following mandated instructional and curricular
choices were the safest ways to accrue higher points on the formal observation rubric by
blatantly documenting to administrators who evaluated us that we met indicators on the
evaluation rubric. Roger, the English teacher who groaned about losing autonomy over his
assessments, pined for the opportunity to be creative during a formal observation, but he felt the
cost was too great for him. Roger, a fairly new teacher and former union delegate, had fought
mightily against what he perceived as an unfair school district that kept teachers on the same
salary guide for four years; therefore, he needed to do everything he could to clinch the highest
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scores possible on the evaluation rubric. This idea is palpable in the situation Roger described in
the following journal entry.
It is a big risk [to stray from the curriculum during a formal observation]. Like in the
standard curriculum I could either do this super safe and know that I have a good
argument for a better score or I want to try this because it sounds more creative and that’s
a little more for my kids. But then the risk is someone is walking by and then didn’t like
it.
As the above excerpt suggests, Roger felt pushed away from taking a creative chance in his
teaching based on fear of being rated poorly on a formal observation by his evaluators. Like
Roger, others in the group had also internalized the importance of scoring well on the
observation rubric which. This, in turn, pushed us into placing the accountability tools and
standard practices at the forefront of our decision-making simply to survive in our jobs. This
continued loss of autonomy and creativity, coupled with the knowledge that two consecutive
years of poor performance on yearly evaluations could lead to our dismissal, enticed us further
towards new professionalism.
The Pull of New Professionalism
Where the push consisted of the policies, practices, and tools at our school that moved us
away from our decisions of yesteryear, the pull was comprised of what moved or lured us toward
becoming educational clerks. More specifically, the pull was the potential personal, financial,
and/or professional security that we could attain with an above average performance, as dictated
by the observation rubric. The pull was the element of the evaluation system, performance-based
pay, meant to attract us to adhering to the mandates and standardization of practice of new
professionalism.
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Performance-based pay pulled/attracted/lured us to new professionalism by means of the
personal, financial, and/or professional security it potentially offered. The ultimate goal of
performance-based pay was to incentivize us to perform in ways that were consistent with the
newly adopted criteria embedded in the evaluation system, which were assumed to be the types
of teaching behaviors that would result in improved student performance on standardized tests.
Unfortunately, the by-product of this movement was our transformation into educational clerks.
We were becoming regurgitators of the knowledge and skills that the powers that be thrust upon
us. However, the pull of performance-based pay, although pressurized like the pushes I described
in the previous section, provided us with the chance to benefit from playing the system by
teaching to the evaluation rubric.
As a reminder, the opportunity to attain performance-based pay by reaching a score of 3.5
or higher (out of 4.0) on our yearly evaluation was very appealing to us for personal,
professional, and/or financial reasons. If we scored 3.5 or higher on our yearly evaluation
(equivalent to highly effective) we moved up two steps on the salary guide in the following
school year; whereas, scoring between 2.5-3.4 (effective) only moved us up one step (like the
traditional salary guide did) and scoring 2.4 or less (partially effective or ineffective) placed us
on a corrective action plan. And, another year of being rated partially effective or ineffective
while being on a corrective action plan would allow the district to seek tenure charges against
tenured participants for performance and remove us from our positions—while non-tenured
teachers, to reiterate, could be released for any reason within the first four years of employment,
regardless of performance. With our positions now less secure and each of us trying to do what
we could to increase our standing and status, performance-based pay was both attractive and
nerve-wracking. This extrinsic reward provided us with an opportunity to attain increased
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financial rewards in a profession with ever-increasing costs (for example, rises in health
insurance and pension contributions) and less contributions to us from our employers (for
example, decreases in cost-of-living adjustments, the elimination of salary guide adjustments
based on the attainment of advanced degrees coupled with a virtually empty pool of money for
tuition reimbursement).
Throughout the study, we discussed how/if the pull of performance-based pay incentives
played a role in our daily educational decision-making. Although we, at times, operated with the
idea that sound educational decisions grounded in our professional knowledge and experiences
would ultimately lead us to attain performance-based pay rewards, this was not the norm. Our inperson conversations and journaling suggested that we made educational decisions in line with
the evaluation rubric and the lure of performance-based pay, even when our professional
knowledge and experience did not support these decisions. When asked to describe his mindset
when making educational decisions under the performance-based pay system, Gary explained
that:
Well that’s the thing, I always want to be a better teacher and I always want to do things
to make myself better, and I think it's like, most people we work with are intrinsically
motivated teachers, but specifically with those evaluations, I felt like I was doing it to get
the highest score possible not necessarily the best way to teach the lesson.
When I prodded Gary further on the topic, especially if the district (as rumored) would
potentially eliminate performance-based pay in the next school year, he elaborated further.
(Please note that below, by “cutesy stuff”, Gary is referring to the addition of extra instructional
strategies and resources that both heighten the learning environment for students and increase
their odds of scoring higher on the evaluation rubric.)
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My instruction isn't going to change but I’m not going to put as much effort into the
planning. What I have is solid and there will be no need to go beyond because highly
effective isn't available. You are not going to see the cutesy stuff. I am not going to put as
much time into the planning for these incredible lessons. I don't think much of the stuff
would come out. What will be eliminated is what I could add if there was pressure on me
to do well.
During this particular PLC session, we got to the heart of the pull of new professionalism and its
effects on us. Performance-based pay, via the opportunity to gain more money, lured us closer to
becoming educational clerks as our decisions were changing in and out of formal observations.
We knew what we needed to do to score high on the evaluation rubric to attain performancebased pay, and when it was unavailable (whether during formal observations or in the
elimination of the opportunity), we believed that our efforts would be toned down because we
had shifted from intrinsic to extrinsic satisfaction. Warren, in his not-so-poetic way, put it bluntly
when summing up this particular PLC session:
For people like Gary, [the elimination of performance-based pay] will be positive,
because he can be creative. But for certain people, what's the incentive to do well? As
long as I am not a complete idiot the two or three times I get observed, I am going to do
whatever I want to do.
At the very end of the study (during post-PLC journaling), the district announced that
performance-based pay would be eliminated the following school year because people were
mastering the observation/evaluation rubric and more money was allocated to compensate highly
effective teachers than the district originally allotted to this. It is worth noting that, although
performance-based pay for teachers would be eliminated, the evaluation system and
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accompanying rubric would remain in place. The overall feeling from the group was that,
although performance-based pay was seemingly a slap-in-the-face to their professionalism (for
example, having to work harder for our yearly keep), it was at least something for which we
strived to attain during difficult financial and professional times. However, with the elimination
of performance-based pay came further resentment towards the evaluation system, its elements,
and the people responsible for its implementation. Otto provided a poignant account of his
feelings toward the introduction of performance-based pay (and his gradual movement towards
embracing new professionalism) and then its eventual elimination:
Our value as employees is constantly decreased based on how the district sees us. We are
a burden, a drain, over paid, underworked, and all we do is complain (possibly true). Yet,
the district cannot function without us. Our compensation has never directly reflected our
value, yet they continue to squander finances and ensure that we never receive a livable
wage. To add insult to injury, they remove the one thing [performance-based pay] that
was reasonable. While the plight of a mismanaged district is very real, it does not account
for the sheer lack of respect and support that we as educators are denied. The district
wonders why things are so bad, why nothing they do works. There are hundreds of
reasons why, but the most glaring is their inability to look at its staff and students as
humans, instead of cogs. With that, it is important to remember these words ‘I know what
I bring to the table, so trust me when I say I’m not afraid to eat alone.’ Sometimes you
have to walk away.
The above comment, from Otto, was the quintessential example of performance-based pay luring
us into becoming new professionals but also affecting our outlook on the profession which, in
turn, affected our educational decisions. As Donald further explained: “This job is stressful
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enough, but it is almost to a point where it's not worth it anymore. The perks that used to make
teaching attractive are disappearing and the pay isn't improving, so at some point we are going to
ask ourselves ‘What am I doing here?’” In analyzing the data, the pull of new professionalism
was very real and the lure of performance-based pay definitely altered our mindset.
Push and Pull Summary
The push and pull of new professionalism was born out of the pressurized performance
and rewards cultures created in our school by an increased focus on evaluation tools, mandated
curricular and instructional methods, and performance-based pay opportunities. The ability to
lose tenure after two consecutive years of being rated as ineffective and/or partially effective, the
lure of performance-based pay during tough, economic times, and the loss of what we held
sacred in the profession (for example, creative choice) all led us to feel and weigh the push and
pull of new professionalism. Next I describe this push and pull through an examination of how
we made educational decisions, all while we were thrust towards new professionalism via fear
and/or reward, my second theme: The Onset of Insecurity, Powerlessness, and Disengagement,
which was a by-product of the push and pull of new professionalism.
What Happened to Us: The Onset of Insecurity, Powerlessness, & Disengagement
Based on my analysis of the data collected, insecurity, powerlessness, and
disengagement, by-products of the push and pull of new professionalism, began to influence our
educational decision-making process. The systems in which we operated decreased our sense of
financial, personal, and professional security, which in turn, created a sense of powerlessness as
rubrics and individuals other than ourselves exerted control over our livelihood more than ever
before. As a reminder, with the implementation of performance-based pay incentives, teaching
staff could no longer move up on the salary guide for attaining a higher degree or completing
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coursework. That is, salary guide movement rested solely on yearly evaluation scores. Moreover,
fear of financial, personal, and professional loss, coupled with a loss of power over our
circumstances, led to our heightened disengagement from work, beyond doing what was needed
to survive. During the PLC sessions and online journaling, we discussed how these by-products
of the push and pull seeped into our daily work. More often than not, we conveyed how
unsettling these changes were to all of us. Throughout this section, I show that each of these
were by-products of the new mandates (pushes) and enticement (pulls) we dealt with. I also
explain how these by-products affected our educational decision-making. Below, I define and
present these individual feelings. However, while I present these components as distinct feelings
we experienced and discussed during the study, they tended to occur in tandem as by-products of
the push and pull of new professionalism.
Insecurity
By insecurity, I refer to fear of our personal, professional, and/or financial well-being that
permeated our daily work and decisions. Through our discussions and actions, we illustrated a
heightened insecurity in our jobs, something we attributed to the intense scrutiny and pressure
that the evaluation system and its tools exerted on us, especially during formal observations.
Throughout the study, it was palpable that insecurity at home and at work played a major
part in the professional decisions we made. Feeling insecure with the tenuous nature of our jobs
and livelihood caused us to make instructional choices with the goal of obtaining high scores on
the observation rubric. This can be credited to the system increasing the level of scrutiny on our
work and the newly, tenuous nature of our jobs. During our in-person discussions and on-line
journaling, it became clear that our sense of security affected how we interacted with our
evaluators and peers during work hours, as well as with our family during afterhours. For
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example, some participants (especially those who were non-tenure) with tenuous financial
situations begrudgingly pushed aside family time, especially when preparing for formal
observations, in order to plan exceptional lessons to score as high as possible on the evaluation
rubric which, in turn, would hopefully improve the family’s financial situation.
Feelings of insecurity wore on us, as I discussed above. We argued that the anxiety the
system created over scoring as high as possible on the rubric to obtain the highest amount of
performance-based pay available on the salary guide played a vital role in our educational
decision-making. Further, beyond the idea that we were fighting for our supper more than ever,
we were also battling a major increase in the costs of living, particularly in the area of health
benefits. For instance, Donald and Gina identified the need for second jobs solely to make up for
increased health benefits costs. Others like Ava and Roger took their chances on the Affordable
Healthcare Exchange to receive a stipend for waiving district-offered health benefits. These
additional details of the difficult financial straits of the vast majority of members in the group
weighed heavily on our educational decisions. We had human responsibilities that were getting
more difficult each year and our personal and financial needs absolutely affected the choices we
made in our school. The statement below, from Ava, summarizes the idea that making
educational decisions is not so cut and dry when one’s personal, financial, and professional
livelihood is hanging by a string.
The need to pay my bills outweighed my healthcare. Thank god I am healthy but what if
that changes quickly? I’m very happy that we have a contract after hearing everyone’s
horror stories. However, and I know that being a new teacher plays a big role in this, I
can’t help but feel that our district teachers are conditioned to settle. However, with this
new contract, I take longer to reach the top of the salary guide, my cap has been
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decreased, I no longer have a way to get a raise as performance based pay is gone and I
don’t get anything for furthering my education. I can’t raise a family in this district.
Donald further described the overall feeling of the group regarding these burning
obligations in his journal entry below.
This whole situation is disheartening to say the least. One of the most attractive reasons
to become a teacher is the pension and the way above average health insurance, take one
of those away and teaching isn't a very attractive profession. Knowing my family is well
cared for, medically speaking, if any issues with their health arise makes it a lot easier to
accept the not so attractive salary, it is a tradeoff almost all of us are willing to make and
have made. I will gladly take less money for the comfort of knowing my family is
protected by some of the best health insurance available to people, but now that the
district is changing to a ʺcheaperʺ insurance that is supposedly equal in quality, this job
has lost any attractiveness it may have had. Let's be honest, none of us became teachers
to become rich, personally I became a teacher to help kids, to be a positive role model
like some of my teachers were for me, to provide my family with good health benefits,
and to ensure that I would be secure in retirement, all while making a comfortable living.
When the district takes away my family's insurance, it says to me ʺwe don't care about
you or your familyʺ and that makes it quite a bit harder to come to school in the morning,
especially when I was up late working a second job because I accepted less money in
exchange for the benefits that are being taken away. I know the district said the new
benefits are equal in coverage, but I don't see how they can be when the district is being
so secretive about it and everyone at central office in charge of this has different answers
to the same question. This is a disaster waiting to happen and the collateral damage is our
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health and well-being. This district is notorious for mismanaging money, so what is going
to happen when they eventually run out of money to pay for some of the claims and we
are left responsible for the doctor bills? It is not a question of “if” this will happen, but
“when” it will happen and “how” bad it will be for all of us when it does happen. This job
is stressful enough, but it is almost to a point where it's not worth it anymore. The perks
that used to make teaching attractive are disappearing and the pay isn't improving, so at
some point we are going to ask ourselves ‘What am I doing here?’”
Through the above discussion about pension and healthcare costs, we see how our
newfound insecurity further complicated the assumed, easy process of providing the highest
quality of instruction to our students. We were people with real-life problems and our students
suffered when we put our own financial and professional needs over the needs of our students
when making educational decisions. We resented the added feelings of insecurity that
pressurized planning and loss of quality time at home brought about. Consequently, we cut back
on our after-hours planning, especially while at home, although this response varied among us
based on our individual circumstances.
Powerlessness
By powerlessness, in this context, I refer to the loss of creative and autonomous control
over our educational decisions. We felt a loss of power/control over our own actions and
decisions, as the system and its accompanying rubrics seemed to dictate more and more what we
did and lessened the curricular and instructional choices we had.
In almost every PLC discussion and the vast majority of journal entries, we described
power as a major factor in fostering positive or negative connections. Members of the PLC
vociferously debated the issue of power throughout the study. Non-tenured participants, such as
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Donald, Ava, and Gina, expressed a resounding feeling of hopelessness as they felt cheated of
the opportunity to make additional money by the power their direct evaluators had (in their
estimation) to deliberately rate them lower on the observation rubric. When speaking as a group,
the non-tenured participants described how the system made them apprehensive about taking
educational risks—especially during formal observations. They described a fear of going above
and beyond the call of duty, as these types of educational decisions were not clearly identifiable
to observers on the evaluation rubric. For example, Gina commented that the person who
evaluated her, a “clueless and script-following administrator” who struggled with in her
evaluating role, “made sure non-tenure teachers, such as herself, did not score high on the
evaluations.” In addition, Ava lamented the fact that she continually had to “second-guess her
instructional decisions” because she certain direct evaluators, particularly her content-area
supervisor, “showed you who was in charge every time we talked during post-conferences.”
And, to Donald, the power many evaluators yielded by way of the evaluation rubric—especially
with non-tenured staff—enraged him. For instance, Donald’s content-area supervisor told him
directly that he could teach the same lesson as a tenured teacher in the building yet he would
receive lower scores on the observation rubric. The content-area supervisor did this because of
the edict he was given regarding the rubric scoring on non-tenure staff members and because he
could not argue with seasoned, tenured staff in the building. One would think that creativity
could never be viewed as something negative when working with children; however, for these
non-tenure participants, creativity was pushed aside in favor of what guaranteed success on the
formal observation rubric.
On the other hand, tenured participants (myself included) with self-described clout as
established, effective staff members and, in some cases, union leaders, fought back against this
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notion of powerlessness since we were given more leeway on observation rubrics—and with this
came more of a feeling of control over our circumstances. For tenured participants such as Gary
and Otto, there were times when we stayed true to our convictions since we had less fear of
repercussions. It is true that since the advent of systems of heightened accountability, a tenured
teacher can be removed from his or her position after two consecutive years of inefficient and/or
partially-efficient performance; however, tenured staff have more stability than non-tenured
teachers who can, for the most part, lose their position at any time for numerous reasons (e.g.,
not being “a good fit”). Therefore, when Otto was asked whether or not he followed through with
nonsensical decisions, especially during formal observations, it was far from surprising that he
asserted he was “not making a one-time change for irrelevant feedback.” Here we see Otto
stating that he went into every lesson (whether it is a formal observation or not) looking to do the
best by his students—regardless of how it might have affected his evaluation score and, in turn,
his security. Otto’s tenure, and the political clout that came with it, empowered him to continue
being authentic in his teaching. Other tenured participants in the group shared instances in which
their actions were in agreement with Otto’s approach. We agreed with Otto because we felt we
had some control over our circumstances, more security than our non-tenured colleagues, and
some wiggle-room to fight back against a system that was gradually attempting to remove our
yearning to put our students first.
The power dynamic is also brought to life through an interaction between Donald and
Gary. Both teachers felt that if they taught identical lessons, Gary (tenured) would receive better
rubric scores than Donald (non-tenured). Gary remarked how their particular content-area
supervisor “doesn’t waste his time with me and he has told me many times that since [I] know
the [observation] rubric inside out, [he doesn’t] even go nuts with spending time on [my]
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observations.” Donald followed these comments by stating that “And I get it, you work hard and
you earned it but isn’t it supposed to be a blind rubric as they always say at our trainings—it
definitely isn’t one that is blind.”
The narratives above from the non-tenured staff show individuals believing that control
over their circumstances and potential for success was lost and that the system was further
pulling evaluators into making decisions based on statuses. And this led us to the perception that
the system allowed these evaluators to carry out traditional power roles, which, in turn, pulled
non-tenure teachers into feeling powerless. It could also be said that the system and its tools
created a regimented and tedious system of assigning quantifiable scores that required our
evaluators to adhere to traditional power structures because there was not enough time to
debate/discuss assigned scores on formal observations. However, it is quite likely that, due to the
failing status of the district, we all became cogs in a wheel in the same fraught system. We
understood that our evaluators were feeling the same pressures of the evaluation system that we
were; however, we could not help believing that they had the best interests of the system in mind
over our own. Just as teachers were viewed by parents and students as representatives of the
district and its policies and procedures, administrators were viewed by those they supervised and
evaluated in the same light.
Disengagement
By disengagement in this context, I refer to decreases in our levels of enthusiasm and
energy while teaching and leading in our school. We expressed frustration and disenchantment
for the ways in which the system attempted to eradicate our passion and spirit for our work.
Salient categories of these energy dips included but were not limited to: the lack of flexibility in
curricular and instructional decisions; the assigned scores on our formal observations trumping
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open discussions about improving our work; and, the overall feeling that we were not valued in
our workplace.
We became further disengaged as our lack of flexibility in our curricular and instructional
decisions heightened. Further, we developed a mindset that the district was dictated more of our
curricular and instructional choices and there was not much we could do—especially if we
wanted to score well on our summative evaluations. Roger explained this thought-process below:
When you are given dictated units, this is day 1, lesson 1, I come in without a worry in
the world that I am going to teach that exact same lesson and if anyone says that wasn’t
good enough, my defense is this is what the district told me that I had to do, that better be
a perfect lesson. If it is not a perfect lesson, that is the district’s fault. That’s me taking, I
don’t know what that is, maybe playing the system a little bit. But they are giving me
what to do so it better be great.
Moreover, we became less enthused with implementing creative and exciting lessons due to the
rigidity of the observation rubric and the fear that missteps (for example, a technology-heavy
lesson not working during a formal observation) would stop us from scoring high on the
evaluation rubric. Donald, by rehashing an earlier conversation he had with Warren, presents this
dilemma and mindset below:
And something Warren always told me that I always respect it he creates his regimented
curriculum and he has it all planned out and I asked him well why do you do that. And he
said to me well I used to teach a different way but then once you got used to working
here under this rubric you could not depend on technology every day. So what happens if
I'm getting observed and I make a lesson that's surely based in technology and just it
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doesn't work? Working in a place like this you can never fully trust that, especially
during the day of an observation.
Beyond our disdain for the lack of flexibility we had over curricular and instructional
decisions, we stressed the fact that our evaluators too were going through the motions of the
evaluation system and let the tools and instruments push aside our ability to be cognitively
engaged. The result of these actions perpetuated the perception that our evaluators no longer
cared for us and/or were not looking out for our best interests in the system. Warren highlighted
these feelings below:
Cause I knew [previous building administrators] couldn’t teach or didn’t care, so
knowing that, you have to focus on the boxes if you are concerned about merit pay. There
are other admins that can’t interpret what is going on and, if you don’t do verbatim, in 20
minutes, there are not checking that box for you. I’m done with this.
By our evaluators not having the time, skills, or political capital to deviate from the system and
its tools, we fell into a state of disengagement. Below, Ava’s description of an interaction with
her content-area supervisor summarized this struggle:
During the Post-Conference, which took a long time since these were only a few of many
scores I disagreed with, I felt that Mr. Franklin was raising my score to either appease me
or to dodge answering, "How could I have improved so that this category could've been
exemplary?" I felt that Mr. Franklin was very hesitant to score me exemplary, he rarely
answered how I could achieve exemplary but would be happy to give me a Proficient 3 as
a compromise instead. His advice for Exemplary scores was to be detailed and up to date
on my online data binder, despite the fact that I had brought in a copy of the [student
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data] scores, class work to demonstrate my analysis of student strengths, and a group
seating chart highlighted and color coordinated to display each student's in-class average
as it is also considered when grouping. If I wanted to be exemplary, I had to do more. I
had to have it logged in the format and categorized the way the district approved of.
Here we see Ava lamenting that she could not have a simple conversation with her content-area
supervisor about improving to improve her teaching; rather, this post-conference was an element
of the system that needed to be completed and her observation was one of many on her
evaluators list to be submitted.
Ava went on to further show this feeling of disengagement and a loss of mental and
physical energy in her job:
Yea, I had a 20-minute observation, I think it went okay but some stuff was maybe
missed but I am just tired of being inspected. I have stuff to do for my kids with post
assessments and PARCC—I’m tired of being bothered. It went well on paper and it a
little confusing at the beginning and end of the period because the seniors who have had
crazy schedules. I know Simon and he is great but he didn’t get to see the big stuff I
wanted him to see. They did not get to share. I wasn’t scored low but it wasn’t fair
because he didn’t see the beginning where you could see student leadership and sharing
and so on. I showed him some stuff and he bumped the score up but I shouldn’t have had
to do that.
Ava fell prey to the pull of the system, as she went into the post-conference ready to fight for her
“points” on the evaluation rubric. And, as a non-tenured teacher, she was forced into
regurgitating content and sticking to the script during formal observations. Moreover, since Ava
was new to the profession, I feared that the creativity for which I hired her, and also saw her use
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on a regular basis, may have been pushed aside for the more regimented decisions that benefited
her on the formal observation rubric. In addition, like Gary earlier, I feared the system’s pull
towards regimented instruction and the lack of rewards for anything beyond that may have begun
to also affect Ava’s daily instruction. And this can be traced back to many things but, most
noticeably, to her interactions with a superior whom she perceived, through his regimented
actions, as not being authentic.
Insecurity, Powerlessness, and Disengagement Summary
In this section of chapter 4, I summarized our struggles with insecurity, powerlessness,
and disengagement, the by-products of the push and pull of new professionalism. The system
complicated our decisions since its pressurized nature affected our ability to balance these
critical elements, resulting more often than not in having us give into the push and pull of new
professionalism. It was an unending cycle that we were trying to navigate through, all while
educating our students and attempting to maintain some semblance of security, power, and
engagement in our work. In the section to follow, I show that we responded to the feelings of
insecurity, powerlessness, and disengagement with everyday acts of resistance.
Our Resistance to Being Remade as Professionals
We were faced with amplified pressure to perform in certain ways during the formal
observation process; hence, this pressure made us fear failure more than ever before. When
insecurity, powerlessness, and/or disengagement set in and we began to feel ourselves being
remade as professionals, we responded with what I came to recognize as resistance. Throughout
the study, we offered examples of how we directly and indirectly fought back against the push
and pull to recreate us as educational clerks. When analyzing my data, I gravitated to the idea of
everyday acts of resistance. Everyday acts of resistance, as defined by Anderson (2008), are
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“tactics of the people that circumvent power rather than actively opposing it.” (Anderson, 2008,
p.261). In this era of performance and surveillance cultures, everyday acts of resistance are
“safer than overt acts of protest and refusal” and can potentially have a “higher effect in
achieving limited objectives of subordinated social actors.” (Anderson, 2008, p. 261, 267). We
followed through with these acts of resistance when we felt we had strayed too far from what
made us the educators we were and when we felt ourselves being recreated into something we
did not like.
In our setting, these acts of resistance were most often delivered indirectly. We did
however, on some occasions, enacted direct acts of resistance by actively and openly opposing
our evaluators. Although direct acts of resistance intensified the definition of everyday acts of
resistance beyond covert actions, they do fall into my overall theme of resistance. Direct acts of
resistance consisted of the times we pushed back directly and/or stood our ground against the
system and our chief evaluators. Indirect everyday acts of resistance consisted of withholding our
time after hours and scaling back our instructional planning and delivery. It should be noted that
the ability to resist and/or the method by which we enacted these forms of resistance (direct or
indirect) varied based on our statuses and the clout we had in our school. For example, those of
us who were tenured, like I was, had some semblance of security and accumulated clout; hence,
if we so chose we were able to push back more than our non-tenured colleagues. In summation,
these actions consisted of decisions that changed the course of education for, in our opinion, the
better, and/or, brought back to us a sense of control over our professionalism.
Direct Resistance
By direct resistance, I refer to our efforts to resist the system’s push to transform our
teaching that were blatantly obvious to our evaluators. Direct resistance took the form of
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instructional decisions that went against the standard curricular and instructional methods we
were directed to utilize in the classroom. It also took the form of pushing back against what we
perceived as subjective evaluations of our work or unfair treatment by our evaluators. Nontenure participants, although frustrated with what they perceived of as an unfair system, mostly
avoided resisting our evaluators directly for fear of retaliation. Of the tenured participants—other
than Otto, Warren, and I—also avoided direct resistance because they believed that “toeing the
company line” was the best way to be successful in their positions. It is interesting to point out
that the three of us who fought back directly either left our positions in the district for other
positions in education (Otto and I) or left education altogether (Warren) within a year the study
ended. The three of us fought back directly and made instructional decisions that extended
beyond the curricula and strategies the district mandated us to use. Some of the participants
pushed back directly against those evaluators we perceived as unfair. In these cases of direct
resistance, our evaluators knew what we were doing. Confronted with our direct attempts to
maintain our sense of professionalism, our evaluators were forced to react.
We presented examples of direct resistance where we refused to be remade as new
professionals and stood our ground regarding our teaching convictions. In these cases, we made
decisions in line with our knowledge and professional experiences and refused to let the system
and its tools change who we were professionally. For example, Otto was tired of making
decisions that contradicted his own expertise. Based on his tenure status and overall disdain for
what he was mandated to implement in his classroom, Otto purposefully decided to teach in
ways he felt would best serve his students. Below is an example of Otto’s direct resistance to a
system he felt was doing a disservice to his students by forcing him and his colleagues to put on
shows during formal observations.
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Maybe it is different because I am tenured, you know it is different because I am tenured
and I do not care for stupidity anymore. I am not changing to put on a show. Why am I
changing for a one-time to show to receive mostly irrelevant feedback? I know you and I
have had some talk about more engagement and I get it. I did not agree with most of it
because it was not my style but I get it and respect (that) because you take pride in your
feedback. But my (current) supervisor? The guy is afraid of his own shadow and could
not teach! I want more questions about how an admin can support me, (that’s) what am I
interested in. I want genuine lesson feedback and I refuse to put on a show.
Otto went on to highlight other elements of his professional decision-making that did not involve
putting on shows. Instead, he chose to do what was best for kids, which in many instances
contrasted with the mandated curricular and instructional choices rewarded by the district.
Transitions [in the evaluation rubric] are so stupid. Multiple parts are “I got you” and
there are always parts where bad or dumb admins can pull the rug out from you. To get
everything into each lesson because the money is dangled in front of you is pointless for
me because they can score you whatever way they want to score you. I always knew kids;
I would teach kids the way it would benefit them. It's all about the relationships and what
you need. If the admin is a joke and you need the money, you will go through hoops. My
hoop days are over.
Otto’s example is one of a teacher who, because tenure gave him a sense of security and
because he was tired of putting on a show f during observations, directly resisted the system and
his evaluators. Otto understood what was required of him to score high on the formal evaluation
rubric; however, his conscience could not allow him to, as he described, “jump through hoops,”
for a district he felt no longer had his best interests in mind.
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When we resisted, as evident in the examples provided above from Otto and Warren, it
was more about stopping the system from redefining who we were as professionals. I also shared
with study participants an example of my own experience during the school year of this study in
which I fought back directly during my first formal observation and the post-conference that
followed. In this instance, my administrative performance was downgraded by my evaluator
during a formal observation visit to our school because one teacher did not have an assignment
on hand after her students completed a quiz. When I attempted to explain my case in defense of
the teacher, I was not given an opportunity to do so. This tactic on the part of my evaluator was
troublesome and contradicted the way in which I observed and evaluated staff in our school.
Upon having my attempts to argue my points dismissed by my direct evaluator, I took the case to
my direct evaluator’s evaluators (not before calling out sick the next day and questioning my
purpose in education). This action was a direct act of resistance, as I was taking on a superior
with evaluative power. Within a month, I noticed that my scores were changed to better reflect
my instructional leadership; however, I was never notified of this change and noticed the
changes in scores only accidentally during a random log-in to the evaluation system. I was told
through reliable sources that my direct evaluator was advised to make the changes based on the
evidence I had provided. Even so, my direct evaluator never alerted me of the changes, as he
was, in my opinion, clearly not interested in being magnanimous and possibly embarrassed. The
quantifiable nature of the evaluation rubric and the post-conference had potentially empowered
or pushed my superior to assign me a score without bothering to discuss the results with me or
even consider making changes—until his superior called him out for the error of his ways.
I suspect my pushback would have been used negatively against me if I had remained in
the school principal position for the second observation of the school year. And I have no doubt

EXPLORING EDUCATORS’ DECISIONS

99

that I would have continued to push back because I knew my heart was in the right place and I
refused to make different decisions just to appease my evaluator and the system. I had tenure in
the district as a principal and had built up much political and social capital. Therefore, my own
overt resistance was coming out of a position of strength, something the majority of my fellow
participants did not have.
Indirect Resistance
By indirect resistance, I refer to our efforts to resist the system’s push to transform our
teaching, which were private to us and not obvious to our evaluators. Indirect resistance
consisted of decisions we made that, although not apparent to our evaluators, were meant to
serve as a way of retaking some control over our professional lives. This type of resistance
ranged from withholding time after hours to plan lessons to scaling down effort and creativity in
our planning and delivery of instruction. Although it was not our intention, our acts of indirect
resistance directly affected the well-being of our students. This effect will be discussed in greater
detail later in this chapter.
Indirect Resistance: Scaling Down Our Efforts & Withholding Our Time
As we progressed through the school year and faced the uneasiness and difficulties of
pressurized evaluations, we became physically and mentally exhausted and broken. Otto
summed up this exhaustion and brokenness as follows:
While the plight of a mismanaged district is very real, it does not account for the sheer
lack of respect and support that we as educators are denied. The district wonders why
things are so bad, why nothing they do works. There are hundreds of reasons why, but the
most glaring is their inability to look at its staff and students as humans, instead of cogs.
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With that, it is important to remember these words: “I know what I bring to the table, so
trust me when I say I’m not afraid to eat alone.” Sometimes you have to walk away.
And this physical and mental exhaustion and breaking point led us to scale back the time and
energy we put into our lessons outside of formal evaluation days. Lacking adequate and secure
outlets to fight back and feeling the need to ensure yearly success, we did subtle things like not
spending extra time after hours planning lessons for a system we felt did not do the same for us.
Although the standardization imposed by the evaluation system severely limited our autonomy
and creative control of the pacing, scope, and sequence of curriculum for our grade levels and/or
subject areas, the evaluation rubric did require us to invest a level of lesson-based effort to attain
an effective or higher score. Thus, due to the physical and mental exhaustion I previously
mentioned, it became common practice for us to only provide what was required of us in the
observation rubric in lessons delivered during formal observations. Consequently, this approach
trickled into everyday lessons not carrying such scrutiny/weight. If we were going to expend
high levels of effort for a district we felt did not respect us, we were going to only do it when the
stakes mattered the most—during formal observations.
Prior to the study, Gary was well-known by all stakeholders at our school as an excellent
teacher who developed great relationships with his students. More than midway through the
school year of the study, and during the time period of which standardized testing took place,
Gary was faced with a dilemma. He wanted to teach an in-depth lesson on a particular topic of
interest to his students, but, due to the revised schedule precipitated by the administration of the
state tests, he was questioning his methods. Prior to this new era in education, Gary stated that he
regularly did extra planning (especially after hours from home) for intellectual curiosity and to
benefit his students; however, the pressure of the observation process, the dissatisfaction he had
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with the implementation of the teacher evaluation system, and the relief of completing formal
observations, led him to scale back his efforts and indirectly resist a new teacher identity the
evaluation system forced on him. Where it seemed to many that the pressurized requirements of
the evaluation system should have made us work harder and longer after school hours, this could
not be further from the truth. This resistance to going the extra mile during after school hours
(which was more prevalent prior to this new era of evaluation) was a direct result of the pressure
and scrutiny that we faced on a daily basis. As a subtle form of resistance, we withheld our
efforts after hours, as an expression of our unwillingness to be remade as professionals—a
remaking that required us to constantly fight for our keep, in lieu of spending time in more
gratifying situations (for example, with our families).
Gary ensured success on his yearly summative evaluation by receiving three highly-rated
formal observations from his evaluators. However, this simple act of toning down his instruction
outside of formal evaluations was an indirect act of resistance. Gary was no longer going above
and beyond the call of duty, as he “felt that there was no way that I was going to stay up until 11
pm to plan this lesson. I’d rather watch a hockey playoff game. There wasn’t any pressure to get
it done so I didn’t go crazy—I just reviewed for the test.” Here, we see a prime example of how
Gary, drained and frustrated by how hard he had to work to potentially attain performance-based
pay, indirectly fought back against the system. That is, Gary indirectly showed dissatisfaction
with his circumstances by refusing to go above and beyond the call of duty for a system that he
felt viewed him more and more as a cog and an evaluation score, rather than the professional he
saw himself being. He had done what the district required of him and he had ensured aboveaverage performance on his formal evaluation, but was not going the extra mile for a district that
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no longer went the extra mile for him. Unfortunately, his actions indirectly hurt his students by
denying them of his best teaching on a daily basis.
Time was very precious to us and we devoted our time and energy to the people and
things we felt supported us as individuals and as educators. As such, we withheld additional
planning time for everyday lessons (especially outside of school hours) because we did not feel
the system cared as much about us as we cared about education—even if it negatively affected
our students. Later in this chapter, I will further describe how we were consciously aware of the
decisions we made which negatively affected out students. And these feelings lessened our
dedication to the profession (one that we felt was trying to remake us on a daily basis) in
comparison to our relationships and interests after hours. We shared examples of indirect
resistance whereby we chose to forego completing work after hours because of the perceived
poor treatment we felt we were receiving at work. For instance, Otto stated that he would “not
waste away a minute of watching cartoons” with his son (which was a gratifying experience) for
a district that stopped caring about him.” Otto went on to describe, with much agitation, his
choice to spend more time with his family. As a tenured teacher with increased financial
pressures at home, he felt able to put the security of his family first. However, his decision to
shun work after school hours was also a sign of his decreased enthusiasm with the system/his pay
and an everyday act of resistance. Otto went on the state the following:
Considering I have not had a formal observation since round one, I will discuss my
thought process for switching from "traditional" to "universal (performance-based pay)."
Economics was the answer. I simply realized I would make more, faster, with an MA
than I would on the traditional guide. The extra step incentive merely allowed me to
advance to what I was "owed" at an accelerated rate, but never actually thought that it
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would materialize. Even with the potential to not receive my extra steps, it made better
financial sense to switch over. I have no regrets about the decision as I knew I would be
underpaid either way. Now I’m just less underpaid.
For these tenured educators, spending time after hours being present in the lives of their
families was important. For example, Otto described “Daniel Tiger Time” with his son and
Donald explained how he put his instruction on cruise control rather than provide his students
with the level of instruction he thought they needed and deserved. These subtle yet important
actions, were the ways we provided indirect resistance to what we deemed to be an increasingly
relentless system. As professionals, we felt obligated to put forth the best effort possible when
planning and delivering instruction for our students. Unfortunately, the badgering that we took
from the system throughout the school year led us to gradually reduce our everyday teaching
efforts to the bare minimum given the pressure of what we needed to do to reach performancebased incentive goals. In brief, we could not directly resist the system and our evaluators during
formal observations by teaching in a way that contradicted standardized practices and evaluation
rubric indicators. We could, however, resist internally what we considered to be a cruel and
flawed system by cutting down on our planning and teaching efforts outside of formal evaluation
in order to make time for situations that gave us long-term gratification, such as spending quality
time with our families. We did change as professionals; however, by subtly refusing to put the
system and its tools at the forefront of everything we did professionally and personally, we were
able to maintain some autonomy over our decision-making.
Direct and Indirect Resistance Summary
In this section of chapter 4, I summarized how we responded to our feelings of insecurity,
powerlessness, and disengagement through direct and indirect acts of resistance. When we
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became frustrated with any or all of these elements geared towards remaking us as professionals,
we resisted—sometimes blatantly in public, but more often than not privately. In the section to
follow, I discuss the collateral damage that resulted from our actions.
Collateral Damage of the System
The pushes and pulls of new professionalism gave rise to the feelings which clouded our
professional decision-making and, in so doing, redefined us as professionals. These feelings and
changes, in turn, pushed us into resisting the system and our evaluators either directly or
indirectly. Combined, our acts of resistance inflicted collateral damage in our workplace. By
collateral damage, I refer to the unintended damage inflicted as a result of the performance
evaluation system and its by-products. This collateral damage consisted of: the pushing of ethical
boundaries, which mostly affected our students; and, a disconnect in our relationships with the
district and our evaluators.
As I presented earlier in Chapters 1 and 2, as well as in the introductory portions of this
chapter, performance and rewards systems were created to improve teacher performance, which
in turn, would hopefully improve student performance. What is left out of this supposed
relationship (improved teaching as related to improved student performance) are the unintended
consequences of this new world of educator evaluation. As we were beset with the anxiety of
performing well on yearly evaluations to protect ourselves, we were tempted into engaging in
unethical practices. These unethical practices (e.g., system gaming) started out as attempts to
indirectly resist in order to succeed on the student-driven portion of the evaluation process;
however, over time, system gaming became just one element of unethical behavior that resulted
from the tedious nature of the evaluation system. In our attempts to succeed under what we
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perceived as daunting circumstances, we changed as professionals—and this change became
evident in the onset of unethical decision-making.
Additionally, while operating within a system we regarded as potentially rigged for us to
fail and/or set up for us to struggle to achieve high evaluation scores, we began to remove
ourselves from relationships with our evaluators. In a profession where teachers and their
evaluators can only benefit from growth-fostering connections, we found ourselves, as an
unintended consequence of the system and its tools, becoming further disconnected from our
evaluators. The pressure to score as high as possible on our yearly evaluations, coupled with our
evaluators having increased control over our evaluations via the new system, drastically affected
these relationships. By our evaluators having the increased power to directly influence our
salaries and future employment (for example, salary increases tied to yearly performance and
decreases in the times and processes to remove tenure from staff members) we grew leery of
working as closely as we did with them in the past, as, we feared, any knowledge of our
inadequacy could be used negatively on our evaluations. This leeriness of our evaluators’
motives was warranted as evaluators were advised to avoid rating too many educators highly
effective on the observation rubrics. In addition, administrators were constantly reminded that we
were a failing district due to our standardized test results and status under state control; therefore,
it was not a good look for the district to have a large number of highly effective teachers while
standardized test scores remained stagnant or plummeted.
We began to reexamine our relationships with our evaluators as anxiety set in and the
task of attaining high evaluation scores proved daunting. Throughout the study, we mostly
viewed our evaluators as agents of the system attempting to keep us from being successful—
rather than the growth-fostering leaders for which we yearned. Our evaluators had a job to do,
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which was to observe, evaluate, and sort us, as well as keep down the number of highly effective
ratings. They, in turn, were evaluated based on the classroom observation reports they completed
and how they followed the districts’ prodding to be cognizant of how many educators we rated
highly effective; therefore, there was a shift in their work from individuals whose primary focus
was to support us in improving our daily work to those also being evaluated and scrutinized more
than ever before by their own evaluators. Hence, our evaluators were not able to provide the
growth-fostering leadership we needed and wanted since they had their own evaluations to worry
about and were being evaluated on their ability to implement the evaluation processes as
prescribed. By describing my own struggles as an administrator under these same circumstances
to the group, I tried to present the case that their other evaluators (some who were my colleagues
or reported directly to me) and I were facing the same pressures that they were. I worried about
the disconnection that was taking place between us, as administrator-teacher relationships were
an important aspect of what I believed made our school successful. In the section that follows, I
discuss in detail unintended consequences that clouded our ethical decision-making (e.g., system
gaming) and disconnected us from our evaluators.
Pushing of Ethical Boundaries
An analysis of the data showed that we made educational decisions geared towards
attaining performance-based incentives—and these decisions typically involved us regurgitating
curricular and instructional strategies demanded of us by the powers that be. Roger describes this
dynamic, one where his own need to score high on the evaluation rubric to obtain performancebased pay, in detail below:
We do not have the required novels available for my class to read, so I am reliant upon
teaching the mandated PARCC Writing unit, which I find to be outdated, poorly paced,
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and underwhelming. However, the risk I take in modifying these lessons is great when
possible observations can reprimand one for deviating from approved lessons. This
doesn't stop me from delivering what I believe to be superior lessons, utilizing my own
creativity and professionalism in lesson designs; however, I do feel it to be a risk. I am
fully confident that my nerves will relax, and my lessons will once again be more organic
and natural after my observation. Until then, I feel that the safest route to a highly
effective observation is to adhere to the district lessons with minor improvements, and
that I won't feel safe to further deviate into better lessons until after my observation.
In a system where extrinsic rewards took center stage over our intrinsic orientations,
producing stress in us all, we changed—and this was evident in our willingness to make
unethical decisions. Although we attempted to maintain intrinsic satisfaction over the extrinsic
rewards the system offered us, our professional decisions became increasingly focused on our
own benefit and/or survival, not necessarily on what was best for our students. We discovered
was that we pushed aside our educational Hippocratic Oath of Do No Harm to students,
especially during formal observations, to ensure our own well-being (for example, choosing an
instructional strategy we considered non-beneficial for our students, but which would allow
evaluators to check off a box on the formal observation rubric). These unethical choices
eventually became the norm for us and, from our day-to-day interactions with colleagues
throughout the district, we can confidently say it became the norm to the vast majority of them as
well. We felt that the district no longer cared about us and, due to the fact that we feared losing
out jobs or not earning performance-based pay, our first priority became ourselves—even if our
students were lost in the shuffle. To summarize, making unethical decisions became a part of our
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everyday repertoire because we were fed up with the direction in which our profession was
headed.
Illustrating our pattern of pushing ethical boundaries, Gina described an experience she
had during which she made a professional chose that was based on self-interest. As Gina
explained, in her first formal evaluation she received a low score on “implementing instructional
technology.” To improve her chances of obtaining performance-based pay for the year, she had
to score high on this domain of the evaluation rubric in the last two formal observations. As a
result, during her second observation, Gina made a decision to overlook the needs of students in
the class who were struggling with basic math skills and focused instead on highlighting her
usage of embedded video clips and graphics, even though she knew some students were
struggling with the content of the lesson. Making matters more complex for Gina, who was a
non-tenured educator who could receive unannounced formal observation at any time and could
be fired for almost any reason with only sixty days’ notice, instructional decisions that benefited
her started to take over her everyday decision-making. As this example illustrate, the system and
its pressures forced Gina into decisions that she knew were wrong; however, she felt the need to
make them to score high on her formal observations, retain her job, and benefit from available
performance-based pay incentives.
In our meetings, we highlighted our conundrums and described how torn we were when
making educational decisions to ensure evaluators had clear evidence during formal observations
to score us high on the corresponding rubrics. What’s more, what was good for formal
observations became the norm for daily instruction since the fear of one poor unannounced
observation lingered with teachers until the evaluation cycles concluded for the year and scores
were finalized. We spoke candidly and sadly about choosing unnecessary video clips, handouts,
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and district-preferred multiple response strategies such as think-pair-shares in order to fulfill a
requirement of the observation rubric—and not necessarily to meet the instructional needs of our
students at a given time. In essence, teachers and administrators cease being professionals when
they concern themselves more with checking off boxes on an observation rubric rather than
exercising their professional judgment.
Although we did not agree with the educational methods we were choosing most of the
time during formal observations, as a group we acknowledged that these decisions had to be
made—regardless of the impact they had on our students. In so doing this, we were
deprofessionalizing our own practice. When Roger was presented with a chance to speak about
this process of giving in to extrinsic demands, he described how, during a week in which he
anticipated receiving an unannounced formal observation, he consistently “threw in a random
video clip that did not affect the lesson” just to ensure he met the technology requirements of the
rubric. Along these same lines, Ava reported how she “always had PARCC-specific handouts
ready to share with students, even if they did not line up with the lesson objective.” Gary went
on to candidly comment that during formal observations he would be “doing extra, fancy moves
just to dunk the basket, even though every basket is worth just two points.” Gary also remarked
that he did “so much work to create these things, that in the end, it is not something I would use
again because it was unnecessary and gimmicky to get me a score.” These comments implied
that educational decisions were becoming more about our end-goal of scoring high enough on
our observations to qualify for performance-based pay—regardless of ethics. As educators, prior
to the implementation of the new performance-based pay evaluation system, we strived to do the
best we could for our students and always looked to experience success through their growth.
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However, this professional approach to teaching began to change with the lure of performancebased pay incentives and the pressures of the system.
Sadly, these unethical educational decisions were not only quite apparent to our group,
but also to our students. In our discussions, it was easy to discern that we knew the difference
between right and wrong in our decisions; however, it was becoming easier (and necessary) to
make unethical decisions in order to ensure our success. We discussed specific observations
where students commented on how different our approach was on a given day. For example,
Gary recounted a formal observation where, upon providing students with manipulatives never
before used in his classroom, “the students had to take time to figure out what they had or how to
handle these objects.” He went on to tell how he “remembered one group in particular hitting the
manipulatives on the table like a ball and having such uncertainty as to what to do next.” Even
the students knew that something was not copacetic but Gary went on, as his success was, at
least during this formal observation, more important than the success of his students.
At the heart of this section is the ethical predicament we were faced with on a daily basis
during the study. As I describe previously, Gina detailed a formal observation during which she
(unwillingly) ignored her students’ strengths and weaknesses to deliver a lesson solely focused
on scoring high on the formal observation rubric—even though she knew this decision would
only benefit her (and not her students). As Gina pointed out, “my kids are working on a third
grade level but, if I don’t teach ‘rigorous, grade level lessons,’ my observation score will go
lower. I had to do it and leave them behind.” Otto unapologetically supported similar decisions
he had made by exclaiming that district teachers “sold their souls when they agreed to a
performance-based pay evaluation system, as the all-mighty dollar would serve as an educator’s
low-hanging fruit.”
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When further analyzing the data pertaining to our own exploitations of the system, I was
drawn to the work of Huriya Jabbar (2013). In her writing, the author argued that, under
pressurized evaluation systems, teachers “gamed the system” by manipulating data to show
greater student achievement gains. By system gaming in our context, I refer to the covert
decisions we made to score as high as possible on our yearly evaluations. Basically, system
gaming referred to the times we manipulated data for our own benefit. Previously, I described
how our decision-making began to focus on our own success over what we thought would work
best for students and could potentially improve our formal observation scores (which made up
85% of our yearly evaluation score). System gaming was another example of unethical decisionmaking that assisted us in scoring as high as possible on the student achievement portion of the
evaluation rubric (15%). System gaming, just like the other unethical instructional decisions
described above, became part of our daily of decision-making process.
A quick review of what makes up a teacher’s yearly evaluation will clarify how system
gaming worked. As I previously mentioned, yearly evaluations for teachers in this study
consisted of the composite score of their formal evaluations (85%) and the average of their
scores on SGOs (15%). The majority of SGOs were based on the demonstrated growth from the
pre-assessments given to students during the first month of the school year to the postassessments given in April of that same school year. For each grade level/content area, every
student in the district takes the same pre- and post-assessment. SGOs, unlike standardized test
scores, are created, implemented, monitored, and scored at the local level by the teacher and the
principal/administrative designee. These SGOs are created from the data obtained during the
administration of district-created, pre-assessments. Additionally, in this lower-performing school
district that was in the midst of fighting back against social promotion, students’ growth from
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pre- to post-assessments (or lack thereof) determined whether or not they would be promoted,
retained, or required to attend summer school. For students in the school where the study took
place, they would be required to attend summer school in Math and/or English if they had not
demonstrated the district-assigned levels of growth from the beginning to the end of the school
year via the aforementioned post-assessments. Therefore, the opportunities for unethical
decisions involving SGOs, which determine 15% of teachers’ evaluations, were abundant due to
the newfound shared desire that students and teachers had to succeed.
System gaming required teachers to work with students to ensure that both sides were
successful (e.g., preparing students for specific questions on formative assessments). English
teachers such as Ava, Roger, and Otto regularly admitted to having discussions in class with
students regarding the importance of SGO pre-assessments. For example, these teachers would
review questions on the pre-assessments in advance with students and, at times, remind students
to score lower on pre-assessments in order to demonstrate growth later on during the postassessments. It was well-known between these teachers and their students that an increase in
scores from pre- to post-assessments would benefit teachers on their yearly evaluations and help
students avoid summer school. Ava, although mortified by how prevalent this type of system
gaming became in our school, defended it was a “necessary step in proving that prescribed
teaching and [policies], such as SGOs, are not an accurate representation of how her students
improved from September-April.” These narratives demonstrated that we knew what needed to
be done to be successful on different elements of the evaluation system, and under the highanxiety circumstances inherent in it, this form of unethical behavior happened more often than
we wanted to admit and functioned as indirectly resistance to our evaluators and the system
itself.
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Otto defended his cheating of the system by describing the unwritten code where “the
students and I know to score low in the beginning (on baseline assessments) because growth will
get me a higher score and get them to avoid summer school.” Donald and Gary, although
teaching in non-tested content areas, echoed the same types of indirect resistance, with Gary
stating that “you’d be a fool not to do what you can to ensure that you score as high as possible
on every area of the evaluation rubric.” For both Gary and Donald, spouses and parents with
mortgages and bills, deliberate instructional decisions (albeit counter-productive and considered
by them at times useless) could determine whether or not they needed to take time away from
their families to work part-time jobs. Gary supported this choice in his journal entry below.
Because I have to say for me, the first year with the new principal, we had a new
contract, was that the first year that we had the new contract, I knew that the possibility
existed to move up two steps each year and I knew since we lost so many steps in the
previous contract, I really needed to take advantage of this opportunity. I had a kid and I
really felt like if I didn’t get that extra step the first time around, I was gone. I needed the
extra money for my family. It was a stress relief and I was happy to make that extra
money, but then here comes this new administrator and I don’t know how this guy was
going to evaluate me going forward so I had to seriously consider what I was going to do
next and do whatever he told me to do. He had this perception and he didn’t come across
very nicely and we were all worried about our well-being.
I also fell prey to system gaming in working with my own SGOs and administrative
goals. For the staff and I, system gaming became more than indirect resistance—it became part
of our daily culture. I established SGOs that I knew I could easily attain, and I set administrative
goals and directed staff members under my purview to focus on those goals. To clarify, unlike
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the teachers in this study, administrator evaluations were calculated in the following manner:
75% based on the scores from my formal observations, 15% based on the average of the SGOs of
every staff member under my purview, and 10% based on my two administrative goals.
Administrative goals were like teacher SGOs, whereby administrators took ownership of student
and staff growth. For example, during the school year of the study, my administrative goals were
based on improving the performance of Algebra I students deemed to be at risk on their initial
formative assessments, as well as increasing the number of PLCs run by the staff. First and
foremost, before choosing between students in Algebra I, Algebra II, and Geometry to represent
my first administrative goal, I spoke to each teacher directly about the students in their classes.
Based on their input, as well as my own knowledge of the teachers’ abilities, I chose the Algebra
I group because both the teachers and students gave me the best chance to score well on my
evaluation rubric. Additionally, I set the stage for my second administrative goal regarding PLCs
during the final evaluations of the previous school year. In summary, if teachers wanted to score
highly effective on the leadership portion of their yearly evaluations, they needed to do more than
just join a PLC—they needed to actively lead one. Yes, actively leading a PLC could only
benefit the students since teachers would be working together to share their expertise; however, I
knew it was also an easy “win” on this portion of my evaluation. This thinking in formulating
SGOs and administrative goals became the norm for me within a system I felt no longer cared
about my best interests.
During the PLC, we acknowledged making potentially unethical educational decisions
involving our students. Although the system enticed us into unethical decision-making, there
were still brief times where we pushed aside the lure of extrinsic rewards and unethical albeit
financially rewarding decisions, by embracing what we felt had great value: the intrinsic reward
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of inspiring students. As I mentioned earlier in this chapter, although we gravitated closer to
becoming what we despised in the vast majority of decisions we made, we did not sell our souls
completely to new professionalism. For example, Donald still refused to redirect students who
were acting appropriately just to pad his evaluation score. Otto still refused to change his
instructional choices during a formal observation. Gina, although giving in to teaching to the
curriculum during a formal observation, made sure to reconnect with those struggling students on
the next “regular day.” Ava, despite becoming jaded by the system, still tried new instructional
strategies when the anxiety of computers not working during a formal observation was gone.
Lastly, I actively participated in the PLCs I forced teachers to establish and also took an interest
in the students of the Algebra I classes who were part of my other administrative goal—beyond
just caring about the demonstrated growth needed to score high on this portion of the evaluation.
However, our overall actions demonstrated that the damage was done and unethical options were
on the table for us to choose.
Our unethical choices give insight into the shocking unintended consequence of
adherence to this system of heightened accountability and one of its central tools, performancebased pay. That is, we fell in line with edicts of new professionalism and embraced becoming
educational clerks, but at what cost? In the literature I reviewed in Chapter 2, I described how
performance-based pay was intended to be used as an incentive to improve teacher performance
and, in turn, student performance on standardized or district-created assessments. The neoliberal
movement did accomplish having us, for the most part, follow curricular and instructional edicts
that policy makers deemed necessary for student success, through the hanging of low fruit
(performance-based pay). However, by the system forcing us into a mode of protecting our
livelihoods, we did whatever necessary to obtain performance-based incentives. That meant, at
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times, making decisions that did not benefit or actually hurt our students, as well as cheating
within, thereby making a mockery of systems meant to improve student performance through our
gaming of student growth objectives.
Disconnection from Our Evaluators
I evaluated staff before and during the high stakes evaluation systems in schools today.
Very early on in this transition from a less-codified and subjective evaluation system to an
objective and quantifiable structure, I noticed changes in the ways in which evaluators and those
whom they evaluated interacted. Prior to the implementation of high stakes evaluations, formal
observations were part of our yearly routine. However, as the new system began to take shape
throughout our school district, the evaluation system came to the forefront of our work. As we
became acclimated to this new world of measuring our work and sorting us accordingly, our
yearly evaluation scores began to weigh more heavily on us and play a major role in determining
our ability and/or willingness to remain in the profession. The lure of the performance-based pay
system was our ability to potentially earn money than previously under the traditional evaluation
system. The downside, as previously discussed, was that our yearly observation and evaluation
scores came to redefine who we were as educators, rather than being a small part of our yearly
body of work as it had been prior to this era. With these changes came fear, and this fear led us
to view the system, its tools, and our direct evaluators as the chief agents of what we felt was
wrong with education.
And this fear was validated as both administrators and teachers partook in conversations
and adhered to edicts whereby evaluators were directed to score individuals low on evaluation
rubrics. This directive was given primarily to keep down costs to the district by not awarding
additional money through performance-based pay incentives. Additionally, this directive was
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based on the fact that the district could not justify having large numbers of highly effective
teachers while having low student scores on standardized tests and less than stellar high school
graduation rates.
For example, in one of our PLC sessions, I described how I was confronted by my direct
evaluators for the high number of teachers rated highly-effective in my previous school.
Because let me tell you, I, last year, we had 28 out of 32 teachers were rated highly
effective and my bosses were consistently making comments to me about how I am too
easy a grader/scorer. We live in a district where you are penalized if you are doing well
and I then let that get into my head when assigning scores on observations. And there are
admins I work with, but not necessarily in this building, who believe that a first year
teacher cannot be higher than Progressing 2 or Prof 1 on anything because it will make
themselves look bad and or they will get called out for this. And so you have
automatically eliminated their ability to move up two steps on the guide.
Not only was this push to keep down the number of highly-effective teachers known by
administrators, it was well-known to teaching staff. Warren, a long-time union representative at
the school and district level—who left the district at the end of the school year of the study—also
described this dynamic.
Cause I know for a fact that admins have been told by central office you cannot make
these people highly effective—you got to keep these highly effective numbers low.
Again, I know for a fact, there are admins that know the score of teacher they are
observing before they walk in the door. They know if they do this, this, and this, they are
only going to score them that. They know the numbers going in. Year 1 the district was
confused and they were pissed that all these people got highly effective. Year 2, when
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you walked in, they knew your score before you did anything. I know [the former
principal] did. [The former principal] talked about knowing going into an observation and
he talked about numbers. And it’s was their [backside] if their numbers are high.
The tedious nature of the evaluation system and all those responsible for implementing it made
us defensive and fearful of the motives of those with evaluative power. As Otto explained in a
journal entry, this system began to replace positive connections between us and our supervisors
with, what we felt, were forced attempts to communicate. Otto described this dynamic as
follows:
Often, any time an opinion is asked it seems to merely be a formality, as if our
professional opinion is only being solicited because it needs to be. In the future, I'd much
rather not provide my opinion than be treated as a bother for offering it. It is a chronic
ailment in schools though, school district administration very often feels as though they
can lead without the support or opinion of their teachers, and this often seems to be the
demise of the school, district, or administrator.
Our first reaction was to withdraw from evaluators, especially those whom we perceived as cold
and unforgiving in their evaluations of us. Nonetheless, our evaluators had their own stories and
worries just as we did. Like us, their work was scrutinized as never before, and they too were
feeling the pull of a changing system of evaluation.
For me, the changes, although different from what teachers experienced in the classroom,
were sudden and powerful. I was expected to devote time to manage and support the sorting
systems, which the district identified as the primary means to measure staff and student
performance. Unfortunately, out of my own need to survive and perform well within this system,
I too, at times, had to toe the company line and support what I felt was a flawed system. And this
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system was, without question, further disconnecting me from my staff. As I describe below in
one of my journal entries completed during the study, I was pressured to be an agent of the
system and sort staff based on my evaluation of how well they met the established performance
as codified in the rubric used.
In [this district], when someone [administrator] has many highly effective teachers, that's
looked at negatively. They think there should be a correlation between our student test
performance and the observations of teachers when for starters there are so many
variables at play. So forget about that piece, if we were observing you a period a day for
180 days, maybe there could be some type of correlation but if you are trying to compare
40 minutes of instruction to our school’s standardized test scores it's not happening. How
can we have highly effective teachers and be a failing district? Well that's you
automatically thinking that these are the only two variables and that this is leading to this.
In [this district], you are viewed as being easy and soft if you have high staff scores. You
have to be tough. I know principals who said they will not give anything higher than
Proficient I to any non-tenure. So that non tenure in years 1-4 has no chance of making
performance based pay so you saved the district money for four years.
However, I tried to balance the need to meet performativity requirements with my own
professional judgment. As time went on and we became more immersed in this system, it was
important that I not take for granted teachers who worked in my school. I tried desperately to
balance what I needed to do to meet the requirements of the system and my evaluators with the
needs of my staff which, above all else, should have been my highest priority. For example, in
the three years leading up to this study, Simon and I worked as hard as possible to build
relationships with our staff through team-building activities, celebrations, one-on-one
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conversations, and any outlet that would bring out the human element of our jobs. I feel we were
successful, and the PLC that served as the site for this study is a testament to the effectiveness of
this approach. My fellow participants characterized Simon and I as people they could trust, and
as evaluators they respected based on our past experiences with them and our knowledge of their
teaching. Warren summed up this claim as follows:
Cause I knew [the former principals] couldn’t teach, [another former supervisor] didn’t
care, so knowing that, you have to focus on the boxes if you are concerned about merit
pay. You, [Simon], and [another supervisor], I am not concerned because I know you
care, you can interpret what is going on, and I don’t need to concern myself with that
box. But there are other admins that can’t interpret what is going on and want blood, and,
if you don’t do things verbatim, in 20 minutes, they are not checking that box for you.
At the time I began soliciting participation in the study, my staff already knew I was leaving the
school for another position outside the district, but they still volunteered to support my work
without feeling any pressure to do so. The eight participants had nothing to gain from working
with me. In the end, I believe these individuals participated in this study because I never forgot
to value them as individuals and professionals, all while trying to balance my own needs and the
edicts of my evaluators.
I was worried with the level of disconnection between administrators and teachers, since I
see this connection at the heart of our work with students. Nevertheless, I felt I could find a
balance between ensuring my personal and professional success by adhering to the stringent
requirements set forth by my evaluators and the system while also attending to the needs of my
staff, I eventually decided to leave the district. When offered such an option, I took it. It is
important to point out that my circumstances were not everyone else’s circumstances, and not all
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had the option to move to a position that allowed for the exercise of professional judgment on a
daily basis, which I did. For many of our evaluators/administrators, who were also feeling
pressure from their own evaluators, there were other factors influencing this disconnection. For
example, the sheer number of evaluations to be completed (the management side), along with the
everyday demands of working in an unpredictable job, limited the time they had to connect with
us. That is, the demands of the system got in the way of human-to-human interactions, such as
simple communication that could maintain a positive connection between and among us.
The damage done to our relationships with the district and, in turn, our relationship with
evaluators served as a major talking point during PLC discussions and online journaling. We
yearned for positive connections with our evaluators; however, the system made us feel insecure,
powerless, and/or disengaged. These feelings, in turn, led us to directly and/or indirectly resist—
and such resistance most often was directed at our evaluators. We knew we deserved and needed
so much more, but the realities of the system did not allow for it. Roger described this dynamic
in the journal entry shown below:
A successful business, school, classroom, relationship: all successful means of selfgrowth are rooted in connections. To first understand one's personal beliefs and
interpretations, ones' individual identity and value, to then feel the comfortability to
express oneself, and lastly to be so willing to grow as to be open to true receptiveness and
ultimately change based upon this. The notion that growth is best achieved by a strong
"individual" seems to pale in comparison to the growth that can be achieved by a strong
individual working within the environment of a comfortable group, each member who is
willing to be their most honest, open, and reflective selves. It is here, in this most
vulnerable state, that learning and awareness can best flourish.
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We began to distrust those who held evaluative power over us as we struggled with feelings of
uneasiness, felt the pushes and pulls of the system, and became progressively concerned about
our personal well-being, as Roger described above. Hence, it became common practice for us to
refrain from making the connections that a school/workplace needs to be in place in order to
foster the success of its students/clients. Ava supported this claim by stating the following: “I
don’t foresee [the refraining from connections] changing the dynamic with Simon, but definitely
expect a difference with [other evaluators]. We’re often expected to make do with what we have
and still meet the demands expected of us—with no room for the human element. I discuss the
importance of administrator-teacher relationships/connections in greater detail in Chapter 5.
We withdrew from our relationships with many of our evaluators (but not those like
Simon, whom we trusted) because we feared that our evaluators would use any weakness against
us in our yearly evaluations, especially in a cash-strapped district where performance-based pay
replaced moving up a salary guide via traditional means (for example, completing a year of
service and/or obtaining an advanced degree). Gary sadly summarized his feelings, and that of
the group, regarding this disconnect from our evaluators as follows: “With performance-pay
potentially being given out by a school district in terrible financial straits and students
performing below the average of their peers, [administrators] are not reaching across the aisle
like they should.” Gary, like all of us, described the feeling of disconnect. The tension of
working within this system, coupled with the pressures that our evaluators undoubtedly were also
faced with while leading in an underperforming district, led both sides to withdraw from
attempting to connect with each other. Post-observation conferences became focused on checkboxes and sorting teachers rather than improving instruction and supporting teacher growth. Staff
meetings and correspondence shifted away from the creative and personable side of the
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profession and became singularly focused on a particular set of district-mandated discourses and
outcomes. This was our perception of what was happening, and wrong or not it illustrated our
feeling that we were disconnected from our evaluators, which in turn, led us to fear the
evaluative power they wielded.
As the evaluation system further heightened the sense of us versus them within our
district, relationships between us and our evaluators began to sour. These connections were
based on how open and personable (or not) we were in our relationships with our evaluators
within the system and in how much we trusted them to look out for our best interests. And, as
Ava explained below, this trust dwindled throughout the implementation of the evaluation
system and its tools.
I feel like you also [have] been able to establish that trust. Where for me, I trust you guys
(Simon and I) but there are times where [another superior] has observed me and I have
asked “Hey, how can I have gotten a better score on this particular thing.” And he would
say “You know what, I will give you a 5 on this one, but I move this one down from 5 to
4.” So I am like you are just flipping the numbers and don’t care about me.
Hence, the slightest inkling that our evaluators were not interested in us as human beings, and
were more interested instead in measuring and sorting us, pulled us away from any cohesion.
Feeling a sense of connection with our evaluators meant, first and foremost, that we trusted these
decision-makers. We had to place great faith in our evaluators as we operated within a system
where they, our chief evaluators, had control over our formal evaluations and, in turn, our
professional and personal livelihood. Additionally, with trust came openness to constructive
feedback—or not. Since our evaluation scores were calculated by rated performance evaluations
completed by our evaluators, it was vital that we were reflective in our practice and open to
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critique and support—and this affected our openness to critique. Moreover, striving for more
than a high score on our evaluation rubric (for example, being the best teacher that we could be)
required improvements in our educational decision-making, which in turn required us to be
connected to our evaluators. We had to be trusting enough to speak about our deficiencies with
our evaluators. This was especially true during observation post-conferences, as these meetings
became rigid and less focused on improving instruction; hence, the openness to feedback needed
to foster connections was pushed aside by what we perceived as the weaponization of the
evaluation rubric by our evaluators. As Warren described during one of our PLC sessions:
These post conferences don’t leave any wiggle room. You get the score and feedback
you have seen already and you pretty much know your score going into it. It's really just
all about the signature and the checkbox at this point.”
We viewed the majority of our evaluators as perpetuating the cold and unrelenting
elements of the evaluation system. However, it was clear that just as we had been reworked by
this system, so too had our evaluators. I explained to the group how we (administrators) had been
reworked, through administrative meetings and professional development sessions, to serve as
agents of the district used to evaluate and sort staff. Additionally, we were obligated to support
the discourses and outcomes the district mandated as part of our daily and evaluated work. Still,
within this sea of disconnection, pockets of administrators who were able to maintain the balance
I felt, which I described earlier in this section. Some were able to maintain a balance based on
their own circumstances while others were able to foster positive relationships by adhering to
their own experiences and schooling when leading their staff. Although the examples that follow
may portray our evaluators mostly in a negative light, it is important to note that some of them
tried their hardest to create positive connections by balancing district mandates, their own
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evaluation scores, and the needs of their staff. Those of us, such as Simon and I, who believed in
stoking open and supportive interactions with our staff, were able to cultivate positive
connections. It should be noted that at the time of this analysis, Simon remains in his position as
principal, probably because this is the only school he has ever worked in as a teacher and
administrator; he feels obliged to support the staff and students at the school; and, financially, he
is too well-compensated to make a lateral move to another school district. Throughout the study,
participants regularly spoke about how Simon and I cultivated this sense of connection. For
example, Ava often spoke about how she was completely at ease during observations and postconferences with Simon and me because she felt we were just as interested in her and her work
as we were in meeting the requirements of the evaluation system. Moreover, Donald provided
countless examples of how Simon and I supported him as a non-tenure teacher who worried
about his job every year of his early career. And, lastly, Warren, who seemed to distrust
everyone in power, felt that Simon and I always had his back by our daily actions, as well as
during formal observations that decided his livelihood. Throughout the PLC and journaling,
when discussing those evaluators from whom they felt disconnected, Simon and I were more
often than not compared to these individuals and presented as how they wished their other
evaluators went about their work. To my fellow participants, I created positive connections, as I
described earlier in this section. In addition, I recognized the demands of teaching in a large,
urban school district that struggled to provide the basic necessities to its students and staff. And
this is not to say that other evaluators, whom I felt fostered mostly negative connections with our
group, did not understand these issues. Rather, I put the needs of my staff and students on the
same level as the mandates of the system and my own personal needs. Still, even for me, this
became a tedious process of trying to balance all three elements and after I while I found it too
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tiring to persist. This led me to leave the district at the beginning of the study. Below is one of
my journal entries in between PLC sessions. It is clear that, at the time, I too was struggling with
this previously described balancing act:
Delicate blends of support and challenge are important. I have often wondered why I
have been successful engaging staff and students during my time as an educator—and
this portion of [the Raider-Roth book] has started to make that really come to light.
Holding people to firm standards and expecting their best seems to happen the most when
supportive systems are in place. It becomes a family dynamic whereby the people closest
to you can be your harshest critics because you know they have your best interest at
heart. And this support goes beyond simply bringing people to the table and
acknowledging their viewpoints; rather, it is providing people with the opportunity to feel
empowered—to feel that what they can do can evoke real change. In addition, a key
element in supportive systems is providing teachers with ways to best strengthen their
ideas rather than convincing them to believe as you do. Being "nice" (which I would
prefer to call "being a human being") is only one element. As a teacher and administrator
who was always considered "too nice" by many of my peers, it is interesting to begin to
realize how they viewed my actions. Was being a "nice person" the problem or was it
really that "being generous with opportunities to lead/challenge those in power " their
true issue with my leadership/teaching style?
For Simon and I, our statuses as tenured administrators, the positivity that trusting
relationships with colleagues brought about, and our embodiment of what it meant to be caring
educators helped us be more cavalier than our colleagues. Simon and I had a great principal/vice
principal relationship, as he and I were open with each other regarding what we struggled with or

EXPLORING EDUCATORS’ DECISIONS

127

areas in which we needed each other’s support. Additionally, we had open and trusting
conversations about the school, the system, and our staff that pushed each other’s thinking.
Along these same lines, although I had a direct superior whom I perceived as weaponizing the
evaluation tool to go after me because we did not get along going back to when we were
principal colleagues, I had my superior’s evaluators in my corner. Yet, notwithstanding my
frustration with this process, I eventually left the district where I knew I had some control/power
and could go over my direct evaluator to his evaluators (and did so on many occasions) when I
felt aggrieved, needed my voice to be heard, and longed for my daily contributions to the district
to be valued.
At various times throughout the study, we discussed our frustration with the lack of
connection with our evaluators. This lack of connection, which I outlined earlier in this section,
contributed to the change in the relationships we had with our evaluators as it was difficult to
trust and be receptive to feedback from those who had expanded evaluative power over us. As a
reminder, although our evaluators always had evaluative power over us, the policies of this new
era of evaluation gave our evaluators increased power over our evaluation scores, yearly
compensation, and job statuses (for example, the revocation of tenure was no longer a tedious,
drawn-out process). Donald summed up our overall view of what a positive connection with a
superior looked like. Although potentially losing his job to a reduction in force (RIF) became the
norm for Donald during his first four years in his teaching position, the open line of
communication he had with Simon and me brought him a sense of calm. And this open line of
communication allowed Donald, as well as other teacher participants in the study, to feel more
connected to some evaluators.
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Every time it [the RIF] has happened, you are hearing about it already. I knew already. I
knew I was getting RIF in January those years. Now I am not hearing anything because I
am hearing the district isn’t cutting. And part of it is you and Simon. I know if you knew
something, you both would tell me, unlike other admins who don't want to have that
conversation.
We valued evaluators who, very simply, attempted to connect with us by letting us speak
our minds and by listening attentively to us. For Simon and I, keeping a nervous non-tenure
teacher updated on potentially losing his job was the norm because we saw this as the right thing
to do. Unfortunately, every participant stated that the vast majority of evaluators we worked for
would not have had such an open line of communication for such a sensitive and confidential
subject. What many would consider a simple gesture, like the one described by Donald, meant a
lot to our group. More than once throughout the study, each of us illustrated what positive
connections with evaluators looked like. Simply put, a positive connection was built first by
evaluators having an open door policy to let us speak and be heard. We valued the ability to
speak our minds, and having an outlet to vent about the happenings of the day meant a lot to our
group. Unfortunately, with the demands of the job intensified and the sheer volume of work
added to us by the evaluation and assessment processes, administrators had to scale back on the
amount of time to have a simple chat with staff and break down barriers. Even I, at times, found
myself lost in a sea of paperwork and mandates and too far removed from what was happening
with my staff on a daily basis. On a few occasions, I joked with the group that I felt like I was
writing about/logging my work more than I was doing any work.
Warren described his ideal administrator (especially within high-stakes accountability
systems), whom he equated to Simon and me, as someone with whom one felt free to “walk into
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their office, shoot the breeze, whether it is about school or not, and the tension comes down in an
observation. Letting [us] vent goes a long way but the problem is we don’t do that enough.”
Moreover, Ava recounted her experiences with the different administrators who evaluated her
during the past two school years who did and did not have open lines of communication. She
thoroughly enjoyed post-conferences with me because I “always gave her an outlet to speak her
mind.” Unfortunately, Ava also made it clear that she would not question the feedback of
specific evaluators for fear of repercussions and because she felt that her overtures would fall on
deaf ears. For Warren and Ava, the tension of the evaluation system and their fears of not
succeeding were alleviated by talking to a supportive superior, which typically increased their
sense of trust.
Along these same lines, Roger and Donald illustrated how their work ethic and selfesteem could be improved by a superior being open to discussing observations (and teaching in
general). For example, Donald described how the open line of communication he experienced
with me allowed him to be more vulnerable, even during a scenario where I was unhappy with a
lesson he delivered to his class. The interaction below occurred after I expressed dissatisfaction
with what I perceived as the lack of rigor in one of his lessons:
Nick comes into my room and I can tell he isn’t happy about what I am doing. Sure
enough, I have an email in my inbox about an hour after he came by and it’s very pointed
and, I have to say, I was angry. But what happened next, and I knew this would happen,
was he allowed me to talk. I understood much of what he was saying and more
importantly, I knew he had one purpose in giving me pointed feedback: to make me
better. Other than Simon, I don’t know anyone else in this building that could literally
undress my instruction and not make me want to just give up or be scared.
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Our administrator-teacher relationship was strong enough (even during this new system
of cut and dry conversations about job performance) where a very good, growth-oriented
discussion ensued in person, rather than a shouting match embedded in hostility and fear. This
vulnerability was evident when Donald stated that my feedback “never had motives and always
gave him something to think about moving forward.” Roger further described the effect on his
vulnerability that open and positive lines of communication had on his educational decisions by
stating that “the best way to improve one’s practice is to have a dialogue with an administrator
who loves teaching.” Moreover, Ava, Gina, Otto, and Roger all supported the notion that
opportunities given to voice their opinions in post-conferences heightened the value of
constructive criticism given by the specific observer and increased vulnerability. As an example
of this newfound awareness, Ava described a post-observation conference with Simon as
follows:
My post-conference included a discussion about the downside of 20 minute observations.
I would have much rather been observed a full 40 minutes for categories that measured:
lesson sequencing and pacing, establishing routine, directions and expectations, and prior
knowledge and making connections. Missing the first 20 minutes of my lesson could
have hindered my score in these categories but missing the last 20 minutes would have
hindered categories related to my implementation of my demonstration of student
learning at the end of the lesson. I feel my post observation allowed me to explain my
lesson better and provide evidence to prove why/how it was effective. I agree with my
administrator's evaluation and believe it is fair. I welcome and respect his feedback and
appreciate his openness to my concerns.
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Throughout the study, it resonated with us how significant supportive and open lines of
communication were in building connections that increased our openness to feedback, which in
turn, helped us improve as educators. At times in this district, I was fortunate to have evaluators
who supported my work in this way, especially at the beginning of my administrative journey;
unfortunately, I also had evaluators who, for the reasons I outlined above, did not/could not
balance my needs with their own, as well as with the mandates of the system. Donald summed it
up best when he stated that “good administrators guide us and focus on improvement for the
betterment of our instruction—not to present and justify a score.” These comments from Donald
highlighted the importance of connections with our evaluators: these connections break down
traditional power barriers between evaluators and those whom they evaluate and allow the focus
to shift to improving our own work. Unfortunately, this level of supportive feedback (for the
various reasons discussed above) was not typical for us during the study (and not typical since
the implementation of the standardized formal system of evaluation). This lack of support led all
of us, at times, to become defensive/reclusive and definitely was another example of the
unintended, collateral damage inflicted by the performance-based evaluation system.
Summary
In this chapter, I described how the push and pull of new professionalism affected our
educational decision-making. I also described how insecurity, powerlessness, and disengagement
were by-products of this push and pull. Beyond this, I contended that when insecurity,
powerlessness, and disengagement set in and we felt ourselves being remade as professionals, we
resisted the system and its agents directly and indirectly. Lastly, we identified the collateral
damage created by the new evaluation process: the pushing of ethical boundaries; and
disconnection from the system and our evaluators. By breaking down traditional power
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structures and dialoguing with each participant in person and virtually, we shared our overall
experiences while teaching and leading within a performance and rewards culture.
If I were keeping score as one would at a sporting event, I would say that, at the end of
this study, the neoliberal movement was winning in its attempts to recreate us as educational
clerks; however, small pockets of positive experiences and resistance were evident as well.
These positive experiences and forms of resistance offer a glimpse into how administrators and
teachers can work together to co-navigate through this type of system moving forward. While it
was clear that we were slowly being reworked into new professionals, there was a chance to
reverse the insecurity, powerlessness, and disengagement we garnered while working under the
pressures of our setting and potentially repair some of the collateral damage inflicted. The
evaluation system and observation rubric are not going away anytime soon (although
performance-based pay was eliminated in the school district that served as the site of this study
for reasons I will discuss in Chapter 5); nevertheless, we have a chance to promote the success of
every stakeholder and potentially end this cycle of suffering and collateral damage through a
different vantage point. In Chapter 5, I explore my findings through the lens of the literature and
RCT, my theoretical framework. In addition, I present the implications that my research has on a
multitude of areas.
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CHAPTER FIVE: DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS
The purpose of this PAR study was to document how educators embedded in systems of
heightened accountability and rewards cultures struggle to maintain professional judgment. I also
sought to systematically examine if and how the relationships between teachers and
administrators were influenced under these circumstances given my impression that they were.
From anecdotal research and tacit knowledge—gathered formally and informally in my role as a
principal evaluating educators before and during this era of heightened accountability—I had
noticed changes in the educational decisions teachers and administrators made, and that the
relationships they had with each other shifted. While my initial hunch that we had changed
during this era of heightened accountability was supported by my study findings what I had not
anticipated prior to engaging in this study was the unintended consequences of the system. These
included a negative influence on participants’ ethics, a lack of knowledge on the part of teachers
in the study that administrators were having similar struggles, and the extent to which the
majority of connections with evaluators were damaged. My data suggests that high stakes
evaluation systems, when coupled with monetary rewards, are likely to substantially damage our
profession through the recreation of educators into new professionals. Through a RCT lens, new
professionalism’s way of recreating educators is antithetical to how organizations and people
grow and prosper. Evaluators and those evaluated are cast into adversarial positions rather than
working together to foster the growth of students, teachers, and the school’s culture. In this
scenario, our students benefit less and teachers’ professional growth stalls and/or suffers.
I designed a PAR study composed of seven teachers from the school where I previously
served as principal for three years, and myself. In addition, the school’s new principal (who
previously served as vice principal at the school) joined the group for our last PLC session. I
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wanted to create a space where we could talk together about being educators within systems of
heightened accountability coupled with monetary rewards. Additionally, I also hoped that
together we could gain insight and offer recommendations on how administrators might support
teachers during these times. PAR operates in an ongoing cycle of data gathering and action. In
this study, I started with an action, that is, creating a space to talk together about decision making
and functioning within systems of heightened accountability tied to monetary rewards. While we
each functioned daily within these systems, we did not have opportunities to make meaning of
these changes across teacher and administrator lines. Talking together in a safe space was a first
step in analyzing how these changes affected each of us and how administrator and teacher
relationships might be reimagined. In addition, we read a book together that utilized RCT to
inform professional development. This book, Professional Development in Relational Learning
Communities: Teachers in Connection (Raider-Roth, 2017), presented how trust-worthy
relationships between teachers and administrators can create nurturing school environments
focused on the best interest of students. By creating processes to support nurturing school
environments, these learning communities assist educators in establishing and sustaining active
learning (Raider-Roth, 2017).
To minimize the risk of talking together across teacher/administrator relationships, no
teacher participant in the study was observed and evaluated by Simon—the new principal after I
left the position—or me during the study. While teachers had volunteered while I was still
principal, I was no longer in a position of authority over them. I originally anticipated that, as the
school’s principal, I would take action based on the group’s discussion; however, this was no
longer my role since I changed jobs. Therefore, for the study, I was primarily a participant and a
researcher. In keeping with PAR, I consistently analyzed data following each PLC meeting and
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brought my emerging understandings back to the group for member checking and to inform the
discussion. Additionally, Simon only joined the study for the last session, which occurred after
summative evaluations for the school year had been completed. Fortunately, we were able as a
group to debrief with Simon during the last session. Lastly, in keeping with the basic tenets of
PAR, I consistently analyzed data, member checked it with my fellow participants, and
reanalyzed the data based on this member checking. The findings presented in this dissertation
are the result of this collective work.
In this chapter, I discuss my findings and present future research possibilities to help
answer the following questions:
1.

When given a supportive space for ongoing dialogue in an era of new

professionalism and neoliberalism, how do we as teachers and administrators
describe our educational decisions while functioning in evaluation systems?
2.

What kinds of actions might teachers recommend or consider taking

regarding how administrators can best support their instructional decision-making
during this era of heightened accountability?
To answer my research questions, I collected and analyzed data from our PLC sessions, as well
as participants’ online, individual journaling. Individual journals focused on our everyday
experiences and critical incidents while operating within our district’s performance and rewards
cultures. In addition, we wrote about our reactions to PLC discussions and the aforementioned
book on RCT that we read.
In Chapter Four, I presented my findings from my PAR study. To summarize, I found
that our educational decisions were influenced by the policies, procedures, and systems enacted
at the study site. In turn, the regimented nature of the accountability systems heightened our
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feelings of insecurity, powerlessness, and disengagement when making decisions. Additionally, I
found that some of our decisions served the dual role of resistance to systems and evaluators.
Moreover, I also found that, at times, we put our needs over the needs of our students when
making everyday decisions. Further, I established that, when making decisions, we factored the
evaluation system and observation rubrics into our decisions more than we did in the past.
Additionally, when examining the action of administrators at our study site, I found that
administrators could best support their teachers by being empathetic to their plight, open to their
concerns and attentive to their needs. Furthermore, a positive outlook, a willingness to break
down traditional power barriers between administrators and teachers, and being as clear and
concise as possible were major characteristics teacher study participants looked for in their
evaluators.
I presented my findings via four major themes. The first theme was the push and pull of
new professionalism. Here I shared how, during our everyday work, we were faced with the
pushes and pulls of new professionalism such as standardized curriculum (push) and
performance-based incentives (pull). In my second theme, the onset of disengagement,
powerlessness, and insecurity, I postulated that the pushes and pulls of new professionalism and
the heightened sense of scrutiny created these newfound feelings which played a part in our
decision-making. Next, in my third theme, direct and indirect acts of resistance, I explored how,
in response to the pushes and pulls and our newfound, aforementioned feelings, we directly (for
example, blatantly calling out our evaluators for perceived unfair treatment) and indirectly (for
example, withholding our time afterhours) pushed back against the system and our evaluators.
Lastly, in my fourth theme, I presented the collateral damage inflicted. Here, I described how we
became disconnected from our relationships with our evaluators and our students and how we
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began to make unethical decisions (for example, system gaming) that negatively affected our
students. In short, the documented veiled attempts to recreate study participants through the use
of a compliance-driven observation rubrics and evaluation systems tied to monetary rewards,
resulted in negative outcomes that I did not anticipate. My findings indicate that the high stakes
accountability and rewards systems had a substantially negative impact on both the study site and
is likely to also negatively influence the teaching profession as a whole.
This final chapter includes a discussion of my findings relative to the literature and my
theoretical framework, RCT, followed by recommendations and implications. First, I revisit the
literature on growth-producing relationships; contextualized teaching and teachers as
professionals; and, performance-based pay incentives. Within this first section, I discuss and
summarize what I have learned and how it connects or adds values to existing research. Next, I
present recommendations and implications for the following groups: teachers; district and school
administrators; and, policy-makers. Third, I describe implications for the study site. Fourth, I
discuss future research recommendations. I close with a discussion of the limitations of the
study, as well as a brief synopsis.
Analysis and Discussion of the Findings
In this section, I revisit the literature on growth-producing relationships, contextualized
teaching and teachers as professionals, and performance-based pay incentives, through an RCT
lens. In addition, I discuss and summarize what I have learned and how it connects or adds
values to existing research.
The overall principle of RCT is to cultivate growth producing relationships amongst
ourselves and our students. For all intents and purposes, RCT is antithetical to the current state of
education, as it stands in direct contrast to new professionalism and neoliberalism, which
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transforms educators into purveyors of one-size fits all content, and decontextualizes our
practices and relationships. As my research suggests, the observation rubric and their own
preoccupation with summative evaluation scores were conditioning teachers to perform
differently, push aside and sometimes rule against their professional judgment, and perform in
prescribed ways. Additionally, my research puts forward the idea that evaluators and evaluatees
were pitted against each other due to the competing demands of their positions within the
evaluation system. Therefore, two groups of individuals whose cooperation is vital to the success
of our students were at odds with each other within this school environment. In this section, I
discuss how the tenets of RCT—a theoretical framework based mainly in mental health
professions—fit into education and help to tell the story of what happened at the study site,
especially in the areas of growth-producing relationships, contextualized teaching and teachers as
professionals, and performance-based pay incentives.
As a reminder, RCT is comprised of six major tenets, all of which were in direct contrast
to what I saw taking place our school, whereby the observation rubric and cold feedback made
warm and nurturing relationships less possible. RCT espousess growth in connection which
guides environments that help cultivate this. However, as my research suggests, our current
school environment worked against this dynamic as evidenced by interactions between
evaluators and those whom they evaluated, as well as the decisions made by participants during
the study. Without the strong relationship of trust and mutuality between evaluators and those
whom they evaluated that Jordan (2010) postulated, the systems and its accompanying rubric
created an environment that negatively impacted the practices of teachers. Consequently,
teachers were recreated as purveyors of content who placed their own judgment and expertise on
the backburner.
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In addition, RCT postulates that individuals will struggle to be successful in their fields
without adhering to the five good things (Jordan, 2008) previously described in the literature
review. From my study findings, all five good things were under attack at our work site;
therefore, educators and those who evaluated them became adversaries. A sense of zest (1) and
the capacity to be creative and productive (4) were lost on participants when their teaching
arsenal was no longer available due to their evaluators’ focus on compliance measures.
Moreover, clarity about oneself (2) and a sense of personal worth (3) were skewed when, more
than ever, our value was judged solely on our summative evaluation scores from year to year.
And, lastly, the desire for connection (5) was brought to a halt when evaluators proceeded to—
out of necessity—enforce the narrow standards of observation rubrics and educators focused
solely on surviving personally and financially.
In the section to follow, I explore how important elements of our learning environment
are negatively affected when RCT’s major tenets are restricted and its five good things are
missing from our daily work.
Growth-Producing Relationships
In my study, I set out to explore what administrators could do to support teachers within
accountability systems. Virtually all recommendations seemingly came back to the lack of
growth-producing relationships due to the system. Therefore, it was important to review the
status of connections and relationships between evaluators and those whom they evaluate
through an RCT lens.
It was apparent throughout the literature and the study that as educators were held to
narrow standards and important school-level decisions were based on data from formal
observations and yearly summative evaluations (which only made up a small percentage of their
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overall body of work in the classroom), both teachers and administrators began to withdraw from
their relationships with their evaluators (Ball, 2003, 2016; Evetts, 2011; Jordan, 2000a; Kallio &
Kallio, 2012; Lewis & Olshansky, 2017; Raider-Roth, 2017; Zeichner, 2010). All participants, as
the evaluation system and the scores assigned to us began to take precedence over our everyday
work, became fearful of the tools used to quantify and sort us. That fear extended to those who
were entrusted by district decision-makers to evaluate us with new tools; hence, evaluators and
evaluatees were placed in adversarial roles where our success was in direct contrast to the
marching orders of our evaluators. This included not just the relationships between teachers and
administrators but also any relationship between those who had to be evaluated and those with
evaluative power. All of these relationships were severely damaged by this system.
As Freedberg (2007) reminds us, RCT advances the idea that relationships and
connections play a major role in social contexts, as the basic tenets of this theory inspire growthfostering practices and supports. It was evident during the study that everyday interactions
between staff and administrators affected the morale and instructional decisions of teachers—and
these effects were mostly negative (Cohen, 2014; Freedberg, 2007; Jordan, 2000a).
Opportunities presented by some evaluators for administrators and teachers to dialogue in nonevaluative and inclusive settings fostered a sense of vulnerability in participants. In turn, this
vulnerability—an openness to being critiqued—that RCT mentions as vital to growth, heightened
the level of feedback given by evaluators to evaluatees and how that feedback was implemented
(Freedberg, 2007; Miller, 2010a). Leaders who were effective in nurturing a positive working
and learning environment enhanced the professional environment for all as much as possible,
although, at times, they too fell into their roles as agents of the system. Although we valued the
authentic attempts by some evaluators to step out of the traditional power structure and build
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positive relationships with staff, which are vital to the success of all stakeholders, the lack of
empathy and flexibility of administrators generally in dealing with teachers impacted the quality
of our effort and our instructional choices (Cohen, 2014; Freedberg, 2007; Jordan, 2000a).
Examples were abundant in the study pertaining to administrators who struggled to gain our
respect, support, and trust because they led out of fear. Unfortunately, maintaining power by
means of establishing barriers to prevent change (for example, evaluators withdrawing from
connections with evaluatees), became the default position for most administrators tasked with
fostering compliance and—whether they were aware of it or not—recreating us.
This removal from growth-fostering relationships along with a heightened focus on
compliance, were key components in recreating us as educators. According to the RCT
framework, it is imperative for teachers and administrators to focus on respectful relationships
and attempt to create systems that enhance and support this way of being, as these connections
will lay the foundation for how students are taught. Unfortunately, new professionalism’s
attempts to recreate us as educators put evaluators and evaluatees at odds with each other—rather
than working together for the common good of student growth. Since it is clear from the findings
that we had started to become the educational clerks that neoliberals have strived for, albeit with
some attempts to offer everyday resistance, there is more reason for administrators and teachers
to find a balance between personal/professional convictions and decisions when trying to bring
the ultimate focus back to students via instructional decisions (Cochran-Smith, 2001; Cohen,
2014; Lewis & Olshansky, 2017; Raider-Roth, 2017). Unfortunately, this is not an easy task and
needs to be further examined. Building on the work of Miller (2010b), those in power
(administrators) need to understand that providing teachers with more power through
connections does not diminish their own power—it only heightens their potential effectiveness in
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their roles. Regrettably, because administrators are cogs in the high stakes evaluation wheel, their
adherence to compliance measures will still trump their ability to foster growth-focused
relationships, as they too must answer to the ultimate power brokers: those reworking education
behind school doors. In the end, we are all suffering, even when pockets of positive interactions
advanced by RCT are in place in our schools. We need to do what we can to promote these small
pockets of RCT-inspired environments and create ripple effects in as many classrooms, schools,
districts as possible.
In addition to a lack of growth-producing relationships with our evaluators, the study’s
findings offer a window into how the pressures and scrutiny of the evaluation system used at the
study site led to damaged relationships with our students. For example, teachers and
administrators regularly made decisions that did not help our students and, at times, even hurt
them. Although current empirical research highlights the effectiveness of accountability systems
and performance-based pay on student outcomes (Dee & Wyckoff, 2013; Firestone, 2014;
Harvey, 2014), these studies tend to ignore the unintended consequences for teachers, which, in
turn, affects students (for example, teachers gaming the system; Jabbar, 2013). Our professional
and financial well-being were at stake and, in the face of complex and competing relationship
demands, we did all we could to maintain our integrity and personal/professional well-being, as
well as resist performance and rewards cultures.
When policies and systems thrusted upon educators create the expectation that the
purpose of the U.S. public school system is to create human capital out of students, both
educators’ and students’ growth is stunted. (Cohen, 2014; Freedberg, 2007; Miller, 2010a). In
these circumstances, educators will place more of an emphasis on maintaining their own
livelihoods than building relationships with students (Cohen, 2014; Freedberg, 2007; Miller,
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2010a). In the study, we see both teachers and administrators, when pushed to this edge, making
decisions no longer based on students’ well-being but on their own professional statuses and
financial well-being. The bottom line, our students—lower income, minority students in a
poverty-stricken school district—suffered in our attempts to fight back against a system that took
away our professional judgment and downplayed our expertise.
To summarize, high stakes accountability systems have done more harm than good to
relationships (Evetts, 2009; Jabbar, 2013). This pattern was clearly evident in the school district
that served as site of the study, where relationships between administrators, teachers, and
students were severely damaged to the point where they may not ever recover due to the levels of
fear and pressure faced on a daily basis. Consequently, our students, rather than being the clients
we are called upon to serve, became the means to an end. More often than not, we chose
instructional strategies to meet indicators on a rubric—not to benefit our students. Lastly, when
feeling frustrated by how our evaluators treated us as they implemented an unforgiving system,
we scaled back our efforts in the classroom and did not give our all. In the end, growthproducing relationships in a nurturing learning environment are becoming harder to create and
sustain under current circumstances.
Contextualized Teaching and Teachers as Professionals
As my findings put forward, the reforms of the new professionalism movement are in
direct opposition to the notion of teachers as professionals and contextualized teaching and
learning. First and foremost, I recognize that both proponents and opponents of neoliberalism
and new professionalism agree that educators need to close the achievement gap (Cochran-Smith
& Villegas, 2015). To researchers such as Talbot and McLaughlin (2002) and Schoenfeld (1998),
in order to close the achievement gap for our students, significant attention needed to be given to
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the effects of the policies on contexts of practice, as well as the evolution of teachers as
professionals—not on outcomes or additional motivation. Unfortunately, as Florio stated in
2002, the sense of urgency to close the achievement gap limited rather than opened our teaching
repertoire. Consequently, the great strides of the 1970s and 1980s to close the achievement gap
by shifting teaching from a behaviorist model of transmission to a constructivist model of active
and meaningful learning were stymied at this study site by the policies and procedures which
focused on inputs over processes (Cochran-Smith & Villegas, 2015). As my research indicates,
these efforts to recreate us disregarded the prior knowledge learners brought to the classroom and
the efforts made by teachers to adapt to this knowledge base in favor of regimentation of practice
(Cochran-Smith & Villegas, 2015). In turn, as Florio (2002) postulated and my research
suggests, we fell prey to research and policies that had limited understanding of the complexities
of teaching and learning.
The idea of teaching being a contextualized practice has gotten lost with neoliberalism
and new professionalism. Instead of following the ideas of Darling-Hammond and Snyder (1999)
who pushed for flexibility in teachers’ instructional decisions and an appreciation of diverse
contexts, my study suggests that we became further entrenched in the mandates and policies of
the system. Rather than supporting the coming together of policy-makers and educators to build
capacity and potentially end the achievement gap (Darling-Hammond & Snyder, 1999), we
followed and enforced routines instead of focusing on sophisticated classroom strategies
Neoliberalism and new professionalism flatten the task of teaching and try to standardize
practices no matter the context. These efforts are not only in direct contrast to the literature on
contextualized teaching but they are also counter to RCT’s five good things, as zest for our work,
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our feelings of personal worth, and our ability to be creative are squashed by attempts to create a
one size fits all model.
This disconnection from contextualized teaching, in turn, led us to feeling that our
professional judgment and expertise was no longer valued; hence, we were less professionals and
more purveyors of content and skills. As Ingersoll and Collins (2018) put forward, schools lack
the true characteristics of a professional workplace because we have been afforded less selfgovernance over our work. As my study suggests, we felt disengaged, insecure, and powerless
against the onslaught of new professionalism; therefore, we exercised our professional judgment
less and began to follow rote methods more. Unfortunately, policies and procedures and a focus
on adherence to a behaviorist-inspired observation rubric stopped teachers and administrators at
the study site from focusing on the deepening, refining, and extending of our subject matter and
practices over time that Feiman-Nemser (2001) considered critical for success. And since, as
Ingersoll and Collins (2018) and the National Commission on Teaching and America’s Future
(NCTAF;1996) proposed, the strongest positive effects in education are tied to teachers’
authority, autonomy, and decision-making influence, it is not at all surprising that the
environment diminished these characteristics.
Performance-Based Pay Incentives
As I outlined in Chapter Two, school districts throughout the country have made attempts
to implement performance-based systems throughout the 20th Century (Dee & Wyckoff, 2013;
Firestone, 2014; Goldhaber, et al., 2008; Johnson & Papay, 2009; Lavy, 2007; Springer, 2009;
Stedman & McCallion, 2001). In addition, the vast majority of school districts adopting
performance-based pay incentive systems are low-income, urban school districts like the one that
served as the study site (Atterby & Mangan, 2020; Firestone, 2014; Goldhaber, 2008; Ingersoll,
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2007; Murnane & Steele, 2007). To reiterate, prior to the advent of NCLB in 2001, these
incentive systems either failed or were unsustainable for a variety of reasons, most notably firm
opposition from teachers’ unions, issues with procedures and implementation, lack of money,
and the lack of objective and consistent evaluation systems (Dee & Wyckoff, 2013; Firestone,
2014; Goldhaber, et al., 2008; Johnson & Papay, 2009; Lavy, 2007; Springer, 2009; Stedman &
McCallion, 2001). In the two decades since the authorization of NCLB, performance-based pay
has been reborn in a prominent way, with the aim to improve teacher quality (Dee & Wyckoff,
2013; Firestone, 2014; Harvey, 2014; Heneman, et al., 2013; Ingersoll, 2007; Lavy, 2007; Weiss
& McGuinn, 2016; Stedman & McCallion, 2001). In addition, since the dawn of RTTP in 2009,
performance-based pay, for the first time, has been tied to more formal and robust teacher
evaluation systems and VAM (Firestone, 2014; Goldhaber, et al., 2008; Ingersoll, 2007;
Murnane & Steele, 2007). It should be noted that even economic literature on which educational
policy has been based, acknowledges that performance-based pay is highly problematic to
implement in “knowledge-intensive areas” such as education, mainly due to lack of control of
relevant variables, including student’s home-life, the imperfections and/or cultural bias inherent
in standardized tests, and the overall inability of schools to choose their client (the student;
Kallio & Kallio, 2012). Additionally, there is an embedded inequity in their implementation, as
these systems are very rarely—if ever—put in place in suburban or affluent school systems
(Atterby & Mangan, 2020; Firestone, 2014; Goldhaber, 2008; Ingersoll, 2007; Murnane &
Steele, 2007). Therefore, the notion that teachers need extra incentives to work in or work harder
at low-income, urban school districts is appalling. Those of us who participated in this study
cared about our students and did not need additional compensation to make us work any harder.
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As my study shows, although performance-based pay offered educators opportunities to
earn additional compensation on a yearly basis, the unintended outcomes outweighed its benefits.
First and foremost, to secure performance-based pay study participants had to perform in ways
that contradicted their professional judgment, and relationships were undermined. In a profession
where most educators claim to have a calling to do well by their students, it is disheartening to
push aside teachers’ professional judgment and autonomy over instructional decisions, in favor
of dictated curriculum and instructional strategies made by someone in a faraway locale. Second,
power shifted in favor of administrators who had complete authority over pay. As this happened,
we became guarded with what we shared with our evaluators, especially those we felt may not
have had our best interest in mind. Consequently, as RCT postulates, lack of trust and
vulnerability with evaluators hurts the school’s ability to change and/or be successful.
Moreover, administrators were seen as agents of a system that educators in the study
began to despise. My findings are aligned with the work of others, particularly opponents of
performance-based pay such as Lavy (2007), as well as Stedman and McCallion (2001), who
suggested that the use of extrinsic rewards in education would most likely be counterproductive,
as we shifted from focusing on the needs of our students to concentrating on our own needs.
Simply put, performance-based pay, when tied to high stakes accountability systems, damages
educators and their students by placing the focus of attention adhering to narrow standards and
observation rubric indicators.
Ironically, at the completion of this study, the school district serving as the site for my
research eliminated performance-based pay. Unlike past failures of performance-based pay
systems, the lack of formal evaluation systems or issues with processes and procedures were not
cited for its nullification; rather, the lack of money and firm opposition from the teachers’ union
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were the reasons given by both the superintendent of schools and the aforementioned teachers’
union. As we suggested in the study, the number of highly-effective teachers increased on a
yearly basis given our familiarity with the teacher evaluation rubric—and adherence to it—and
the evaluative approach of administrators. As a result, the district had to pay out significantly
more money on a yearly basis than they budgeted. And, in an impoverished, urban school district
where budget cuts are a major talking point every year, further payouts of performance-based
pay could potentially cost teachers (union members) their jobs when the district is faced with a
budget shortfall. Unfortunately, the announcement of the end of performance-based pay in the
school district eliminated any opportunities to obtain additional pay, as traditional outlets for
enhanced salary guide movement, such as obtaining a master’s degree, had been eliminated in
the previous labor contract and did not return when performance-based pay ceased. Therefore,
the onslaught on the professionalism of teachers continued.
The reaction of participants to the elimination of performance-based pay is very complex
to unpack. Both teachers and administrators in this study loathed the oppressive culture of the
performance-based pay incentives because it forced them to change the way they made
educational decisions—especially when we put our own well-being in play with the needs of our
students. However, participants were also enraged by the elimination of performance-based
incentives because it was the only outlet they had to attain additional pay, as the pay increases
for attaining an advanced degree which were eliminated with the advent of performance-based
pay were not returned. Therefore, at play was the further erosion of teachers as professionals and
the continuation of the push by neoliberal advocates to turn educators into nothing more than
transmitters of content with less opportunities for the fair pay of which they were entitled.
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The study suggests that performance-based pay did ultimately succeed in reworking
educators as per the neoliberal agenda. The district, in its attempts to improve standardized test
scores, change its image, and lure quality educators to its schools, implemented a monetary
rewards system. However, the dangling of the low-hanging fruit coupled with what study
participants labeled systematic poor treatment of teachers, led us to seek the rewards, but at a
cost. To ensure compliance with district-sponsored curricula and instructional strategies,
monetary rewards were tied to evaluation scores. In addition, most district evaluators completed
formal observations with a laser-like focus on observation rubric indicators. Consequently, in
order to meet performance-based pay requirements, and because they were irritated that fair
professional pay was not available and other hoops had to be jumped to gain additional monetary
rewards, teachers in the district played the game and allowed themselves to be reworked. These
decisions to play the game changed them as educators and negatively affected students who
became pawns in the system.
As I stated in Chapter Two, most of the research on performance-based-pay focuses on:
1) how students perform on standardized tests when their teachers are given the opportunity to
obtain monetary rewards; and, 2) teacher recruitment and retention rates. My findings, however,
highlight unintended consequences of performance-based pay that need to be taken into account
when schools consider implementing it as a cornerstone of their evaluation systems. To most, the
ability to obtain additional pay for highly effective work seems like a reasonable and positive
way to boost school morale and increase productivity. However, my findings suggest that this
line of thinking is faulty. First, as Ball and Olmedo (2013) have previously argued, it demeans
teachers by forcing them to meet, at times, highly unattainable goals and assumes that they alone
are the ultimate reason for the success or failure of their students. Beyond this, as my study
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shows, it places students in harm’s way because when educators feel underappreciated and over
scrutinized, they will do all they can to meet the necessary professional objectives to obtain
monetary rewards, even when this involves making unethical decisions not in the best interests
of students. Additionally, it changes the relationships between administrators and teachers since
growth-fostering connections are replaced by relationships built around inspection, quantifying,
and sorting. In brief, performance-based pay theorists and researchers need to attend not only to
teacher retention/recruitment and student performance on standardized tests but also to the
unintended consequences of enacting these systems.
Recommendations and Implications for Practice and Theory
In this section of Chapter Five, I present recommendations, as well as implications for
future research. Although small pockets of positive stories and efforts to avoid being recreated as
educators were evident in the study, my overall findings highlight the significant number of
negative effects that high stakes accountability systems had on participants. I discuss
recommendations aimed at teachers, district and school administrators, and policy makers.
Lastly, I present and implications for the study site and recommendations for future research.
Recommendations for Teachers
Reclaim the profession. Teachers have lost the ability to exercise their professional
judgment at the level they have in the past. Second, they have been forced to implement
curriculum and instructional strategies that do not take into account the need for contextualized
learning. Third, they have been asked to work harder for additional money with less available
resources and a more adversarial relationship with their evaluators. Lastly, they have been forced
into pushing aside the best interests of their students—impoverished minority students at the
study site—in their attempts to maintain their jobs and potentially attain performance-based pay
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incentives. Therefore, it is seemingly a difficult task to reclaim their profession, especially when
evaluators hold power over their livelihoods. However, at least outside of the formal observation
process, teachers still have the ability to exercise their professional judgment and bring meaningmaking into their lessons. Teachers must adhere to compliance measures and rubrics when they
are formally observed and evaluated; however, outside of formal observations, teachers have the
opportunity to push the envelope and be more creative than they can be within the walls of
pressurized accountability proceedings. These attempts to reclaim the profession can be the
confidence-boosts teachers need to take creative control back in their classrooms and potentially
attempt to implement during formal observations. The (re)gaining of confidence in their
professional judgment could be the springboard to conversations with their evaluators about what
(potentially) works better in their context during and outside of formal observations.
Do not forget that students matter. Although the opportunities to have summers off and
having earlier than normal work hours may have driven some into the profession, it is safe to say
that the vast majority of us educators went down this career path to positively affect the lives of
children. Unfortunately, the push and pull of new professionalism has put teachers in the most
tenuous of circumstances (for example, easier outlets to remove tenure and less guaranteed
income) that the profession has ever seen. As my study presented, it is easy for teachers to fall
into the trap of worrying about their personal and professional well-being and pushing aside the
needs of our students to insure acceptable yearly performance on yearly summative evaluations.
However, although it may be difficult in the sea of heightened accountability and job/financial
security to veer away from strictly following rubric requirements, teachers need to continue to
fight for those that have the smallest say in their education: their students. If teachers on-the-
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ground do not first and foremost stand up for what is right for their students in their classrooms,
who else will?
Unify in numbers. Teachers need to realize that they are not alone and that there is
power in numbers. By working together with union leadership, like the teachers at the study site
did in pushing for the abolishment of performance-based pay incentives, teachers have the ability
to affect positive change by, for example, fighting for fair pay. Teachers will, regardless of what
their evaluators and policy-makers say, have the most in-depth knowledge of what is happening
in classrooms and what needs to be done to benefit their students; therefore, it is up to them to
work together collectively and push for change when anything egregious is taking place in their
schools. Pushing for fair pay, fair evaluations of their work, respect for their professionalism, and
respect for the specific needs of their individual contexts will be more effective in larger,
organized numbers than via individual pockets of resistance.
Recommendations for District and School Administrators
Push back against the status quo for the sake of the profession. My findings suggest
that the field of education is at a critical point. The onerous high stakes accountability systems
that prevails today in school districts throughout the U.S. operate on the faulty reasoning that
streamlining educational practices and eliminating professional judgment is for the betterment of
both educators and students. Therefore, district and school administrators need to join with the
teachers whom they supervise and evaluate and push back against the systems that unfairly
evaluate and sort evaluatees. I hope that school leaders, especially those with evaluative power,
will heed the words of the study participants—as well as the staff they supervise and evaluate—
and fight back against the cold and unforgiving systems that are gradually reworking educators.
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Below, I recommend two ways district and school leaders can push back on these high stakes
systems.
Systems of compliance need to be reconsidered. First, it is extremely important that
administrators, when working with and evaluating educators, not let compliance factors get in
the way of creating growth-fostering relationships with staff members. In reviewing the small
pockets of successful administrator-teacher connections, the most noticeable element was
conversations/relationships that addressed the issue of compliance but held firm to the notion
that good teaching, as well as authentic interactions and feedback, were of the utmost
importance. Rather than having compliance dictate the interactions between administrators and
teachers, authentic and open dialogue that promotes teachers’ usage of their professional
judgment should be at the forefront of these interactions. And in the face of the heightened
workload administrators now have (for example, detailed requirements for maintaining building
safety and security; and, stringent time frames and reporting requirements for allegations of
harassment, intimidation, and bullying) this is not an easy task. However, by implementing a
high level of organization and never wavering from the sanctity of instructional feedback,
administrators can take small steps to ensure that teachers receive undivided attention and
poignant feedback in writing and in person. It is the duty of district and school leaders, who are
tasked with observing and evaluating the teachers on the ground, to get systems of compliance
reconsidered before they further erode the profession and further remove the small pockets of
time available to build deep connections with staff whose livelihoods they control. Just as
teachers have begun to speak up and resist their direct evaluators, so too must district and school
leaders speak about these concerns and resist when interacting with their own evaluators—even
in the face of pushback.
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Professional judgment and expertise should be embraced—not shunned. Next, although it
sounds very basic, the professional judgment and expertise of educators should be encouraged in
schools and should drive instructional decisions. For far too long, educators have had their
instructional and curricular decisions dictated to them by individuals in distant locales who may
never have taught the subject area or grade level in question. Therefore, it is paramount that
educators be given back creative control and the ability to shape their curriculum and units of
instruction based on their knowledge, know-how, and expertise. District and school leaders need
to support these efforts not only because educational decisions should be driven more by
individuals who know the context, content, grade levels, and students they are teaching, but also
because of the energy and enthusiasm that autonomy and creative control brings back to
individuals who have craved and yearned it for so long. A simple first step for district and school
leaders is to shift the focus away from compliance and indicators and allow teachers to be
creative and have fun with the material. At this point, if a teacher needs to improve, the feedback
from the administrator comes from a place of support and growth rather than inspection and
quantifying.
Recommendations for Policy Makers
After nearly a decade operating under pressurized and objective evaluations systems, it is
time to rethink the usage of accountability systems which dehumanize and deprofessionalize
educators. Below, I present recommendations for policy makers to: stop reworking educators
into clerks; eliminate student performance from teacher evaluations; and replace rewards systems
with systems that respect educators.
Respect teachers as able professionals. Alternatively, my study suggests growing
evidence that high stakes accountability systems have been destructive to education. Neoliberal
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attempts to rework educators into clerks who follow the scripts of faraway policy-makers, have
significantly hurt our ability to educate students (Evetts, 2009; Jabbar, 2013; Raider-Roth, 2017;
Zeichner, 2010). As I previously discussed, participants in my study became singularly
concerned with meeting compliance requirements to ensure our own professional and personal
livelihood—and that is not why the vast majority of educators entered into this profession. What
has been lost within high stakes systems of accountability is the everyday work of educators. As
a reminder, this study took place in New Jersey and, at the time of the publication of this
dissertation, 85% of yearly summative evaluations of teachers in non-SGP schools are based on
between one and three observations depending on tenure status or classification (teacher,
administrator, or educational specialist). These observations range from 20 to 40 minutes each.
Thus, yearly evaluations—and the livelihood of those evaluated—are based on anywhere from
20 to 120 minutes of an entire school year. For those of us doing the math, if you consider that a
teacher teaches 200 minutes per day (five periods of 40 minutes each) and multiply that by 180
school days, you would end up with 36,000 minutes per year. Hence, under the current
evaluation system, 0.05% to 0.33% of a teacher’s performance throughout the entire school year
determines their yearly evaluation score. As we move forward operating within this system,
policy makers at the local, state, and national levels need to keep in mind these numbers and
implement ways for educators to have their evaluations consist of more than just the glimpses in
time that formal observations provide. Many observation systems such as Stronge allow teachers
to submit additional evidence beyond what is happening during the formal observation.
Nevertheless, it is important that policy makers take a step back and see that quantifiable scores
from formal observations are based on such a small percentage of teachers’ actual work years
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that is virtually impossible (and unfair) to, under current circumstances, to make high stakes
decisions based on these small segments of instruction.
Eliminate student performance from teacher evaluations. Teachers play an important
role in the success—or lack thereof—of their students. However, it is absurd to directly tie the
progress/growth of students to the summative evaluations of teachers when there are so many
additional factors such as economic statuses and family situations which play critical parts in a
child’s education. For example, an important finding during this study was the system gaming
that took place when utilizing SGOs, which currently account for 15% of teachers’ summative
evaluations. To recap, SGOs are created by teachers grading either teacher-created or districtcreated pre-assessments, developing attainable goals in conjunction with their principal or his/her
designee, administering a post-assessment, and comparing the results of the post-assessment to
the pre-assessment. Throughout the process, as I outlined in Chapter Four, the opportunity for
system gaming takes place whereby both teachers and students (and, in some cases,
administrators) work together to ensure that everyone is successful. And, to reiterate, these SGO
scores make up 15% of the summative evaluations that are used to both rate educators and make
high stakes decisions. Moreover, although this study focused on high school teachers who did
not receive an SGP like their grades 3-8 teaching counterparts, we cannot overlook the inequity
of those teachers having student growth—or lack thereof—on standardized tests factored into
high stakes decisions affecting their livelihoods. Based on the role that multiple elements at play
in a child’s schooling, the absurdity of using standardized tests given over 1-3 days in a yearly
evaluation, and the lack of validity of SGOs described previously, policy makers need to
reconsider the inclusion of student performance in future summative evaluation scoring.
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For a school district with poor standardized test scores, we should assume that locallycreated tests would be welcomed with open arms by all stakeholders and expect highly effective
teachers to have students perform well on tests they construct (Darling-Hammond, et. al., 2012).
Unfortunately, the system gaming involved in the pre and post test process was flawed and
skewed by the high stakes nature of the system, whereby students, teachers, and administrators
worked together to succeed, thus tainting the results. Therefore, the initial intent of implementing
VAM-like measures into composite evaluation scores and the expectation that great teachers will
undoubtedly improve student performance was tarnished at the study site.
Replace rewards systems with systems that respect educators. Performance-based pay
was implemented in the teacher evaluation system of the school which served as the study site
from 2013-2018. As a struggling, urban school district, the point of its implementation was to
increase teachers’ incentives to perform better in the classroom which, in turn, would hopefully
improve students’ performance on standardized tests. In addition, it was believed that
improvement on standardized test scores would assist the school district in regaining local
control. At the conclusion of the 2017-2018 school year, the district had paid out approximately
$750,000 in additional salary due to individuals attaining highly-effective statuses; however, the
standardized test results remained much the same, with slight increases. The main reason for the
elimination of performance-based pay was the financial cliff that the district continued to face—
and the paying out of additional pay for teachers being rated highly effective did not help.
However, the findings of the study highlight that this monetary rewards system was doomed to
fail from the start. Whether it was teachers teaching directly to the observation rubric to obtain a
highly-effective rating, not going above and beyond the call of duty after the formal observations
for the year were completed, or discussing one’s performance in the classroom in relation to
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indicators on a rubric rather than in the interest of growth in the profession, performance-based
opportunities did more harm than good.
To recap, my research suggests the absurdity of the decision to implement a monetary
rewards system. As a reminder, the district that serves as the study site is a struggling school
district under nearly three decades of state control. This district has poor standardized test scores,
dilapidated buildings, limited funding for instructional resources, a transient population of staff
members, and a poor reputation to anyone on the outside. To improve student performance and
the district as a whole, the district decided to have its educators work harder—not smarter—to
meet narrow goals in a tedious accountability system. And, by doing this, teachers could
potentially obtain monetary rewards by making compliance-driven decisions, no longer in the
best interests of students. In addition, to attract other individuals to come work in the district,
rather than a promotional campaign to improve its image or utilizing available funds to rectify
the above-mentioned struggles, it lures candidates to its schools via extrinsic rewards. It is safe to
say that performance-based pay was a debacle in this school district and, even after its
elimination, still affects the district via the collateral damage it inflicted. Therefore, I recommend
that, rather than school districts providing monetary rewards, they should support professional
labor and fair pay. Pay teachers a fair salary, provide them with what they need to be successful,
and stop micromanaging their every move. The only place where monetary rewards should ever
be available in education is for the completion of additional duties, such as rewriting a
curriculum for a particular grade level—and not in high stakes accountability decisions and
summative evaluations.
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Implications for the Study Site
Future PAR studies may provide additional spaces for authentic conversations to examine
the everyday work of teachers and administrators within similar evaluation. These conversations,
in turn, can lead to concrete action steps to potentially change how we support and evaluate
teachers and administrators. My dissertation suggests that there is much work to be done to push
back against the reworking of educators into clerks—and this is truly site-dependent. In some
instances, PAR studies conducted in school districts may be the final push to make substantial
change in a particular context or system. However, in other cases, such as the site in which my
study was conducted, PAR can serve as a springboard to begin the process of changing how we
support and evaluate teachers and administrators. In the case of my former school, which served
as the site of the study, it was and continues to be an anomaly in the school district; therefore,
although our unique efforts were gradually recognized during and after my leadership as school
principal, these attempts are still nowhere near the norm in the school district. It was my hope,
and it remains the hope of Simon, the current principal, that our efforts at the study site will
inspire other schools to take similar small steps to fight back against a cold and unrelenting
system looking to forever change the profession. Since change has to start somewhere, PAR
studies such as this one serve as an example of how on-the-ground efforts to engage in
conversations in a non-evaluative setting are one small step for schools, especially those
thoroughly embedded into the compliance-driven nature of high stakes evaluation systems.
Recommendations for Future Research
In addition, this study suggests that administrators, like teachers, feel the pull of
heightened accountability measures and are forced to weigh personal/ professional convictions,
as well as numerous relationships, when making daily decisions. Therefore, the field of
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education can benefit from an exploration of the on-the-ground efforts of administrators who
play dual observation roles (evaluator/evaluatee) in these systems of heightened accountability,
as our voices deserve to be heard.
Lastly, this study suggests implications for new professionalism. New professionalism is
ingrained in federal, state, and local educational systems with no end to its reign over our
educational decisions in sight. Old professionalism was not perfect and was never free of
oversight from evaluators through formal observations and evaluations; however, the change is
how the larger community views this supervision and its effect on the professionals themselves
as there is now an expectation of a direct correlation between teacher performance and student
performance on standardized tests (Weiner, 2020). Currently, this oversight is embedded in the
neoliberal position of inspection and assessment (Weiner, 2020). Recently, Weiner (2020)
postulated that educators would benefit from moving away from an “either/or” mentality towards
professionalism and embracing the idea of a “nuanced professionalism”—one where the
elements of old and new professionalism are woven together. Although Weiner (2020) suggested
that the work of educators has shifted to that of educational clerks/new professionals, the true
impact of this shift is how educators now internalized their roles and how this new
internalization affects their daily decisions (Torres & Weiner, 2018), which, most notably, puts
administrators and teachers at odds with each other. Current research presents mixed results for
new professionalism’s potential effects on student outcomes (Weiner, 2020). Additionally, the
majority of scholars in the field agree that competition, market forces, standardization, and
accountability have embedded themselves in the profession (Zeichner, 2010); however, school
districts may be mistakenly identifying the wrong teachers for removal and/or rewards (Atteberry
& Mangan, 2020; Paige & Amrein-Beardsley, 2020). Paige and Amrein-Beardsley (2020) also
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postulate that evaluations are becoming linchpins and obstacles in the evaluation processes,
rather than an important ingredient in teacher quality analyses and local instructional planning
decisions.
Conversely, since research in this area is so new, pockets of complicated success stories
need to be taken into account. Stone-Johnson (2014) claimed that younger educators have
accepted this new professionalism, most likely because it is the only system they have ever
known, and potentially because of the concrete nature of expectations. Additionally, Weiner and
Torres (2016, 2018), as well as Moore and Clark (2016), have postulated that at least some
educators embrace inspection and accountability as a means to allow them to meet professional
standards swiftly and efficiently given they provide what is deemed to be clear guidelines for
successful performance during formal observations. Still, it is worth noting that scholars such as
Hall and McGinty (2015) posit that educators who have accepted and embraced the restrictive
elements of performance and rewards cultures have done so mostly out of fear and loss of
autonomy over instructional decision-making.
The current literature on performance and rewards cultures within education focuses on
the effects of teachers on student outcomes—and even that literature is a small sampling at this
time. Despite these early attempts, larger efforts need to be made to move from an examination
of theory to an in-depth examination of how those theories work out in practice, especially
within performance-based settings. Deeper stories of the work and the decisions that educators
make on a daily basis in the wake of the shift from old to new professionalism are very much
needed to assess the potential, lasting impact of this movement. Furthermore, while
administrators are engulfed in this system, minimal research has been conducted to examine and
assess their efforts within performance and rewards cultures. This is a vital component of future
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research since, as Ball (2003) hypothesized, administrators are being labeled as the technicians
of this larger transformation. It is therefore imperative for research to detail the specific ways in
which administrators, not just teachers, are also caught in the ongoing cycle of inspection,
sorting, and ratings—and are not just enforcers of the system’s edicts. It is paramount to capture
the nature and role of all educators within the system in order to help us meet the changing and
varied needs of all stakeholders (Weiner, 2020). As Atteberry and Mangan (2020) argued,
studies that carefully consider the implications of relying on quantitative data to characterize the
yearly work of teachers and administrators are needed.
Limitations of the Study
PAR is a value laden form of qualitative research, particularly because it is a catalyst for
changes to broader societal concerns and challenges in possibly non-responsive institutions, such
as education (Herr & Anderson, 2015). As such, my aim as a researcher was to break down the
barriers of traditional researcher-subject power relationships and create a setting where
participants wanted to come together for the common good of the location and profession (Herr
& Anderson, 2015). As a result of this fostering of empowering relationships, I aimed for all
stakeholders to develop the knowledge and consciousness necessary to reflect upon and operate
within the technical and social dimensions of their daily instructional practice (Tripp, 1990).
The findings represent an analysis of the dialogue (written and verbal) between seven
teachers and two administrators serving in a Northern New Jersey high school. Therefore, my
study gives a glimpse into the everyday interactions between administrators and teachers, both of
whom were evaluated within systems of accountability and had the opportunity to obtain
performance-based pay incentives. Additionally, for these teachers and administrators, being
provided with an opportunity to dialogue in a non-evaluative setting, such as a PLC, had actually
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been the norm for nearly three years. Therefore, despite the aforementioned limitations, the
findings from this study site have the potential to be the springboard to change for a nonresponsive institution as the district it is located in, contribute to our understanding of how
teachers make educational decisions on a daily basis while operating within performance and
rewards cultures, and to help us identify the ways in which administrators can better support
teachers not just during formal observations, but within their daily work.
Conclusion
During this PAR study, I attempted to analyze and comprehend the everyday decisions of
educators teaching and leading within systems of heightened accountability and rewards culture.
My study involved seven members of the school where I previously served as principal, along
with myself and the school’s principal, who had previously served as vice principal. All
participants were members of the teaching staff who had previously participated in and/or led
PLC sessions similar to the sessions that served as the basis for my data collection. These
participants chose to participate in order to engage in an authentic conversation about our current
conditions. Participants relished the opportunity to describe the efforts of evaluators, whom they
perceived to embrace top-down management styles that reinforced efforts to recreate us into
educational clerks. To boot, they also chose to participate in this study because of the mutually
empowering relationship that we developed during my time as the school’s principal.
Overall, the data points to the idea that educators are being pushed and pulled into
becoming educational clerks (Raider-Roth, 2017) by the policies and tools established and
implemented by neoliberal decision-makers. This push and pull, in turn, affected our overall
psyche and decision-making, led us to resist in the best ways we could, and caused much
collateral damage—particularly to the relationships between educators and evaluators, and to the
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well-being of our students. Simply put, educators and the profession are being eroded by systems
currently in place. The insight I gained from my fellow study participants and my own
introspection offers a fascinating look into the decision-making processes of human beings, who
are facing an all-out attack on their profession while trying to: do their jobs well, ensure their
own professional and financial security, and do right by the students for whom they are
responsible.
In closing, this study had a major impact on me. Going into the investigation, I was naive
in thinking that teachers working in the school where I previously served as principal knew my
own plight while operating in this system of heightened accountability and rewards culture. As a
participant-researcher it was exciting (and upsetting at times) to share my stories as both the
evaluator and evaluated. It was also invigorating to know that fellow study participants, after I
shared my experiences as an evaluatee with them, now observed that their evaluators faced
similar struggles. Moreover, it was illuminating to talk out at length the plight of the negatively
perceived evaluators described in the study, as well as the complexity of our own educational
decision-making. In addition, I am proud—and upset—that my prior angle and opinion of the
effects of systems of heightened accountability, surveillance culture, and rewards culture were
supported by my research. I also am honored that my fellow study participants valued my work
as their school principal enough to give up a Friday afternoon prep period (after I was no longer
their direct evaluator) to meet with me over the course of four months for this study. Lastly, and
most important, I look fondly upon my efforts to break down traditional power structures and
empower fellow study participants to speak their minds about the current system of performance
and rewards cultures—in the hope of curtailing our seemingly inevitable transformation into
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educational clerks and complete erosion of our profession. If we do not fight for ourselves and
push back against systems that we know are meant to forever change the profession, who will?
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